SUO: RE: Lifecycle Integration Schema
Dear Jon,
See comments below.
Matthew West
Principal Consultant
Shell Information Technology International Limited
Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
Email: matthew.west@shell.com
Internet: http://www.shell.com
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawbrey@att.net]
> Sent: 02 September 2003 15:34
> To: West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE; SUO
> Subject: Re: Lifecycle Integration Schema
>
>
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> LIS. Discussion Note 6
>
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> Matthew,
>
> Re:
>
> LIS: | abstract_object
> |
> | An <abstract_object> is a <thing> that does not exist
> in space-time.
> |
> | EXPRESS specification:
> |
> | ENTITY abstract_object
> |
> | ABSTRACT SUPERTYPE
> |
> | SUBTYPE OF (thing);
> |
> | END_ENTITY;
> |
> |
> http://www.tc184-sc4.org/wg3ndocs/wg3n1328/lifecycle_integrati
> on_schema/lexical/abstract_object.html
>
> LIS: | possible_individual
> |
> | A <possible_individual> is a <thing> that exists in
> space and time.
> |
> | This includes:
> |
> | - things where any of the space time dimensions are
> | vanishingly small,
> |
> | - those that are either all space for any time,
> | or all time and any space,
> |
> | - the entirety of all space time,
> |
> | - things that actually exist, or have existed,
> |
> | - things that are fictional or conjectured and
> | possibly exist in the past, present or future,
> |
> | - temporal parts (states) of other individuals,
> |
> | - things that have a specific position, but zero extent in
> | one or more dimensions, such as points, lines, and surfaces.
> |
> | In this context existence is based upon being imaginable within
> | some consistent logic, including actual, hypothetical, planned,
> | expected, or required individuals.
> |
> | EXAMPLE. The pump with serial number ABC123,
> | Battersea Power Station, Sir Joseph Whitworth,
> | Shakespeare, and the starship "Enterprise" can be
> | represented by instances of <possible_individual>.
> |
> | EXPRESS specification:
> |
> | ENTITY possible_individual
> |
> | SUBTYPE OF (thing);
> |
> | END_ENTITY;
> |
> |
> http://www.tc184-sc4.org/wg3ndocs/wg3n1328/lifecycle_integrati
> on_schema/lexical/possible_individual.html
>
> JA: It must be clear that there is nothing very definitive or
> definitional about the lead off statements in these texts?
>
> JA: At this point I only know the word "thing", which appears to be
> an undefined primitive, though we have had a characterization of
> how it is intended to be used in particular contexts of
> discussion.
>
> JA: And we have the constraint on the application of the words that
> tells us that things are partitioned into abstract_objects and
> possible_individuals.
>
> JA: But I have no information that allows me to apply
> the criterion of "existing in space and time".
>
> MW: I quite agree. I would love to know how to do this.
>
> JA: It is always possible that the information is meant to flow
> the other way around, and that maybe I should have started
> at the bottom of the ordering, if there is a bottom?
>
> MW: I'm not sure it would help.
>
> Me neither.
>
> JA: Some of the examples only add more difficulties to the mix.
>
> JA: By what sort of decision process can I judge whether the
> Starship Enterprise is "imaginable within some consistent
> logic, including actual, hypothetical, planned, expected,
> or required individuals"? The catch here is not so much
> the "imaginable" as it is the "consistent".
>
> MW: Not sure I understand the problem here ...
>
> The problem is this. You say the following things:
>
> LIS: | EXAMPLE. The pump with serial number ABC123,
> | Battersea Power Station, Sir Joseph Whitworth,
> | Shakespeare, and the starship "Enterprise" can be
> | represented by instances of <possible_individual>.
>
> LIS: | A <possible_individual> is a <thing> that exists in
> space and time.
>
> LIS: | In this context existence is based upon being imaginable within
> | some consistent logic, including actual, hypothetical, planned,
> | expected, or required individuals.
>
> I am trying to figure out (1) what you mean by the term
> "possible_individual",
MW: Reading
http://www.matthew-west.org.uk/Documents/Spatio-temporal-Paradigm.pdf
may help to understand what we are getting at.
> (2) whether that meaning can be formalized in terms of an
> axiomatic theory,
MW: I would like the answer to that question too.
> (3) what sorts of things come under the heading of a
> "possible_individual".
>
> A. From what you say in the Example clause, I take it that
> you consider
> the Starship Enterprise to be an instance of a
> <possible_individual>.
MW: Yes.
>
> B. From what you say in the defining clause, I take it that
> you consider
> the Starship Enterprise to be a <thing> that exists in
> space and time.
MW: Yes, but perhaps in some possible world (or more appropriately
universe).
>
> C. From what you say in the context clause, I take it that
> you consider
> whatever exists to be "imaginable within some consistent logic".
MW: Yes. If the existance of an object is logically inconsistent, then
we are not interested in it. The star ship Enterprise is a good example
of something imaginable, which includes things that are in our real
world/universe.
>
> Therefore, I must conclude that you consider the Starship Enterprise
> to come under the heading "imaginable within some consistent logic".
MW: Correct.
>
> I am just asking for clarification of these properties that you
> mention in defining or explaining the term "possible_individual".
>
> JA: By what sort of decision process can I judge whether the
> Starship Enterprise is "imaginable within some consistent
> logic, including actual, hypothetical, planned, expected,
> or required individuals"?
>
> In other words:
>
> What is the operational definition of "imaginable within some
> consistent logic".
MW: See above.
>
> MW: Probably something to be aware of is that the target audience
> for this document is engineers and IT professionals, and not
> philosophers/logicians. So I do not recommend looking too
> deeply. Take a gloss, and if you think it can be stated
> more clearly/formally raise an issue and make a proposal.
> I am quite up for improving this start point. In fact
> that is one of my main reasons for proposing it here.
>
> All the engineers I know are characteristically concerned
> with how scientific knowledge plays out in the real world,
> and how to upgrade the traction of KR patent rubber tires
> on realworld roads. All of my questions at this time are
> being asked in accord with that same exact spirit.
MW: That's fine. Always happy to try to elucidate our thoughts
and improve on them where we can.
>
> JA: At this point I still have to treat "abstract_object" and
> "possible_individual" as undefined terms, but as ones that
> are constrained in their relative meanings by their declared
> logical relations to each other, and also to the term "thing".
>
> MW: Fine.
>
> JA: It is interesting that we can have these quanta of information
> about relations long before we have information about essences.
> The classical example of this occurs in axiomatic geometry, where
> "point" and "line" are terms that remain undefined in any absolute
> sense, and yet are constrained to take up their roles in
> a relation
> that is described by axioms, in this way being "defined
> in relation"
> to each other.
>
> MW: This seems to be as much as you can do.
>
> JA: I am also reminded of another relation that John Sowa points out
> between his analogous arrays of Abstract and Physical categories:
>
> JS: | Each abstract category on the right of Figure 2.7
> | [Figure 2 on the web page] is said to 'characterize'
> | the corresponding physical category on the left:
> |
> | a schema characterizes an object;
> | a script characterizes a process;
> | a description characterizes a juncture;
> | a history characterizes a participation;
> | a reason characterizes a structure; and
> | a purpose characterizes a situation.
> |
> | John Sowa, 'Knowledge Represntation', p. 75.
> | http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/toplevel.htm
> | http://users.bestweb.net/~sowa/ontology/toplevel.htm
>
> MW: Unfortunately I don't "get" John's categories,
> so this doesn't help me much.
>
> At this stage of the game, I was only noticing the similarity
> between the
> penultimate division of Top into Abstract and Physical and
> the preliminary
> partition of <thing> into <abstract_object> and
> <possible_individual>, just
> in the not-so-exact spirit of comparative ontology.
MW: That bit I do get, so fine. it is a distinction it seems
more unusual not to make than to make generally.
>
> JA: This is very important, as it brings us to the threshold
> of Peirce's sign relations. I will return to it again.
> And it bears on the Note that you appended to "thing":
>
> LIS: | NOTE 1. Every <thing> is identifiable within a system.
> | System identifiers created by other systems and received
> | as part of a data exchange may be stored for future reference
> | as an identification, referring to the originating organisation
> | or system.
>
> MW: I suggest not worrying about this, as I have said before.
> In terms of philosphical importance, it can be deleted.
>
> In terms of engineering importance, it cannot.
MW: Fine. Happy to talk about the engineering design decisions and
the rationale too.
>
> Jon Awbrey
>
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