SUO: Re: Lifecycle Integration Schema
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LIS. Discussion Note 6
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Matthew,
Re:
LIS: | abstract_object
|
| An <abstract_object> is a <thing> that does not exist in space-time.
|
| EXPRESS specification:
|
| ENTITY abstract_object
|
| ABSTRACT SUPERTYPE
|
| SUBTYPE OF (thing);
|
| END_ENTITY;
|
| http://www.tc184-sc4.org/wg3ndocs/wg3n1328/lifecycle_integration_schema/lexical/abstract_object.html
LIS: | possible_individual
|
| A <possible_individual> is a <thing> that exists in space and time.
|
| This includes:
|
| - things where any of the space time dimensions are
| vanishingly small,
|
| - those that are either all space for any time,
| or all time and any space,
|
| - the entirety of all space time,
|
| - things that actually exist, or have existed,
|
| - things that are fictional or conjectured and
| possibly exist in the past, present or future,
|
| - temporal parts (states) of other individuals,
|
| - things that have a specific position, but zero extent in
| one or more dimensions, such as points, lines, and surfaces.
|
| In this context existence is based upon being imaginable within
| some consistent logic, including actual, hypothetical, planned,
| expected, or required individuals.
|
| EXAMPLE. The pump with serial number ABC123,
| Battersea Power Station, Sir Joseph Whitworth,
| Shakespeare, and the starship "Enterprise" can be
| represented by instances of <possible_individual>.
|
| EXPRESS specification:
|
| ENTITY possible_individual
|
| SUBTYPE OF (thing);
|
| END_ENTITY;
|
| http://www.tc184-sc4.org/wg3ndocs/wg3n1328/lifecycle_integration_schema/lexical/possible_individual.html
JA: It must be clear that there is nothing very definitive or
definitional about the lead off statements in these texts?
JA: At this point I only know the word "thing", which appears to be
an undefined primitive, though we have had a characterization of
how it is intended to be used in particular contexts of discussion.
JA: And we have the constraint on the application of the words that
tells us that things are partitioned into abstract_objects and
possible_individuals.
JA: But I have no information that allows me to apply
the criterion of "existing in space and time".
MW: I quite agree. I would love to know how to do this.
JA: It is always possible that the information is meant to flow
the other way around, and that maybe I should have started
at the bottom of the ordering, if there is a bottom?
MW: I'm not sure it would help.
Me neither.
JA: Some of the examples only add more difficulties to the mix.
JA: By what sort of decision process can I judge whether the
Starship Enterprise is "imaginable within some consistent
logic, including actual, hypothetical, planned, expected,
or required individuals"? The catch here is not so much
the "imaginable" as it is the "consistent".
MW: Not sure I understand the problem here ...
The problem is this. You say the following things:
LIS: | EXAMPLE. The pump with serial number ABC123,
| Battersea Power Station, Sir Joseph Whitworth,
| Shakespeare, and the starship "Enterprise" can be
| represented by instances of <possible_individual>.
LIS: | A <possible_individual> is a <thing> that exists in space and time.
LIS: | In this context existence is based upon being imaginable within
| some consistent logic, including actual, hypothetical, planned,
| expected, or required individuals.
I am trying to figure out (1) what you mean by the term "possible_individual",
(2) whether that meaning can be formalized in terms of an axiomatic theory,
(3) what sorts of things come under the heading of a "possible_individual".
A. From what you say in the Example clause, I take it that you consider
the Starship Enterprise to be an instance of a <possible_individual>.
B. From what you say in the defining clause, I take it that you consider
the Starship Enterprise to be a <thing> that exists in space and time.
C. From what you say in the context clause, I take it that you consider
whatever exists to be "imaginable within some consistent logic".
Therefore, I must conclude that you consider the Starship Enterprise
to come under the heading "imaginable within some consistent logic".
I am just asking for clarification of these properties that you
mention in defining or explaining the term "possible_individual".
JA: By what sort of decision process can I judge whether the
Starship Enterprise is "imaginable within some consistent
logic, including actual, hypothetical, planned, expected,
or required individuals"?
In other words:
What is the operational definition of "imaginable within some consistent logic".
MW: Probably something to be aware of is that the target audience
for this document is engineers and IT professionals, and not
philosophers/logicians. So I do not recommend looking too
deeply. Take a gloss, and if you think it can be stated
more clearly/formally raise an issue and make a proposal.
I am quite up for improving this start point. In fact
that is one of my main reasons for proposing it here.
All the engineers I know are characteristically concerned
with how scientific knowledge plays out in the real world,
and how to upgrade the traction of KR patent rubber tires
on realworld roads. All of my questions at this time are
being asked in accord with that same exact spirit.
JA: At this point I still have to treat "abstract_object" and
"possible_individual" as undefined terms, but as ones that
are constrained in their relative meanings by their declared
logical relations to each other, and also to the term "thing".
MW: Fine.
JA: It is interesting that we can have these quanta of information
about relations long before we have information about essences.
The classical example of this occurs in axiomatic geometry, where
"point" and "line" are terms that remain undefined in any absolute
sense, and yet are constrained to take up their roles in a relation
that is described by axioms, in this way being "defined in relation"
to each other.
MW: This seems to be as much as you can do.
JA: I am also reminded of another relation that John Sowa points out
between his analogous arrays of Abstract and Physical categories:
JS: | Each abstract category on the right of Figure 2.7
| [Figure 2 on the web page] is said to 'characterize'
| the corresponding physical category on the left:
|
| a schema characterizes an object;
| a script characterizes a process;
| a description characterizes a juncture;
| a history characterizes a participation;
| a reason characterizes a structure; and
| a purpose characterizes a situation.
|
| John Sowa, 'Knowledge Represntation', p. 75.
| http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/toplevel.htm
| http://users.bestweb.net/~sowa/ontology/toplevel.htm
MW: Unfortunately I don't "get" John's categories,
so this doesn't help me much.
At this stage of the game, I was only noticing the similarity between the
penultimate division of Top into Abstract and Physical and the preliminary
partition of <thing> into <abstract_object> and <possible_individual>, just
in the not-so-exact spirit of comparative ontology.
JA: This is very important, as it brings us to the threshold
of Peirce's sign relations. I will return to it again.
And it bears on the Note that you appended to "thing":
LIS: | NOTE 1. Every <thing> is identifiable within a system.
| System identifiers created by other systems and received
| as part of a data exchange may be stored for future reference
| as an identification, referring to the originating organisation
| or system.
MW: I suggest not worrying about this, as I have said before.
In terms of philosphical importance, it can be deleted.
In terms of engineering importance, it cannot.
Jon Awbrey
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