RE: SUO: RE: Evaluation Framework for Content Standards
Dear Julian,
Nice to hear from you.
See comments below.
Matthew West
Principal Consultant
Shell Information Technology International Limited
Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
Email: matthew.west@shell.com
Internet: http://www.shell.com
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Fowler, Julian [mailto:JFowler@modulant.com]
> Sent: 18 June 2003 13:43
> To: West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE; John F. Sowa; Chris Partridge;
> standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> Subject: RE: SUO: RE: Evaluation Framework for Content Standards
>
>
> Matthew et al
>
> -----Original Message-----
>
> ... in response to John Sowa's comment suggestion:
>
> > Some of these implications will be handled automatically if
> > Person4D and Person3D are both defined as subtypes of Person.
> > Any properties that are independent of the 3D/4D distinction
> > would be defined for the type Person, and they would therefore
> > apply equally well to the same person under either description.
>
> MW: The problem is that there is not one John Sowa, but a 3D
> John Sowa and a 4D John Sowa, not one that is both 3D and 4D, so
> you need something that relates them and says they are equivalent.
>
> I take it that John's proposal *is* predicated on the
> assumption that there is (in the real world) one John Sowa,
> who can be identified and described from multiple
> perspectives (e.g., using a 3D ontology or a 4D ontology). I
> think that its important here to separate two components
> within the lattice of theories:
>
> 1. When seeking a capability to accommodate different
> ontologies within a common framework, we have to seek out
> concepts that are common across these different perspectives.
> In this example, the common_person_concept is necessarily an
> abstraction that shares some of the intent of both
> 3d_person_concept and 4d_person_concept.
MW: The problem is that 3D and 4D concepts of John share as much
as wave and particle theories of light. Viz they are theories of
the same phenomena.
> We need to be able
> to assert some minimum level of equivalence/correspondence,
MW: Yes.
> through abstraction,
MW: No. You can create a union of 4D person concepts and 3D
person concepts, but there is still a 3D John object and a 4D
John object, and the need for some equivalence between them.
> if we are to have any hope of success
> then the ability to define a deterministic method by which I
> can communicate facts from a 3d world view to a 4d world
> view. Otherwise we might as well start on defining multiple
> point-to-point mappings between ontologies.
MW: If we cannot find a theory that subsumes both 3D and 4D, or
find that one subsumes the other, then yes we will have to do
point to point mappings.
>
> Therefore, within the lattice, there must be relationships
> between 3d_person_concept and common_person_concept and
> between 4d_person_concept and common_person_concept ... we
> shouldn't assume, though, that these relationships are
> necessarily supertype/subtype.
MW: I'm not quite sure what you are proposing here. See my
previous remark.
>
> 2. In addition to such relationships that deal with concepts,
> we need to (separately) address how these concepts are
> represented in these different world views. Coming back to
> the process/event discussion, the distinct viewpoints there
> could be addressed by having a common_event concept that can
> accommodate both views, and also have necessary
> relations/constraints that define the necessary and/or
> preferred representations of these concepts in their
> respective views. Therefore, the determination of whether a
> common_event has location in space and/or time is distinct
> from the determination of whether it is necessary to know the
> spatial or temporal location of a specific event.
MW; This is an important distinction.
> This would
> help to avoid recourse to optional/default relationships at
> an SUO level, which I see as an unhelpful mixture of ontology
> and data modeling.
MW: Quite.
>
> regards
> Julian
>