SUO: RE: Lifecycle Integration Schema
Dear Jon,
See comments below.
Matthew West
Principal Consultant
Shell Information Technology International Limited
Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
Email: matthew.west@shell.com
Internet: http://www.shell.com
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawbrey@att.net]
> Sent: 02 September 2003 20:01
> To: West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE; SUO
> Subject: Re: Lifecycle Integration Schema
>
>
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> LIS. Discussion Note 8
>
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> Matthew,
>
> Focusing on:
>
> LIS: | possible_individual
> |
> | A <possible_individual> is a <thing> that exists in
> space and time.
> |
> | This includes:
> |
> | - things where any of the space time dimensions are
> | vanishingly small,
> |
> | - those that are either all space for any time,
> | or all time and any space,
> |
> | - the entirety of all space time,
> |
> | - things that actually exist, or have existed,
> |
> | - things that are fictional or conjectured and
> | possibly exist in the past, present or future,
> |
> | - temporal parts (states) of other individuals,
> |
> | - things that have a specific position, but zero extent in
> | one or more dimensions, such as points, lines, and surfaces.
> |
> | In this context existence is based upon being imaginable within
> | some consistent logic, including actual, hypothetical, planned,
> | expected, or required individuals.
> |
> | EXAMPLE. The pump with serial number ABC123,
> | Battersea Power Station, Sir Joseph Whitworth,
> | Shakespeare, and the starship "Enterprise" can be
> | represented by instances of <possible_individual>.
> |
> | EXPRESS specification:
> |
> | ENTITY possible_individual
> |
> | SUBTYPE OF (thing);
> |
> | END_ENTITY;
> |
> |
> http://www.tc184-sc4.org/wg3ndocs/wg3n1328/lifecycle_integrati
> on_schema/lexical/possible_individual.html
>
> JA: It must be clear that there is nothing very definitive or
> definitional about the lead off statements in these texts?
>
> JA: At this point I only know the word "thing", which
> appears to be an undefined primitive, though we have
> had a characterization of how it is intended to be used
> in particular contexts of discussion.
>
> JA: And we have the constraint on the application of the words that
> tells us that things are partitioned into abstract_objects and
> possible_individuals.
>
> JA: But I have no information that allows me to apply
> the criterion of "existing in space and time".
>
> MW: I quite agree. I would love to know how to do this.
>
> JA: Some of the examples only add more difficulties to the mix.
>
> JA: By what sort of decision process can I judge whether the
> Starship Enterprise is "imaginable within some consistent
> logic, including actual, hypothetical, planned, expected,
> or required individuals"? The catch here is not so much
> the "imaginable" as it is the "consistent".
>
> MW: Not sure I understand the problem here ...
>
> JA: The problem is this. You say the following things:
>
> LIS: | EXAMPLE. The pump with serial number ABC123,
> | Battersea Power Station, Sir Joseph Whitworth,
> | Shakespeare, and the starship "Enterprise" can be
> | represented by instances of <possible_individual>.
>
> LIS: | A <possible_individual> is a <thing> that exists in
> space and time.
>
> LIS: | In this context existence is based upon being imaginable within
> | some consistent logic, including actual, hypothetical, planned,
> | expected, or required individuals.
>
> JA: I am trying to figure out:
>
> JA: (1) what you mean by the term "possible_individual" ...
>
> MW: Reading
>
>
> http://www.matthew-west.org.uk/Documents/Spatio-temporal-Paradigm.pdf
>
> may help to understand what we are getting at.
>
> I will look at it, in good time, but you understand that I am
> presently following my nose like a good parser-positer-prover
> should, and I am obliged to ask myself, and you, whether this
> text in front of me permits of formalization in a systematic,
> step-by-step fashion. Now, I am not so grindstone-nosed as
> to think that it might be done in a single pass without any
> need to backtrack, but if you do not see at least some of
> these issues that I am encountering as representing real
> obstructions to the formalization process, that need to
> be addressed, then I might as well drop this task from
> the queue, so to speak.
MW: I'm following my nose too. I don't claim to know much about
axiomatisation, and I'm hoping to learn.
MW: The document above is quite short, and outlines the approach
we are taking. Your choice of course.
>
> JA: (2) whether that meaning can be formalized
> in terms of an axiomatic theory ...
>
> MW: I would like the answer to that question too.
>
> That is why I am asking these questions.
>
> JA: (3) what sorts of things come under the
> heading of a "possible_individual".
>
> JA: A. From what you say in the Example clause, I take it that
> you consider the Starship Enterprise to be an instance
> of a <possible_individual>.
>
> MW: Yes.
>
> JA: B. From what you say in the defining clause, I take it that
> you consider the Starship Enterprise to be a <thing> that
> exists in space and time.
>
> MW: Yes, but perhaps in some possible world
> (or more appropriately universe).
>
> That is, of course, a whole new ballpark, one that is
> positively filled
> with many popular and entertaining amusements, but I personally would
> look for another way to understand, in rational scientific terms,
> what is really going on with the phemomena of truth in fiction.
MW: I'm open to suggestions, but that is what we do in the absence of
anything we have found better.
>
> JA: C. From what you say in the context clause,
> I take it that you consider whatever exists
> to be "imaginable within some consistent logic".
>
> MW: Yes. If the existance of an object is logically inconsistent,
> then we are not interested in it. The star ship Enterprise is
> a good example of something imaginable, which includes things
> that are in our real world/universe.
>
> That is, of course, a whole new:
> (1) barrel of monkeys,
> (2) can of worms,
> (3) ...
MW: Probably.
>
> JA: Therefore, I must conclude that you consider the Starship
> Enterprise
> to come under the heading "imaginable within some
> consistent logic".
>
> MW: Correct.
>
> JA: I am just asking for clarification of these properties that you
> mention in defining or explaining the term "possible_individual".
>
> JA: By what sort of decision process can I judge whether the
> Starship Enterprise is "imaginable within some consistent
> logic, including actual, hypothetical, planned, expected,
> or required individuals"?
>
> JA: In other words:
>
> JA: What is the operational definition of
> "imaginable within some consistent logic".
>
> MW: See above.
>
> Sorry, I have not seen anything like
> a real definition of that yet,
> operational or otherwise.
MW: By logically consistent we meant that the existance of objects
did not present a logical inconsistency. Imaginable means that they
could exist in this or some possible world.
>
> MW: Probably something to be aware of is that the target audience
> for this document is engineers and IT professionals, and not
> philosophers/logicians. So I do not recommend looking too
> deeply. Take a gloss, and if you think it can be stated
> more clearly/formally raise an issue and make a proposal.
> I am quite up for improving this start point. In fact
> that is one of my main reasons for proposing it here.
>
> JA: All the engineers I know are characteristically concerned
> with how scientific knowledge plays out in the real world,
> and how to upgrade the traction of KR patent rubber tires
> on realworld roads. All of my questions at this time are
> being asked in accord with that same exact spirit.
>
> MW: That's fine. Always happy to try to elucidate
> our thoughts and improve on them where we can.
>
> JA: I am also reminded of another relation that John Sowa points out
> between his analogous arrays of Abstract and Physical categories:
>
> JS: | Each abstract category on the right of Figure 2.7
> | [Figure 2 on the web page] is said to 'characterize'
> | the corresponding physical category on the left:
> |
> | a schema characterizes an object;
> | a script characterizes a process;
> | a description characterizes a juncture;
> | a history characterizes a participation;
> | a reason characterizes a structure; and
> | a purpose characterizes a situation.
> |
> | John Sowa, 'Knowledge Represntation', p. 75.
> | http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/toplevel.htm
> | http://users.bestweb.net/~sowa/ontology/toplevel.htm
>
> MW: Unfortunately I don't "get" John's categories,
> so this doesn't help me much.
>
> JA: At this stage of the game, I was only noticing the similarity
> between the penultimate division of Top into Abstract and Physical
> and the preliminary partition of <thing> into
> <abstract_object> and
> <possible_individual>, just in the not-so-exact spirit of
> comparative
> ontology.
>
> MW: That bit I do get, so fine. It is a distinction it
> seems more unusual not to make than to make generally.
>
> Maybe. At any rate the existence of the distinction and
> the question of how to draw it in effective logical terms
> are two distinct questions. So far you have proposed the
> differential feature "exists in space and time" versus the
> alternative, but that mark adds no information to the first
> primitive strokes between the two categories if we have no
> way of telling what "exists in space and time" from that
> which does not. That would make it an incidental gloss
> rather than a definitive or a normative elucidation.
>
> JA: This is very important, as it brings us to the threshold
> of Peirce's sign relations. I will return to it again.
> And it bears on the Note that you appended to "thing":
>
> LIS: | NOTE 1. Every <thing> is identifiable within a system.
> | System identifiers created by other systems and received
> | as part of a data exchange may be stored for future reference
> | as an identification, referring to the originating organisation
> | or system.
>
> MW: I suggest not worrying about this, as I have said before.
> In terms of philosphical importance, it can be deleted.
>
> JA: In terms of engineering importance, it cannot.
>
> MW: Fine. Happy to talk about the engineering design decisions
> and the rationale too.
>
> What we were here to make light. (WWW.HTML)
>
> I need a nap to clear my head.
> I think we should think about
> what we really want here, and
> maybe I will get back to this
> when I answer Chris' question.
>
> Jon Awbrey
>
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