SUO: Re: Ontology, Epistemology, and Semiotics (was Lifecycle Integration)
> Pierre,
>
> Every means of communication, including every language,
> every notation, and every means of recording, processing,
> or transmitting information, is a semiotic system.
It is hard for me to understand why you would write this chunk of a taxonomy of
semiotic systems in this context.
> JS> But I do want to point out that computer systems are
> > nothing more nor less than giant semiotic tools for
> > processing signs that relate to things in the real world.
> >
> PG> These are implementation issues.
>
> Of course they're implementation issues. The difference
> between mathematics and computer science is implementation.
> And so is the difference between formal linguistics and
> the grammars for particular languages. So what? That
> does not in any way diminish their importance or their
> relevance to the SUO project.
That does not make them more important or relevant to this project either. I'm
not diminishing anything, I'm just drawing a line. This project is a a worthy
endeavour in a narrow subdomain of theoretical KR.
> JS> And as semiotic systems, there are strong similarities between
> > playing basketball and running a business or between erotic
> > theater and the legal system of laws, legislatures, and courts.
> >
> PG> Sure, nice point for a social ontology.
>
> The only conceivable "nonsocial" ontology is theoretical
> physics.
I won't argue on whether it is even meanignful to call theoretical physics an
ontology. The claim makes no sense to me anyway.
There seems to be a wealth of object and processes which are not social, a
wealth of social constructs which include as parts, are related somehow to
(e.g., causally) non social entities, a wealth of social processes which rely
on non social entities and processes. It is as if you took the predicate
SocialEntity to be dissective in various way, most notably mereologically
(parts of social entities are social entities themselves). It is a weird
philosophical claim and a very bad ontological engineering choice.
There are other domains: basic subdomains of biology and medicine (not only
human of course), anatomy, physiology; chemistry; molecular biology; physical
geography and its subdomains; physics and its subdomains, particularly applied
in engineering sciences; mathematics, arguably; and so on and so forth.
I don't see intentionality everywhere, although I agree it is important for
handling interesting parts (domains) of reality.
> As soon as you get to any kind of application
> (including applied physics and engineering), questions
> of purpose and intention are the primary considerations.
Engineering is an interesting case. What you make is never the less a weak
claim, the kinds of purpose and intentions at stake are rather thin and hardly
scale with a social ontology. It seems to me that issues are whetehr the raw
material for manufacturing a piece of an engine ought to be this steel or that
one. Which is about physical properties of the engine and of the prospective
parts. This is what set the constraints, only peripherically what the engine
will be used for, say. I've never heard about a category of steel labelled
'Suitable for building a SUV steel'. But whether a given steel is suitable for
a given use is a problem of solving a number of constraints, there's no
suitability issue in itself.
Now, if you are interested in the enegeneering design activity, in the
relations between the engineering design and the market or in the
organizational structure of a plant, sure, things might get substantially
different on occasions.
> They are the deciding factors in determining what to
> represent and how to represent it.
Even there, from a representation point of view, you don't need no
sophisticated exegesis of social reality, suitability can probably be a stand
alone relation. It's not always clear that you care for expliciting what
suitable for a purpose means.
Pierre/