Re: SUO: Re: One Stone Fits All
John Sowa wrote:
> There are many words that are used for many different purposes.
> Lexicographers make no value judgments about anybody's choice of
> words. They just catalog them, analyze them, and write definitions
> for them.
>
> Ontologists have a lot in common with lexicographers in cataloging
> and defining concepts that people have chosen to use. They must be
> prepared to define (or to provide a methodology for defining) any
> concepts that anyone has found useful for describing anything that
> exists or may exist.
>
> However, anyone who is developing a methodology for doing ontology
> must choose some suitable theoretical foundation and accompanying
> terminology for the purpose of working within that methodology.
>
> JFS>Good question. In any case, I would throw the words "analytic" and
> >>"synthetic" into the same dustbin as "universals" and "particulars".
> >
> TD> What about "species" and "individuals"? Into the dustbin?
>
> The terms that I was deprecating are ones that I believe are
> overburdened with too many confused and confusing issues to
> be useful in a methodology for doing ontology. Among them
> are the words "universals", "particulars", "analytic", and
> "synthetic". I don't believe that we should include those
> terms in a glossary of recommended words for use in the
> SUO ontology project.
>
> The words "species" and "individual" are terms that are used in
> biology. They are important to that subject, and any ontology
> of biological terms should be able to define them.
>
> In fact, I would even be happy to include the words "universals"
> and "particulars" in an ontology for talking about the history
> of philosophy. I would not, however, use those words in the
> definitions or in the methodology for writing definitions.
>
> John Sowa
John,
What if "species" and "individuals" are real in a sense that "universals"
and "particulars" are not? While the latter terms are clearly just
abstractions, their existence limited to human imagination, the former
appear to exist regardless of whether or not we recognize them as real.
While your dog is a living individuation of the canine species, your
telephone instantiates the class of "telephones" in our minds only. In
reality, a telephone is a bunch of atoms assembled in such a way that they
mechanically carry out a particular function. While "telephone" exists only
in our imagination, "dog" exists in itself.
So, if "species" and "individual" are not merely utilitarian abstractions
but self-contained realities, wouldn't they be included in the ontological
definitions?
Thanks for your time.
Ted Dace