SUO: Re: Ontology, Epistemology, Semiotics
Pierre,
PG> So you are proposing to send platitudes to two mailing
> lists. I doubt Wittgenstein had this concept.
Not platitudes, which are trite sayings, but truths
that are often painful and disturbing. They are the
kinds of things that everybody knows, but many people
refuse to acknowledge them. That was Wittgenstein's point.
PG> I don't know much about Peirce and your parenthetic comment
> makes me doubt. When I say semiology is irrelevant to upper-level
> ontology, does that cover what's relevant to semiology in Peirce then?
The term "semiologie" was by Saussure, and it is the most common
term used by writers who talk about signs from a Saussurean point
of view. Although I think highly of Saussure for what he did
in linguistics, I believe that Peirce's work, which he called
"semeiotic" is both more general and more compatible with
modern logic. In fact, Peirce considered logic to be a special
case of his version of semeiotic. (And he certainly knew modern
logic, since he invented the most widely used notation for
predicate calculus as well as the graphic notation I prefer.)
PG> I wonder if your claim is that we need a social ontology
> module in SUO.
I don't know what you mean by a "social ontology module".
I certainly believe that the SUO must be general enough to
support the categories sufficient for talking about agents
(human, animal, or robots) that interact and communicate.
But the notion of purpose is necessary even if you are
not trying to characterize interacting agents.
As I have said many times, I also believe that the
distinctions from which categories are generated are more
fundamental than the categories themselves. One important
distinction, which Peirce found essential for taking about
signs in general and languages in particular is the triad
of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.
Jon Awbrey has been going through endless online tutorials
about Peirce's triads. But for a brief overview, see
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/categories.html
This is a collection of excerpts from Peirce's writings.
They are not very intelligible by themselves, and it is really
necessary to read more -- such as the papers in the two-volume
"Essential Peirce".
PG> And there is more than intent and purpose in an ontology
> of these domains (you seem to black out completely on physical
> causality).
I am not "blacking out" physical causality. If you want to
know what I think about causality, read my paper:
http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/causal.htm
Processes and Causality
PG> Ontology of chemistry is not a conceptualization of laboratory
> activity. There are precipitations outside laboratories, everyday
> in my toilet bowl for instance. And indeed there is more to
> chemistry than mixing.
Of course. But what distinguishes chemistry from physics is
the methodology for studying and working with certain aspects
of physical reality. The categories of chemistry use some
categories of physics, but they add special categories that
cannot be defined without considering the purpose of the
methods, applications, and restriction of the subject matter.
PG> ... Now we have a relativist medicine which has shown
> death to be normatively bad only from certain perspectives.
Fine. You've proved my point. That just shows that
different purposes lead to different kinds of medicine.
PG> Drugs do not have intend nor purpose, unless there is
> an agent to stick them up their ass. You can talk nearly
> as much about the relationship of a drug to a disease
> as you can of the relationship of a disease to its causes
> without worrying about these.
You're proving my point again. Calcium carbonate is a physical
substance, which has no purpose in itself. But in the pharmacopeia,
it is listed as a drug with several uses: as an antacid, as a
dietary supplement, etc. You cannot define it as a drug without
considering its purpose.
PG> Is there a word then which isn't a disguised synonym for one
> aspect of "purpose"?
Yes, of course. Many words. Examples include "elephant",
"walk", "the", "boy", "is", "slow", "calcium carbonate",
"energy", "universe", "blue", "air", "tree", "ass", etc.
PG> Terms are meaningless and concepts completley useless which
> apply without restrictions. I already made this remark discussing
> a putative predicate SocialEntity which you would seem to apply
> to everything and nothing.
I did not propose that term. You did. All I showed is that
you did not have a clear definition for it.
PG> Recall that Matthew's vocabulary comes from Process Engineering.
> My urinary system was not designed and it has no purpose, although
> it may have a function. Please, don't tell me purpose and function
> are synonymous, you'll soon break my long lasting belief in the
> richness of your mother tongue.
I agree: purpose and function are not synonymous. But every
engineering project, does have a purpose -- and one very common
purpose is to design something whose function is similar to
the function of some naturally occurring system.
But there is a strong similarity, which has raised many
controversies among biologists. As "objective" scientists,
they want to formulate their theories purely in terms
of efficient causes. But biological systems are very
difficult to explain without using words like "purpose".
Any biologist who said "the purpose of the urinary system
is to excrete liquid wastes" would be banished as giving
ammunition to the creationists who are trying to use biology
to prove the existence of God the Creator who is the Grand
Designer of the Universe.
And that is why Peirce introduced his category of Thirdness.
Every instance of purpose or intention is an instance of
Thirdness, but there are things like biological functions,
which are also instances of Thirdness without implying the
existence of some being who had that explicit purpose.
PG> I wish you wouldn't reply that scales can't "be defined
> independently of the purpose or intentions of some agent".
No, you can have scales for temperature, weight, etc.
But "significant" is a close synonym for "meaningful",
and meaning is an example of Thirdness.
John