Re: ontology as science (was: Re: SUO: Re: (ELP's summary of MRW's standards experience))
Mike,
Yes, certainly:
> Are you saying that ontologists make hypotheses about what
> exists in the world and then go out and attempt to determine
> whether they are right? One posits zebras, and then goes out
> zebra hunting?
In most cases, they don't have to do the dirty work because
a lot of other scientists have brought back the evidence
and cataloged it in appropriate categories. Those are the
lower levels of the hierarchy, which are filled with millions
of concept types.
> Another ontologist posits universals and then devises some
> experiment and checks how many objects are actually
> instantiations of universals to confirm or nullify her
> hypothesis?
The question of universals is a fundamental issue that arose
in the formulation of scientific theories, and many very good
scientists have devoted years of work to determine how to
formulate theories with or without them. The general conclusion
is that you must have universals (AKA predicates and relations)
in order to formulate any theory of physics or any other "hard"
science.
> Or on a more concrete level, would I define something called
> a metre, and then, lo and behold, go out into the world and
> discover it.
That is an example of a conventional definition, which is used
in every branch of science. You cannot record your experiments
without defining suitable units of measurement. And the methods
for defining those units depend critically on other scientific
procedures. Our hero, C. S. Peirce, was the first one to suggest
that the meter be defined in terms of a wavelength of light, and
he invented the experimental equipment that demonstrated how to
do so.
> I really am quite baffled by this claim. Ontologies give us
> conceptual frameworks with which to talk about what exists,
> etc. In some sense it's pre or post scientific, but I don't
> really understand what it would be to collect data on ontology
> issues.
To a large extent, that collecting can be done by looking at
and building on the work of other scientists in particular
specialities: physicists for space, time, matter, causality;
biologists for living things; engineers for artifacts of all
kinds; and, for what it's worth, the work of the "softer"
social scientists for things relating to human behavior,
language, political institutions, economics, etc.
In addition, ontologists must use many of the skills of the
lexicographers to make sure that the categories have some
correspondence with the traditional naming conventions in
ordinary language.
And finally, ontologists must use mathematics and logic to
relate all the axioms and definitions. Those are not empirical
sciences, but they are traditional tools of the hard sciences.
John