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Re: SUO: ELP's summary of MRW's standards experience




On Fri, Jun 20, 2003 at 10:25:49AM +0100, West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE wrote:
> 
> Dear John,
> 
> Just a couple of points.
> 
> 1. What I like about Nicola's work is that his foundations are explicit
> so you can get to say whether you like them or not. I am agnostic about
> different 3D ontologies because I think they are infererior for the
> kinds of purposes I have in mind. However, like you I think it is
> important to accomodate both 3D and 4D views.
> 
> 2. I looked at the bit in Nicola's paper about coincident objects. He
> gives the example of the lump of clay and the vase it constitutes. In
> fact a 4D analysis would also see these as two things, because the temporal
> extents are different, even though at some stages of the lump of clay
> they are coincident. The vase is in effect a temporal part of the piece
> of clay. One of the things I particularly like about the 4D approach is
> how it deals with the issues of apparently coincident objects.

My impression was that the 4D approach is attractive precisely because it
lets us posit that there *aren't* 2 objects for the duration of the vase:
the vase is (is-identical-with) a temporal part of the lump of clay
(4D-speak for "during that time the lump and the statue are the same
thing"). So the 2 objects *are* coincident, not just "apparently
coincident" -- in fact they are the same, i.e., there is one, not two,
objects. 

Although I haven't read Sider's book (I am familiar with his Phil. Review
article with the same title), I confess to some puzzlement as to what
exactly a "3D theory" is and says. Sider's interpretation of it as the
mere denial of "four-dimensionalism" makes it very opaque -- in fact, my
impression is that Sider makes this denial so unintelligible that one
comes away with a doubt as to the very meaningfulness of the debate.

But suppose, in any case, that the 3Der won't appeal to temporal parts:
then he'd have to agree to something like the Aristotle-Guarino-Lowe
thesis: that the statue is the same as the lump of clay with a certain
form (a property that is not essentially or "rigidly" of the lump), not
just the same as the lump of clay simpliciter.

> 
> 
> Matthew West
> Principal Consultant
> Shell Information Technology International Limited
> Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
> 
> Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
> Email: matthew.west@shell.com
> Internet: http://www.shell.com
> 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: John F. Sowa [mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]
> > Sent: 20 June 2003 00:32
> > To: West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE; sowa@bestweb.net; Eric Peterson; Mike
> > Pool; apease@ks.teknowledge.com; clegg@cyc.com; John 
> > DeOliveira; Patrick
> > Cassidy; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > Subject: RE: SUO: ELP's summary of MRW's standards experience
> > 
> > 
> > Dear Matthew,
> > 
> > I agree that having well-defined rules is important, but
> > those rules also have implications, which can create
> > inconsistencies, as we have noticed.
> > 
> > JS>You have to be very careful with Nicola's DOLCE.  One of his
> > >fundamental assumptions is totally inconsistent with Matthew's
> > >principle "if two things have the same spatiotemporal extent,
> > >they are identical."
> > 
> > MW> I have no problem mapping to and from multiple coincident objects
> > >as long as I know what the rules are and they are consistently 
> > >applied. That the rules do not coincide with many peoples intuitions
> > >is a different issue.
> > 
> > Intuitions lead to statements that embody them.  They can be
> > stated in formal languages or in natural languages, but sooner
> > or later, they generate inconsistencies with other intuitions.
> > 
> > Although I am in favor of well-defined methodologies, I have
> > serious doubts about the desirability of Nicola's identity
> > rules.  They solve a problem that exists only in Nicola's
> > conceptual model, not in mine or in others that I believe
> > are both more widely used and more suitable as a foundation
> > for ontology.
> > 
> > However, I would be willing to allow Nicola's model to
> > coexist as an option, but not one that I would recommend.
> > 
> > John
> > 
> 

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