RE: SUO: Unanimous consent
Dear Pierre,
See comments below.
Matthew West
Principal Consultant
Shell Information Technology International Limited
Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
Email: matthew.west@shell.com
Internet: http://www.shell.com
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Pierre Grenon [mailto:pierre.grenon@ifomis.uni-leipzig.de]
> Sent: 29 August 2003 16:08
> To: West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE
> Cc: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> Subject: RE: SUO: Unanimous consent
>
>
> A few clarifications.
>
> > > PG: I was refering to the second kind of maturity. Not the
> > > maturity of the
> > > project's findings (anyway, longevity is not always a sign of
> > > maturity, you
> > > will agree), but that of the document in its capacity as a
> > > proposal for being a
> > > starter.
> >
> > MW: This is a clear difference of opinion that we have. You
> > presume that a starter document must have a certain level of
> > completeness. I do not. No rules have been set by this group
> > for the level of completeness a starter document should have,
> > so you can only be extrapolating from SUMO (in fact IFF was
> > substantial, but rather incomplete when it was first propsoed).
> > I think your presumtions are questionable as "rules" of this
> > group, although you are of course entitled to your own
> > preferences as to the level a document should be. In the end
> > the group will decide.
>
> I don't believe that this group is an enlighted
> self-regulating agent. I've
> been nitpicking on occasions because it is my opinion that
> this group should
> erect higher standards in order to deserve the credits it is
> pretending to.
MW: I would not object if the group did erect higher standards.
But it hasn't yet erected any standard beyond significant
approval. One should I think know what the target is. I would
be happy if this proposal led to the establishing clear standards
for submissions.
> The
> desidearta I express seem to me rather casual as an
> ontologist. Of course, all
> I express regarding the methodology of this group is but my
> opinion, I'm no
> master of ceremony. But I guess this is rather a problem of
> culture reather
> than opinion. Never the less, it seems to me that this group
> would be better
> off if proposed material was judged on criteria similar to
> those by which the
> final product shall be evaluated, rather than dependent upon
> pleasant email
> exchanges. Let's close the debate if you will.
MW: Not the practice I am used to in standards development.
>
> In reply to Mike Pool, you say that we have only our opinions
> at our services.
> I regard KR both as an enginering and a scientific field, I
> don't really care
> for opinions. I consider metaphysics as a tool, I really
> don't care for
> opinions. As concerns ontology, as a methodological maxim, I
> tend not to assume
> that I'm dealing with opinion but with theories. Theories
> deserve to be
> expounded and someone who offers a theory has to perform this
> task as a duty.
> Again, let's close the debate, if that was a different one.
MW: The opinions are not about ontology itself, but standards
development though.
>
> [...]
>
> > >
> > > > 1. Should there be a 4D ontology as part of the SUO work?
> > >
> > > PG: There should be an ability to sustain a 4d ontology.
> > > I.e., there should be
> > > an ability to deal with 4D entities. I think there should not
> > > be any claim
> > > about which are what.
> > > Your approach seems to provide a 4D ontology. It is, in my
> > > opinion, faulty in
> > > that it commits to 4D. (Not sure what i'm saying is very clear.)
> >
> > MW: Committing to 4D is the intent. That is not supposed to commit
> > the whole SUO effort to 4D though.
>
> The first is the real issue. The second is expectable in the
> context of the
> Sowa coup, so to speak.
>
> > > > 2. Is this a good start point? (if not suggest a better one)
>
> Obviously, we still don't know.
>
> > > >
> > > > > (I think it would profite the development of OpenCyc based
> > > > > document more than
> > > > > that of SUMO). Incidentally, and to gloss on my own soup, it
> > > > > seems to me that
> > > > > this is something which could communicate well with one part
> > > > > of our framework
> > > > > here (that which Barry Smith as baptized SPAN as you know),
> > > > > provided we
> > > > > recognize that terminology is not an issue (I could be hung
> > > > > on the marketplace
> > > > > in Leipzig for saying this publicly).
> > > >
> > > > MW: Actually it would be even more interesting to see how to
> > > > communicate with the other part (SPOT?).
> > >
> > > PG:
> > > I'm sure Barry could find something to name SPOT. It's
> > > SNAP... for snapshot.
> >
> > MW: Sorry, I couldn't remember and was too lazy to look it up.
> >
> > > It's presentist, 3d, good old fashion Aristotelianism. The
> > > whole thing in which
> > > SNAP and SPAN (which is primarily a temporal distinction) are
> > > articulated is
> > > BFO.
> > >
> > > I think SPAN (our 4D) can handle much of your ontology. Your
> > > ontology relates
> > > to SNAP the way SPAN and SNAP relates. In our official
> > > linguo, your physical
> > > objects are parts of lives of SNAP entities, they are SPAN
> > > entities themselves.
> >
> > MW: Something like that, but of course 4D just doesn't bother
> > with the SNAP stuff - representing information just with a SPAN
> > type objects.
>
> Precisely, SPAN in isolation is a pure occurrent ontology. It
> can be used by a
> 4d ontology without bothering about the other component. The
> point with BFO
> is that we think it's not enough. That's why we're more
> interested in how the
> two paradigm relate than in reductionism which is more or
> less a definitional
> exercise once you have any of the alternative ontologies.
MW: I object to the term reductionism. That involves removing
something necessary. I would accept minimalism - only accepting
what is necessary.
>
> > > (Of course, calling them physical objects is pure
> > > terminological heresy.)
> >
> > MW: (Surely the heresy is SNAP :-) )
>
> Jesus said 'he who endures to the end shall be saved.' (Matt
> 4:13) He didn't
> say 'perdure'.
MW: Obviously not a philosopher then ...
>
> > > It
> > > seems that you handle participation as parthood, which is
> > > coherent with my BFO
> > > parsing of your claims. We don't, there's no parthood
> > > relations between SNAP
> > > and SPAN (apologies for the terminological endoctrination).
> >
> > MW: Correct.
> > >
> > > One difficulty is that you have processes with qualities
> > > (i.e., the t.p. part
> > > of your car is red). It would be odd for us to think of
> > > redness as a property
> > > of your car's life.
> >
> > MW: They are not necessarily processes in our ontology, so
> > this objection makes no sense.
>
> Not sure I'm satisfied with this, does that relate to your
> notion of state? See
> below.
MW: Yes. State does not occur in the model, but is a good word
to use for a possible_individual that is a temporal part of
another possible_individual.
>
> > > What we mean is that the car's life is
> > > that of an entity
> > > (the car) which happens to be red during the occurrence of
> > > one of the temporal
> > > parts of such process (the life). The redness of the car (a
> > > particular) is on
> > > the side of continuants.
> >
> > MW: Well to justify SNAP you have to decide when you are
> > going to use them, but 4D sees the world differently, and
> > does not accept these "rules".
>
> Sure, obviously these considerations were not pure 4d talk.
>
> > > Now, you can certainly introduce as many process-types as you
> > > want, but this
> > > seems rather ad hoc. This is a general feature of processes
> > > which have their
> > > properties necessarily and which let themselves best
> > > interpret as instances of
> > > classes (class nominalistic properties). I didn't have time
> > > to look cloesly at
> > > the way you handle properties, pardon me.
> >
> > MW: Properties are classes, individuals are members of them.
>
> Thanks for the clarification. The problem of some classes
> being ad hoc stands.
MW: Not quite sure what you mean here by "ad hoc".
>
> [...]
>
> > > PG: One of the problem is the way you handle relations
> > > between physical object.
> > > It seems that all relations are cases of underlap in a
> > > process (or activity,
> > > unless that's too specific).
> >
> > MW: Perhaps in SPAN terms, but in our terms they are states that are
> > related to each other.
>
> The point was on the fact that relations between states are forms of
> underlapping. Now, I might not use your vocabulary
> adequately. I found only one
> parenthetic mention of the term 'state' as a synonym of
> 'temporal part'. So,
> not sure if I understand you well.
MW: You do.
> By process, take that I mean 4d entity or process-like
> entity. Do you used
> process in the sense of your 'activity' (possible_individual
> bringing about
> change?) It seems that I intended 'possible_individual'.
MW: I would normally consider process and activity as synonyms.
possible_individual would be more appropriate.
>
> With respect to underlap.
>
> I would expect from your theory that the following holds:
> - all possible individuals are occurrents / perdurants for
> those which last.
MW: And those that don't. Possible_individual covers everything
that exists in space-time, including instantaneous objects.
> - temporal part and aggregation (do you have a mereological
> sum?) preserves
> this.
MW: Sounds right.
> - participation is a form of parthood (composition)
MW: Sounds right. part of an activity.
>
> If X is the some of Y and Z, the relation that there is
> between Y and Z is a
> form of underlap (they are both part of a third individual).
>
> Matthew and Pierre met and agreed that Matthew should use the
> term 'endure'
> rather than 'perdure' in Matt 4:13 (of course the movie is
> dubbed in English).
>
> Is the following a correct parse of your theory? (Can you
> fill in the blanks?)
>
> (classification Matthew Whole_Life)
> (classification Pierre Whole_Life)
> (classification Meeting ?)
MW: (classification meeting class_of_activity)
> (composition_of_individual Matthew Meeting)
MW: No we need to identify the state of Matthew that is a part
of the meeting. So:
(temporal_whole_part state1 Matthew)
(composition_of_individual state1 meeting)
> (composition_of_individual Pierre Meeting)
MW: Similarly:
(temporal_whole_part state2 Pierre)
(composition_of_individual state2 meeting)
>
> How would you account for the 'meet' relation?
MW: We would normally consider this redundant (derivable) from
the meeting activity. However, technically you can have any
relationship you want between any two things.
>
> Is it
> i) a relation between Pierre and Matthew (two whole life ind)
> ii) a relation between the respective temporal parts of
> Pierre and Matthew
> contemporary with the meeting?
MW: This would be correct
>
> i) means that there is another relation actually_meet which
> is parsed along the
> line ii), i.e.,
>
> (meet Pierre Matthew) =def there is a temporal part of
> Matthew, a, and a tp of
> Pierre, b, which coincide temporally with the meeting such
> that (actually-meet
> a b).
> (In fact, we can already expect as a consistent claim that x
> and y summed
> together make up the meeting. That participants are parts and
> that individuals
> are spatiotemporal extents and due to 'extensionality', the sum of the
> particpants is then identical to the meeting.)
>
> Now, what is the relation between these two temporal parts of
> M and P? The one
> baptized actually-meet? This is a special case of underlap
> which is a relation
> holding between two individual parts of a third individual.
> This is trivial if
> meeting = x + y.
MW: It does. An activity is defined as the sum of its participants.
>
> It seems to me that any relation between possible_individuals
> will be a direct
> case of mereological underlap when understood as ii) and a
> slightly composed
> case of underlap, let's say partial_underlap reducible to
> underlap of some
> parts (i.e., have_two_parts_which_underlap) when it understood as i).
MW: I'm not quite sure what you mean by "underlap" - presumably that
they do not overlap. Underlap would not be essential. So you could
have two objects that themsleves overlapped that were participants
in the activity - though it might be hard to think of an example.
>
> > > While we're at it and to go abck to earlier things about
> > > participation. Seems
> > > to me that another problem with the paper is in the very
> > > claim that activities
> > > are aggregates of individuals, e.g., a meeting is the sum of
> > > the participants.
> > > Not sure that all parts of the participants are parts of the
> > > meeting the way
> > > the participants are parts of the meeting.
> >
> > MW: The participants are temporal parts rather than whole life
> > individuals.
>
> So, it's case ii.
MW: Yes it is case 2.
> The NOTE on 'participation' is misleading,
> it suggests that
> this is a particular case.
MW: The note says:
NOTE The <possible_individual> that is the part in the <participation>
is may be a temporal part of a <whole_life_individual> that is
classified by the <role_and_domain> that indicates the role it plays
in the <activity>.
MW: Apart from the "is may be" I can't see a problem. It says the
individual may be a temporal part of a whole life individual, but
that a whole life individual can participate in an activity for the
whole of its life. Is there something I'm not seeing?
>
> Some true triffles to finish:
>
> > > Yet another related issue is that you collapse identity into
> > > spatiotemporal
> > > colocation.
> >
> > MW: Correct. It seems to be the "norm" with pure 4D ontologies.
>
> I thought about it and remembered that you are relationist,
> and this gives you
> an excuse. ;)
MW: Sorry, relationist is?
>
> > > I think we discussed that already a few weeks
> > > ago. As I said at
> > > that time, this is a strong rigidity of your approach
> > > (incidentally, it is not
> > > a general feature of 4D).
> >
> > MW: It is not a necessary choice I agree, but it is Ted Sider's
> > choice, amongst others. The rigidity has advantages of course.
>
> Rigidity is not good for a SUO, imho.
MW: again not for the SUO as a whole, but as a position within the
SUO, I even think it may be necessary.
> But it might be good
> for the pushist
> agenda.
MW: Pushists are? and their agenda is?
> I'm surprised that you do not reflect on the fact
> that Ted Sider only
> expresses his opinion.
MW: Well he argues quite strongly for this position, but it is not
the only one you can take. But I agree with the principle he seems
to have of taking things as far as they will go to see if they will
break.
MW: To be serious though, I think the real issue is that there is
not enough evidence of how different ontological foundations work
out in practice. Without this kind of evidence, I think we are left
too often with opinions. One of the things I am hoping for here is
that by putting some different ontologies side by side, we can gather
some evidence. But until then I will stick to the maxim (paraphrasing)
"All ontologies are wrong, but some are useful".
>
> [...]
>
> > MW: Final Draft International Standard. I'm afraid even the previous
> > version (Draft International Standard) had to be bought.
> The logs of
> > the review process are available, but not much use without the base
> > document.
>
> Won't these people dump a few give away copies? One could be
> shipped to
> Auckland where ther's apparently no copyright laws. I would
> subscribe again to
> the ontology list for the occasion.
MW: You could write to the Secretary of SC4 and explain that you are
involved in a standards development activity, and ask to have access.
It may be given, I don't know. It is this reason that allows members
of SC4 access.
>
> Pierre
>
> [...]
>