RE: SUO: Automated or Semiautomated Ontology Development
Hi Bill,
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Bill Andersen [mailto:andersen@ontologyworks.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, 12 March 2002 9:35
> To: Chris Lofting; John F. Sowa
> Cc: cg@cs.uah.edu; SUO
> Subject: Re: SUO: Automated or Semiautomated Ontology Development
>
>
> On 3/10/02 11:34, "Chris Lofting" <ddiamond@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
>
> > Note the interdigitation of
> objects|relationships|objects|relationships etc
> > This reflects the interdigitations across the brain of
> left/right fields etc
> > and especially the interdigitations in the frontal lobes (and so
> > left|right|left|right connections of neurons from different
> hemispheres via
> > the corpus callosum etc etc) also note the ability for
> reversals (the verb
> > 'to TOM' can be derived easily by conversion of WHAT to WHERE
> etc) as can
> > tomato - tomatoed, daughter - daughtered, father - fathered, partner -
> > partnered, stick - sticked....IOW CONTEXT allows for the
> elements of A/NOT-A
> > to swap)
>
> Well, Chris...
>
> Phineas Gage had his corpus collossum severed by a 6-foot iron tamping rod
> that was driven through his scull by an explosion (for those of you who
> don't know this story - it's true) and he didn't seem to have any problem
> with the subtleties of English afterwards.
Firstly:
Gage *did* have problems - the event had a marked affect on how he RELATED
socially (IOW communicate). You seem to think that the only form of
communication is spoken - no way. MOST communication is implicit, body
language, tone used etc etc and the subtleties of that communication, the
refined elements, are reflected in the planning and expression. His loss of
this function made him into a very *unrefined* individual when his behaviour
is compared to that before the event.
Communication is about objects and relationships and all species are capable
of communicating through these concepts that pre-date language as we usually
interpret it. Other species have a problem with memory and so knowledge
storage, sense of history etc etc. [see Stephen Rose's work on memory in
'lower' lifeforms]
The sameness within all species is due to the use of neurons, thus the
'hemispheres' of the brain of a Zebra fish work identically to ours but
lacks our precision etc (left deals more with 'dot' precision and so what is
KNOWN object); right deals more with 'field' precision and so what is
UNKNOWN or APPROXIMATE (relationship - requires text-context analysis). The
whole brain reflects these biases and these are identifiable using dyes to
create banding))
The associations areas are more anterior in the brain and occupy an area
that develops last and as such reflects socialisation, language development
and fine grained distinctions. Gage lost all of that and became very much
corse grained. The genes give us the potentials - nurture then refines
things (or neglects things which means nearby neurons will recruit any
negelected neurons for *their* purpose - as we do at the social level ;-))
Note that in anterior damage to one hemisphere the other tries to compensate
and so emerges properties of the other as dominating behaviour. e.g. left
anterior damage leads to emergence of right brain functions (intergration
bias) and that includes depression as a property (the more intergrating bias
on the right can manifest as feelings of constraint). Right anterior damage
leads to emergence of left brain functions (more differentiation of self
etc) and that includes mania/psychosis as a property. These are general
patterns and 'simple' concepts such as timing problems in left-right
oscillations of the brain lead to these same sort of 'emergences' - e.g.
total accumulated time spent 'in' one hemisphere, if it exceeds the total
time spent 'in' the other will lead to the same sort of 'emergence' where
depression emerges with too much time over the right in that the
characteristics of the right (lack in precision, intergration issues etc)
dominate general thinking.
Degrees of damage to both sides (or one side) will elicit variations. e.g.
the more single context, dot precise left, the side that controls precise
expression in most, if partially damaged (stroke etc) the damage will show
as a loss in 'dot' precision - 1 + 2 = ? is answered with *approximations*
(4,5..?). Note that this loss in 'dot' precision correlates with the
association of high detail and manic perspectives to this part of the brain;
intense exagerations, creative etc.
I would like to have a tape of Gage's expressions. There are some
transcripts around of children who have had a hemisphere removed. At a
superficial level they seem 'ok' in expression but zoom-in for details and
you can identify the anomolies. (there is a recent book out on this -
Battro, A.M.,(2000) "Half A Brain Is Enough : The Story of Nico" CUP - also
see texts on the 'water on the brain' condition)
So - despite the implications in your comments - I assure you Bill I HAVE
done my homework ;-)
Secondly:
>
> That said, what on earth does this have to do with what either Jon Awbrey,
> John Sowa, or I were talking about?
>
JA made reference to two links as examples of his perspectives -
"BA> Step up to the plate and write the code, and we'll see if it works.
The two talks I mentioned discussed a lot of code that has already been
written that does many of the necessary tasks:
http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/negotiat.htm
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/autotalk.htm
And I'll be writing more later to spell out more of the details with
more pointers to actual running programs."
I extracted a particular section for comment in that it showed JAs
perspectives that IMHO reflect a degree of over education with an emphasis
on Noun Phrases etc etc. and so the formality of Transformational Grammar
etc as a 'base'. We need to review the rigidity of that by taking a step
backwards and recognising the neurocognitive processes and in particular the
object:relationship processes that allow for the object:relationship (and
so, for example, particle:wave etc) distinctions to share the same space and
allow context to define which is expressed when (and so definition of an
object is whatever I can associate with 'WHAT' as compared to definition of
a relationship which is whatever I can associate with 'WHERE' etc)
Since we can map the types of numbers we use in Mathematics to these
neurocognitive processes so we see we are identifying a 'fixed' pattern for
communication regardless of manner (in numbers we have -
(1)whole numbers - sense of objects
(2)rational numbers - sense of parts
(3)irrational numbers - sense of invarient relationships (PI, e etc)
(4)imaginary numbers - sense of dynamic relationships (cyclic, morphic
change etc)
The development process leads us to combine these types into complex numbers
(1+2+3 {or more so 1 is enfolded into 2, 2 enfolded into 3} = reals +
imaginary = complex) just as we do with 'basic' categories to give composite
categories in language. (and even in whole numbers we see the same
patterns - primes as 'pure wholes' and all others as composites - 'derived
wholes' IOW mappable to products of relationships of the primes etc)
(A lot of this was missed in the book Lafoff G., & Nunez, R.(2000)"Where
Mathematics Comes From" Basic Books. Which was unfortunate since there was a
missed opportunity to strongly make the point re mathematics, logic, the
spoken word, and all other aspects of communications)
Chris.
------------------
Chris Lofting
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