SUO: Popper, Kuhn, and Peirce
Jon,
I strongly agree with that point:
> The mainstream is mostly a circular flow, and you know where
> that goes.... that keeps them eternally rediscovering
> what they eternally discredited just 5.5 years ago.
I also use the same rule of thumb whenever I read
any book on philosophy:
> A good rule of thumb, as I know you know, is to
> look in their bib or index and see if you find
> the name of Peirce figuring there.
Unfortunately, it is merely a necessary but not a
sufficient condition.
Recently, I came across a review of a book by Steve Fuller
on the debates between Popper and Kuhn. (See copy below.)
I know that Popper did read Peirce, from whom he took
the principle of "finite fallibility", which he renamed
the principle of "falsifiability". But Popper hadn't
read (or perhaps didn't understand) enough of Peirce
to appreciate the full import of his philosophy.
Kuhn was aware of some of Peirce's work, but he also
failed to appreciate the full depth. I think that the
best way to characterize the debate between Popper and
Kuhn is by the subset of Peirce's philosophy each one
adopted:
- Popper emphasized deduction and induction.
- Kuhn emphasized abduction.
From Peirce's point of view, the debate between them
is silly: you need all three. In effect, Peirce is
a 21st-century philosopher who synthesized the various
partial views of various 20th-century philosophers,
such as Popper and Kuhn.
It is incorrect to say that Peirce "anticipated" all
those 20th-century philosophers, because he made major
improvements on his successors. It is better to say that
Peirce is a 21st-century philosopher who synthesized
various partial views by many 20th-century philosophers,
such as Popper and Kuhn.
By the way, Susan Haack is another philosopher who
calls Peirce "the first 21st-century philosopher".
John Sowa
________________________________________________________________
The myth of structure
Aug 7th 2003
From The Economist print edition
Kuhn vs Popper: The Struggle for the Soul of Science
By Steve Fuller
Icon Books; 224 pages; £9.99
OH BOY, is science important. This is one half of the premise of Steve
Fuller's new book, “Kuhn vs Popper”. And as premises go, it is a pretty
easy one to defend. After all, technology, which stems from science, is
the major reason we now live so differently from our ancestors of 100,
or even 50 years ago. The other half of Mr Fuller's premise—the claim
that the philosophy, history and sociology of science are also
important—is not so self-evident. Nonetheless, his book frames a variety
of important questions—about just how far scientists should shoulder
responsibility for their ideas and about the role of the university in
modern life—and it does it very well.
As the title suggests, the book concerns a debate between Thomas Kuhn
and Karl Popper. Kuhn was a philosopher of science known for his 1962
book, “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, in which he came up
with the concept of a “paradigm”—the idea that the bulk of science goes
on in a given framework for arbitrary historical reasons until too many
problems arise and a revolution, or paradigm shift, occurs. Popper,
another philosopher of science, is best remembered for his doctrine of
“falsifiability”—the contention that science, by definition, is a
project that tests hypotheses that could conceivably be proved false.
The title refers to a debate that took place in London, in 1965, when
Imre Lakatos, a colleague of Popper at the London School of Economics,
organised a session, chaired by Popper, at which Kuhn spoke. Although Mr
Fuller uses the debate to consider the role of science in the world and
the relationship between scientists and those who study them, he gives
the debate itself short shrift. Unless one has already read the papers
that emerged from the debate Mr Fuller does not successfully convey
exactly what happened. Because he believes the outcome of the debate,
which Kuhn won, to be of vital importance, this is more than a little
bit frustrating.
Mr Fuller admits that Kuhn's opinions have triumphed in the court of
intellectual public opinion; he is frequently mentioned as one of the
most-cited academic authors of the 20th century. Yet the author, a
professor of sociology at the University of Warwick, still contends that
Kuhn's conception of paradigms does not, in fact, reflect the way that
scientists work, or should work, and that Popper's writings are both a
better description of the scientific endeavour and a better prescription
for how their ambitions should be framed.
Mr Fuller's book begs comparison with another recent chronicle of a
debate that Popper lost, “Wittgenstein's Poker”, which is an account of
an informal argument Popper had with Ludwig Wittgenstein about the
nature of philosophical problems. Mr Fuller's book is devoid of colour
and biographical anecdote.
It is perhaps admirable that Mr Fuller has clearly set out not to
entertain but to exhort. If his book is lacking in urbanity, that is
because it is what should properly be called a tract. Mr Fuller believes
that Kuhn, despite the appropriation of him by post-modern theorists of
science, has had a reactionary effect on science itself.
The book whirls through the intellectual milieu of modern philosophy and
science with an assumption that the reader is as erudite as Mr Fuller.
His book is too hurried to be an end in itself, and not thorough enough
to convince sceptics of his point of view. His cursory treatment of
Heidegger will not sway anyone who disagrees with his interpretation of
the legendarily dense philosopher. However, his contrarian approach to
Kuhn is certainly interesting, and his defence of Popper touching. If he
could have wheeled a bit less freely from Aristotle to Adorno, the book
might have been essential reading. As it is, it is merely interesting.
Kuhn vs Popper: The Struggle for the Soul of Science.
By Steve Fuller.
Icon Books; 224 pages; £9.99
Copyright © 2003 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All
rights reserved.