SUO: *Date 23 Mar 2002 -- Peirce-To-Peers Diapragmatic Diorthesis
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Thought for the Day
| I cannot explain the deep emotion with which I open this book again.
| Here I write but never after read what I have written for what
| I write is done in the process of forming a conception.
| Yet I cannot forget that here are the germs of the
| theory of the categories which is (if anything is)
| the gift I make to the world. That is my child.
| In it I shall live when oblivion has me --
| my body.
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce -- "Logic Notebook" -- 1867 March 23
|
| http://www.iupui.edu/%7Epeirce/web/writings/v2/w2/w2_01/v2_1.htm
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Peirce-To-Peers Diapragmatic Diorthesis
Now that every body suddenly appears to be digging up,
as if from their own skulls, the elemental grounds of
pragmatic hermeneutics, a corpus as long pre-composed
as C.S. Peirce or Kant or -- all along the watchtower --
perchants a relict trio of Bonnie Old Saint Augustine,
well, the First Clown cannot help but to observe that
maybe there will be some bodies who'll now comprehend
the conventional observation that Peirce here indited:
| The second kind of representations are such as are set up
| by a convention of men or a decree of God. Such are 'tallies',
| 'proper names', &c. The peculiarity of these 'conventional signs'
| is that they represent no character of their objects. Likenesses
| denote nothing in particular; 'conventional signs' connote nothing
| in particular. (Peirce, CE 1, pages 467-468).
|
| Now those who are not accustomed to the homologies of the conceptions of
| men and words, will think it very fanciful if I say that this concurrence
| of four terms to determine the sphere of a disjunctive term resembles the
| arbitrary convention by which men agree that a certain sign shall stand
| for a certain thing. And yet how is such a convention made? The men
| all look upon or think of the thing and each gets a certain conception
| and then they agree that whatever calls up or becomes an object of that
| conception in either of them shall be denoted by the sign. In the one
| case, then, we have several different words and the disjunctive term
| denotes whatever is the object of either of them. In the other case,
| we have several different conceptions -- the conceptions of different
| men -- and the conventional sign stands for whatever is an object of
| either of them. It is plain the two cases are essentially the same,
| and that a disjunctive term is to be regarded as a conventional sign
| or index. And we find both agree in having a determinate extension
| but an inadequate comprehension. (Peirce, CE 1, page 469).
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce,
|"The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis",
| Lowell Institute Lectures of 1866, pages 357-504 in:
|
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition',
|'Volume 1, 1857-1866', Peirce Edition Project,
| Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
|
| http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03749.html
| http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03752.html
| http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03767.html
And, of course, I must append this self-quotation:
http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg00792.html
| post*crypt
|
| their omniobjective reconsilience
| makes diapragmatic our diorthesis,
| swear latin lovers in their place.
|
|'but none do there I think embrace' ...
|
| while a hermenaut's gyre on the horizon
| fastens one wheel I will welcome seeing
| quicken the patent reinventure of being.
|
|'and that would be the first human race' ---
Jon Awbrey
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