RE: SUO: Monolithic ontologies (was ontology as science)

["West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE" <matthew.west@shell.com>]

Dear Ian,

See comments below.


Matthew West
Principal Consultant
Shell Information Technology International Limited
Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom

Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
Email: matthew.west@shell.com
Internet: http://www.shell.com


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ian Niles [mailto:iniles@teknowledge.com]
> Sent: 24 June 2003 18:17
> To: West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE; Ian Niles; John F. Sowa; Erik Larson;
> Fowler, Julian; Jon Awbrey; Burkett, Bill;
> standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> Subject: RE: SUO: Monolithic ontologies (was ontology as science)
> 
> 
> Matthew,
> 
> 	Comments below.
> 
> -Ian
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE [mailto:matthew.west@shell.com]
> > Sent: Tuesday, June 24, 2003 3:38 AM
> > To: Ian Niles; John F. Sowa; Erik Larson; Fowler, Julian; 
> Jon Awbrey;
> > Burkett, Bill; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > Subject: RE: SUO: Monolithic ontologies (was ontology as science)
> > 
> > 
> > Dear Ian,
> > 
> > See comments below.
> > 
> > 
> > Matthew West
> > Principal Consultant
> > Shell Information Technology International Limited
> > Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
> > 
> > Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
> > Email: matthew.west@shell.com
> > Internet: http://www.shell.com
> > 
> > 
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Ian Niles [mailto:iniles@teknowledge.com]
> > > Sent: 23 June 2003 18:58
> > > To: 'John F. Sowa'; Erik Larson; Fowler, Julian; Jon 
> > Awbrey; Burkett,
> > > Bill; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > > Subject: RE: SUO: Monolithic ontologies (was ontology as science)
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > John,
> > > 
> > > 	I hope you don't mind if I jump in here.  It's true, as the
> > > quotation from the WonderWeb paper asserts, that the 
> > > developers of the SUMO
> > > did not assume a "specific theoretical approach" in creating 
> > > and refining
> > > the ontology.  However, this does not imply, as you seem to 
> > > believe, that
> > > there is no metaphysical perspective which has guided the 
> > > development of the
> > > ontology.  In fact, the SUMO is firmly rooted in metaphysical 
> > > naturalism,
> > > viz. the belief that the natural world, the world of physical 
> > > processes and
> > > objects, is all that there is.  Since naturalism is 
> > > compatible with many
> > > theoretical orientations, it is possible to be both 
> > > metaphysically grounded
> > > and ontologically eclectic.  
> > 
> > MW: Looking this up in the OED suggests that this is mostly about
> > excluding spiritual and supernatural matters. Is that what you
> > mean?
> 
> Right, excluding everything that cannot be regarded as a 
> description of a
> physical object or process (at some level of abstraction).  
> 
> > 
> > MW: This leaves quite a lot open (well almost everything in fact).
> > In particular 3D/4D.
> 
> I did address this controversy in my message.  Since the 
> consensus of this
> list has been, I think, that the two representations are 
> intertranslatable,
> let's just pick one and use a mapping in cases where the other is more
> convenient.

MW: Then you also need the other one to map to...
> 
> > 
> > MW: Where do you stand on possible and modal matters? Do you admit
> > the Starship Enterprise or Sherlock Holmes as things one can talk
> > about (I can't find these in nature). And how about things like
> > stock options? Abstract objects are not part of the natural world,
> > but I assume you do not wish to exclude those do you?
> 
> I agree that we can meaningfully talk about fictional objects, stock
> options, and abstract objects.  However, I don't think the 
> meaning of these
> things is conferred by a Platonic form or some other such 
> nonsense.  I'd
> prefer a Wittgensteinian approach that cashed out their 
> content in terms of
> their function in the language game of which they're a part.

MW: I thought you were disdaining metaphysics - and then you name drop
like this!

MW: So what does/would Sherlock Holmes and the Starship Enterprise
refer to? What language game are they a part of?

MW: In what sense is a stock option involved in a language game?
> 
> > > 
> > > 	As I've said before, I think that the whole purpose of 
> > > a standard
> > > upper ontology is defeated if one assumes anything beyond 
> > > naturalism.  For
> > > one thing, the add-ons 
> > 
> > MW: Could you give some examples of what you mean by "add-ons"?
> 
> Well, there are metaphysical positions that are incompatible with
> naturalism, e.g. Platonic realism or dualism.  However, I 
> don't think these
> alternatives or the others like them would promote any of the 
> applications
> mentioned in the SUO Scope and Purpose statment.  Furthermore, as I
> mentioned below, these other metaphysics would tend to alienate large
> classes of academic users.  

MW: Well I would not include them either unless there were a significant
group that was prepared to work on their inclusion. This is not simply
an academic exercise, and in general I find that the best indicator of
what is valuable is the willingness of people and organisations to
commit resources to the development of artifacts - including SUMO.
> 
> You and John have been arguing, I take it, that the SUMO is 
> lacking because
> it was built upon a sufficiently robust metaphysical foundation.  

MW: The underlying issue is that without a clear foundation, 
the ontology tends to be ambiguous, because different people can overlay
different assumptions and interpretations on the same constructs.

> I've
> responded that we did assume a metaphysical perspective in 
> constructing the
> ontology, viz. naturalism, and I argued that this perspective 
> was enough.  I
> don't think anything else is needed.  If you think something 
> additional or
> different is needed, please let me know what that is.

MW: How you deal with change is the biggest one. I notice Chris
is already pursuing this.

MW: Beyond that I can only suggest that you read Ted Sider's
book Four Dimensionalism. A large part of which is actually about
some different flavours of 3 dimensionalism that are possible.
He is setting them up to knock them down, but he does enumerate
a number of 3D positions that have been taken in the literature.
Your's may be one of them, or none of them, (it can't be all of 
them) but it would be useful to say which up front.
> 
> > 
> > > will always alienate those who are 
> > > ontologically
> > > committed to the negation of the add-ons, and, to the extent 
> > > that people
> > > refuse to use the ontology, it will not serve its intended 
> > function of
> > > semantic middleware.  For another thing, the add-ons are, I claim,
> > > unnecessary.  Although they may arouse deep passions among 
> > > philosophers, we
> > > have yet to find one that is needed to facilitate semantic 
> > > interoperability.
> > > The closest we've come is in the 3D/4D dispute, but, even 
> > > there, I think the
> > > consensus was that you could simply pick one representation 
> > > and then provide
> > > a mapping to the other.  
> > 
> > MW: It is not as simple as that. They have different expressive 
> > capabilities.
> 
> I hate to risk resurrecting this whole debate, but I think 
> the conclusion
> was that the two schemes or representation are intertranslatable.

MW: From which I understand that it was at least your conclusion.
Mine was that we need both because they (potentially at least) have
different areas of application.
> 
> > 
> > > This is exactly what we have done 
> > > with the SUMO.
> > 
> > MW: So which one did you pick? What flavour does it have?
> 
> It's 3D.
> 
> > > 
> > > 	In any case, perhaps rather than citing chapter and verse from
> > > Pierce, you could cite an example where a metaphysical 
> > assumption more
> > > robust than that of naturalism is needed to facilitate one of the
> > > applications mentioned in the SUO Scope and Purpose statement.
> > 
> > MW: Naturalism is hardly a complete metaphysical foundation. It is
> > just one of the things you need.
> 
> So what else do you need?  Really, Matthew, you and John 
> ought to be able to
> give me one example.  That's all I'm asking for.

MW: I've mentioned one above 

- how you deal with change. 

But how about:

- what it means to be an individual (process or physical object  - or both?).

- What sorts of things physical quantities are (pressures, temperatures etc)

Your responses to these things will give some insight into your metaphysics.
> 
> > > 
> > > -Ian  
> > > 
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: John F. Sowa [mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]
> > > > Sent: Saturday, June 21, 2003 2:31 AM
> > > > To: Erik Larson; John F. Sowa; Fowler, Julian; Jon 
> > Awbrey; Burkett,
> > > > Bill; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > > > Subject: Re: SUO: Monolithic ontologies (was ontology 
> as science)
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > Erik,
> > > > 
> > > > I mentioned SUMO as an example of a monolithic ontology
> > > > because Adam has been insisting for a long time that there
> > > > is no need to support options, modules, or microtheories.
> > > > 
> > > > He agreed to vote for motion #2, but he remains unconvinced
> > > > about the need for any kind of modularity that goes beyond
> > > > the simple decomposition of SUMO into 11 modules, all of which
> > > > are assumed (but not yet proven) to be consistent with one
> > > > another.
> > > > 
> > > > The definition of a monolithic ontology is one that is (or
> > > > can be) stated as a single consistent theory with no room
> > > > for incompatible options.  That is what SUMO is today, but
> > > > it's definitely not what Cyc is.  I don't know about DOLCE.
> > > > 
> > > > > John, you're not singling out SUMO as a "monolithic" ontology
> > > > > are you?  Many would agree that it's significantly less
> > > > > monolithic then its competitors, specifically becuase it was
> > > > > designed with communities of users in mind.  For instance...
> > > > 
> > > > Those quotations from Guarino and OpenCyc state principles,
> > > > which don't say anything about modularity.  I believe it is
> > > > a mistake not to emphasize modularity and options.  But I know
> > > > that Cyc does have about 6000 microtheories, and I hope that
> > > > mechanism (or something like it) eventualy makes its way into
> > > > OpenCyc and whatever is proposed by the SUO Working Group.
> > > > 
> > > > >SUMO:
> > > > >
> > > > >Because of its characteristic merging of different upper level
> > > > > ontologies, SUMO is actually not influenced by a specific
> > > > > theoretical approach, rather it tends to take from various
> > > > > ontological proposals those general categories which seem
> > > > > to be largely shared by the computer science community.
> > > > 
> > > > I doubt that Guarino or the Cyclers would question the value
> > > > of borrowing ideas and axioms from many different sources.
> > > > 
> > > > But when people say that they have "not been influenced by
> > > > a specific theoretical approach" that merely means that they
> > > > have not fully analyzed their assumptions.  That is not a good
> > > > sign -- it implies that that they have not done their homework.
> > > > 
> > > > > Given your interest in avoiding biases in the construction
> > > > > of an SUO, it seems you ought to be receptive to the SUMO
> > > > > approach.  Are you?
> > > > 
> > > > I'll reply with a quotation from my favorite philsopher,
> > > > C. S. Peirce:
> > > > 
> > > >    Find a scientific man who proposes to get along without any
> > > >    metaphysics... and you have found one whose doctrines are
> > > >    thoroughly vitiated by the crude and uncriticized metaphysics
> > > >    with which they are packed.  We must philosophize, said the
> > > >    great naturalist Aristotle -- if only to avoid 
> philosophizing. 
> > > >    Every man of us has a metaphysics, and has to have one; and
> > > >    it will influence his life greatly.  Far better, then, that
> > > >    that metaphysics should be criticized and not be allowed
> > > >    to run loose.
> > > > 
> > > > Peirce said this about Ernst Mach and the positivists, but
> > > > he would have been even more vehemently opposed to the logical
> > > > positivists of the 1920s and 30s.  It also applies to anybody
> > > > who claims no influence from "a specific theoretical approach."
> > > > 
> > > > John
> > > > 
> > > 
> > 
>