RE: SUO: Logic and Ontology
Dear Bill,
See comments below.
Matthew West
Principal Consultant
Shell Information Technology International Limited
Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
Email: matthew.r.west@is.shell.com
Internet: http://www.shell.com
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Bill Andersen [mailto:andersen@ontologyworks.com]
> Sent: 05 March 2002 18:02
> To: SUO
> Subject: Re: SUO: Logic and Ontology
>
>
>
> On 3/5/02 09:10, "West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE"
> <Matthew.R.West@is.shell.com>
> wrote:
>
> >
> > Dear Colleagues,
> >
> > I was recently sent a copy of Axiomathes, and noticed a paper
> > with the above title.
> >
> > Cocchiarella, Nino B.; "Logic and Ontology", Axiomathes 12:
> 117-150, 2001
> >
> > The part of the paper that interested me was the different
> > interpretations that could be made of predication, depending on
> > whether your basic ontology is based on nominalism, conceptualism,
> > or realism (or some graduation between).
> >
> > One of these, attributed to Quine, sems to coincide with my own
> > interpretation of predication, and I repeat it here.
> >
> > "Quine's understanding of his ontology as platonistic and of sets
> > as universals is based on a rather involuted argument, the
> essentials
> > of which are as follows: if we were to adopt platonism as a
> theory of
> > universals as represented by higher order logic in which predicate
> > as well as individual variables can be bound, then
> >
> > 1. predicate quantifiers can be given a referential ontological
> > interpretation only if predicates are (mis)construed as singular
> > terms (i.e. terms that can occupy the argument or subject positions
> > of predicates); and
> >
> > 2. assuming extensionality,
>
> That's a big assumption. I have to think this through better
> but if you
> make this move then you're committed to something like Lewis'
> view where a
> predicate like "Beer" applies to all the beer there is,
> anywhere, at any
> time (thus extensional). On this view "Beer" can't apply
> conditionally to
> individuals at worlds or at times.
MW: Correct (more or less), but this is quite consistent with
a 4D view of the world and possible worlds. There are of course
significant upsides to being able to take this view in terms of
rigour and simplicity.
>
> So, accepting the view of predication that you want is asking
> a lot from
> those who don't buy extensionality (this extensionalism
> carries several not
> insignificant ontological burdens of its own in exchange for
> a clean theory
> of predication) or who are actualists but still want
> statements like "There
> could be more beer than what there is" to come out as true.
MW: I agree, which is why I think there is a potential problem
at the highest level. Of course there is no problem in reformulating
your statement above into an equivalent 4D statement.
> Given that,
> there is no basis to call the basis of predication in KIF
> into question.
> After all, it's just a logic and you're being a little hard
> on it, don't you
> think?
MW: I think I am just pointing to potential ambiguity in the
meaning fo predication dependent on the usage of the language
(or FOL in general rather than just the language).
>
> That said, I think you've raised a good issue to think about.
> Those who
> know a lot about Lewis and Quine please chime in here, but I
> think I have
> the basics right.
>
> .bill
>