SUO: Re: More Sand In The Gyres
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John,
Some recursed thoughts on the topic of context, with
continuous reference to communities of interpretation.
I think that it is crucial to distinguish Peirce's way of
treating context from Tarski's way of attempting to do it.
"Logic as semiotic" affords a context for logic itself that
grounds out what would otherwise be a never-ending series of
contexts within contexts. Just think of how some people, who
dismiss the very idea that such a "pre-modern" as Peirce might
have contributed anything of signifcance to the subject, still
go about treating the subject of what they style "pragmatics".
Having been led, kicking and screaming, to the realization that
maybe syntax and logical form do not sufficiently determine either
connotative or denotative meaning in the only way that they have to
understand the word "determination", that is, in the absolute sense,
they then proceed to hit on the tactic of saying this: "Since sense
must be absolutely determinate, then it shall be necessary to invent
the absolute determiner thereof." Humbly eschewing the job themselves --
methinks the theory-laden protest too much -- they delegate the task to
"context", or any other convenient euphemism for the absentminded deity.
Thus continues the comedy of trying to keep the process of interpretation itself
out of the picture, why? the deus absconditus only knows, but it goes without
saying that it has the effect of obstructing any reflection on that process.
That is not the way that Peirce did it. Peirce explicitly puts the process
of interpretation back into the picture, oftentimes soppily in the guise
of the interpretive agent or psyche, but then again more astutely by
dint of the interpretant signs that ensue on the signs of objects.
Yes, there are places where the two roads cross -- Peirce had all this
new-fangled stuff about hermeneutic attitudes and semiotic situations
hatched down tight long before the current wave of re-assessing and
re-accustoming its imports got stirred up by those who have of late
just begun to throw off the fetishitic duties of excessive worship
of syntax as the answer to every question about meaning in life.
But Peirce's method is very distinct from Tarski's, for all of
the reasons that I have noted above, and probably a few more
that I forget right now.
Jon Awbrey
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> JS: To a very large extent, I agree.
>
> JA: Since it's terribly unlikely that any of us are anywhere near
> grokking the "essence" of anything -- I do not deny that essences
> exist, indeed, I think it is very likely that some do, it's just
> that most of the historically nominated candidates have so far
> turned out to be historical accidents -- I think that it is
> far more useful in the meantime, awaiting the end of inquiry,
> to speak of our descriptions of things and how they change
> from time to time, and how they change in appearance
> from point of view to point of view.
>
> JS: This, by the way, leads to one of my major criticisms of DOLCE.
> They use an unqualified modal operator to mark what they claim is
> "essential" to some type. As I have pointed out many times, every
> claim of necessity rests on some implicit "law" that makes something
> necessary or essential. Instead of an unqualified "essence marker",
> we should require a explicit statement of some law (or axiom) that
> states the principle for whatever essence is being assumed. For
> more on that subject, see my paper "Laws, Facts, and Contexts":
>
> JS: http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/laws.htm
>
> From my im-POV-erished state, I guess what I see is a group of people,
> in whose collabored descriptions of the world, the string "essential"
> prominently figures. Fine, I will not attack it, but merely attach
> it with some convenient index of the group, say, "essential_DOLCE".
> What it means to me what it means to them I will have to reckon in
> terms of its fruits under their cultivation, sweet or sour, as the
> case may be. Of course, being experienced, I have my suspicions.
>
> TJ: Quine's demolition of the analytic/synthetic dichotomy does
> for concepts what Witt's family resemblances does for things.
> It blurs the sharp distinctions. In particular, it blurs the
> dichotomy between a statement being true by definition (analytic
> a priori, in Kantian terms) and being true by empirical matter of
> fact (synthetic a posteriori, in Kantian terms).
>
> JA: Can you explain to me in your own words
> how you think that Quine demolished the
> analytic/synthetic dichotomy?
>
> JS: Good question. In any case, I would throw the words "analytic" and
> "synthetic" into the same dustbin as "universals" and "particulars".
> As a replacement, I would recommend the approach in the laws.htm paper.
>
> Well, I guess I will give TJ more time to answer.
>
> JA: The dichotomy between dichotomies and continua is a false dichotomy.
> In mathematics, continua are constructed by way of limit processes,
> like Cauchy sequences, from dichotomies, like Dedekind cuts, and
> continuous functions are constructed via "step" functions.
> One of the most spectacular elaborations of this way
> of doing things is Conway's and Knuth's concept of
> "surreal numbers", which stuff vastly more points
> in a line that even the real numbers contain,
> all constructed by means of certain types
> of dichotomies. And incidentally, akin
> to a particular type of "game theory".
>
> JS: I agree.
>
> JA: Not all of it, but a large share of these ideas from Whit. and Witt.
> amount to little more than popularizations of ideas that have long
> been stock in trade in topology, algebraic and point set flavors.
>
> JS: I believe that Witt. and Whit. have more to offer, but in any case
> I agree that philosophers have a lot to learn from mathematicians
> and physicists.
>
> Yes, let me retract the minimizing implications of "popularization",
> as I certainly read enough of them, and they served to whet my wits
> and my appetite from an age when I could hardly digest the hard stuff,
> and I wish more such lights would take the trouble to write good ones --
> and then again, I was only talking about a particular set of ideas
> about homologies and topologies when I said "large share".
>
> JS: Peirce, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein are three "outsiders" who applied
> their training in mathematics, physics, and engineering to revolutionize
> philosophy. In return, the 20th century analytic philosophers did their
> best to ignore them. I believe it's now time to bring them back with
> a vengence. See my paper on "Signs, Processes, and Language Games":
>
> JS: http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.htm
>
> Vindication. I like the sound of that!
> On to T^3, the Toyota Truck Terminator!
>
> Jon Awbrey
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