SUO: Re: Lifecycle Integration Schema
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LIS. Discussion Note 8
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Matthew,
Focusing on:
LIS: | possible_individual
|
| A <possible_individual> is a <thing> that exists in space and time.
|
| This includes:
|
| - things where any of the space time dimensions are
| vanishingly small,
|
| - those that are either all space for any time,
| or all time and any space,
|
| - the entirety of all space time,
|
| - things that actually exist, or have existed,
|
| - things that are fictional or conjectured and
| possibly exist in the past, present or future,
|
| - temporal parts (states) of other individuals,
|
| - things that have a specific position, but zero extent in
| one or more dimensions, such as points, lines, and surfaces.
|
| In this context existence is based upon being imaginable within
| some consistent logic, including actual, hypothetical, planned,
| expected, or required individuals.
|
| EXAMPLE. The pump with serial number ABC123,
| Battersea Power Station, Sir Joseph Whitworth,
| Shakespeare, and the starship "Enterprise" can be
| represented by instances of <possible_individual>.
|
| EXPRESS specification:
|
| ENTITY possible_individual
|
| SUBTYPE OF (thing);
|
| END_ENTITY;
|
| http://www.tc184-sc4.org/wg3ndocs/wg3n1328/lifecycle_integration_schema/lexical/possible_individual.html
JA: It must be clear that there is nothing very definitive or
definitional about the lead off statements in these texts?
JA: At this point I only know the word "thing", which
appears to be an undefined primitive, though we have
had a characterization of how it is intended to be used
in particular contexts of discussion.
JA: And we have the constraint on the application of the words that
tells us that things are partitioned into abstract_objects and
possible_individuals.
JA: But I have no information that allows me to apply
the criterion of "existing in space and time".
MW: I quite agree. I would love to know how to do this.
JA: Some of the examples only add more difficulties to the mix.
JA: By what sort of decision process can I judge whether the
Starship Enterprise is "imaginable within some consistent
logic, including actual, hypothetical, planned, expected,
or required individuals"? The catch here is not so much
the "imaginable" as it is the "consistent".
MW: Not sure I understand the problem here ...
JA: The problem is this. You say the following things:
LIS: | EXAMPLE. The pump with serial number ABC123,
| Battersea Power Station, Sir Joseph Whitworth,
| Shakespeare, and the starship "Enterprise" can be
| represented by instances of <possible_individual>.
LIS: | A <possible_individual> is a <thing> that exists in space and time.
LIS: | In this context existence is based upon being imaginable within
| some consistent logic, including actual, hypothetical, planned,
| expected, or required individuals.
JA: I am trying to figure out:
JA: (1) what you mean by the term "possible_individual" ...
MW: Reading
http://www.matthew-west.org.uk/Documents/Spatio-temporal-Paradigm.pdf
may help to understand what we are getting at.
I will look at it, in good time, but you understand that I am
presently following my nose like a good parser-positer-prover
should, and I am obliged to ask myself, and you, whether this
text in front of me permits of formalization in a systematic,
step-by-step fashion. Now, I am not so grindstone-nosed as
to think that it might be done in a single pass without any
need to backtrack, but if you do not see at least some of
these issues that I am encountering as representing real
obstructions to the formalization process, that need to
be addressed, then I might as well drop this task from
the queue, so to speak.
JA: (2) whether that meaning can be formalized
in terms of an axiomatic theory ...
MW: I would like the answer to that question too.
That is why I am asking these questions.
JA: (3) what sorts of things come under the
heading of a "possible_individual".
JA: A. From what you say in the Example clause, I take it that
you consider the Starship Enterprise to be an instance
of a <possible_individual>.
MW: Yes.
JA: B. From what you say in the defining clause, I take it that
you consider the Starship Enterprise to be a <thing> that
exists in space and time.
MW: Yes, but perhaps in some possible world
(or more appropriately universe).
That is, of course, a whole new ballpark, one that is positively filled
with many popular and entertaining amusements, but I personally would
look for another way to understand, in rational scientific terms,
what is really going on with the phemomena of truth in fiction.
JA: C. From what you say in the context clause,
I take it that you consider whatever exists
to be "imaginable within some consistent logic".
MW: Yes. If the existance of an object is logically inconsistent,
then we are not interested in it. The star ship Enterprise is
a good example of something imaginable, which includes things
that are in our real world/universe.
That is, of course, a whole new:
(1) barrel of monkeys,
(2) can of worms,
(3) ...
JA: Therefore, I must conclude that you consider the Starship Enterprise
to come under the heading "imaginable within some consistent logic".
MW: Correct.
JA: I am just asking for clarification of these properties that you
mention in defining or explaining the term "possible_individual".
JA: By what sort of decision process can I judge whether the
Starship Enterprise is "imaginable within some consistent
logic, including actual, hypothetical, planned, expected,
or required individuals"?
JA: In other words:
JA: What is the operational definition of
"imaginable within some consistent logic".
MW: See above.
Sorry, I have not seen anything like
a real definition of that yet,
operational or otherwise.
MW: Probably something to be aware of is that the target audience
for this document is engineers and IT professionals, and not
philosophers/logicians. So I do not recommend looking too
deeply. Take a gloss, and if you think it can be stated
more clearly/formally raise an issue and make a proposal.
I am quite up for improving this start point. In fact
that is one of my main reasons for proposing it here.
JA: All the engineers I know are characteristically concerned
with how scientific knowledge plays out in the real world,
and how to upgrade the traction of KR patent rubber tires
on realworld roads. All of my questions at this time are
being asked in accord with that same exact spirit.
MW: That's fine. Always happy to try to elucidate
our thoughts and improve on them where we can.
JA: I am also reminded of another relation that John Sowa points out
between his analogous arrays of Abstract and Physical categories:
JS: | Each abstract category on the right of Figure 2.7
| [Figure 2 on the web page] is said to 'characterize'
| the corresponding physical category on the left:
|
| a schema characterizes an object;
| a script characterizes a process;
| a description characterizes a juncture;
| a history characterizes a participation;
| a reason characterizes a structure; and
| a purpose characterizes a situation.
|
| John Sowa, 'Knowledge Represntation', p. 75.
| http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/toplevel.htm
| http://users.bestweb.net/~sowa/ontology/toplevel.htm
MW: Unfortunately I don't "get" John's categories,
so this doesn't help me much.
JA: At this stage of the game, I was only noticing the similarity
between the penultimate division of Top into Abstract and Physical
and the preliminary partition of <thing> into <abstract_object> and
<possible_individual>, just in the not-so-exact spirit of comparative
ontology.
MW: That bit I do get, so fine. It is a distinction it
seems more unusual not to make than to make generally.
Maybe. At any rate the existence of the distinction and
the question of how to draw it in effective logical terms
are two distinct questions. So far you have proposed the
differential feature "exists in space and time" versus the
alternative, but that mark adds no information to the first
primitive strokes between the two categories if we have no
way of telling what "exists in space and time" from that
which does not. That would make it an incidental gloss
rather than a definitive or a normative elucidation.
JA: This is very important, as it brings us to the threshold
of Peirce's sign relations. I will return to it again.
And it bears on the Note that you appended to "thing":
LIS: | NOTE 1. Every <thing> is identifiable within a system.
| System identifiers created by other systems and received
| as part of a data exchange may be stored for future reference
| as an identification, referring to the originating organisation
| or system.
MW: I suggest not worrying about this, as I have said before.
In terms of philosphical importance, it can be deleted.
JA: In terms of engineering importance, it cannot.
MW: Fine. Happy to talk about the engineering design decisions
and the rationale too.
What we were here to make light. (WWW.HTML)
I need a nap to clear my head.
I think we should think about
what we really want here, and
maybe I will get back to this
when I answer Chris' question.
Jon Awbrey
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