SUO: Re: Lifecycle Integration Schema
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LIS. Discussion Note 19
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JA = Jon Awbrey
MW = Matthew West
PG = Pierre Grenon
JA: I am just referring to the fact that general theories of signs from
the times of Hippocrates and Aristotle forward have recognized both
the analogies and the differences between "artificial signs", those
that we make, and "natural signs", for example, smoke as a sign of
fire, or laughter as a sign that our delirium is not too serious.
This is a bit of backpropaganda that I'm strutting out here to
reinforce my earlier remarks about the connections among all
types of signs, whether they form in nature or in nurture:
MW: OK. I guess we would see natural signs as consequences.
JA: Physical effects can be natural signs of their objects,
if there is anybody around to interpret them as such,
but consequences come too late to do us much good.
We prefer to get signs in advance of the outcome.
So even in the wild, sign relations, even the
2-adically degenerate ones, are by nature
information-theoretic rather than causal,
even if it always involves some causal
or physical process to embody them.
PG: Semiology and epistemology are relevant only to a small portion
of ontology (e.g., as fields and correlated activities accounted
by a social ontology on a par with basketball playing and erotic
theater). Other than that, this doesn't go further than the dead
end of metatheoretic flourish.
Pierre,
I acknowledge the point of view that the theories of signs, information,
inquiry, and knowledge can be detached from theories of being in itself.
I just no longer find that way of looking at the matter to be much help.
Jon Awbrey
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