Re: SUO: Logic and Ontology
Yes, I would agree that if you assume extensionality, as Bill suggests,
you are nearly to the end of your chain, Matt. But many people have real
problems with this assumpton.
I too received this Axiomathes issue (and I too have a problem with the
extensionality assumption), but have not yet read the Cocchiarella
article (though I am usually sympathetic to his views). But I didn't
think that was Lewis's view: geez, Bill, I thought nearly the opposite,
will have to review. I just thought Lewis took a realist position wrt
possible worlds.
Leo
Bill Andersen wrote:
>
> On 3/5/02 09:10, "West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE" <Matthew.R.West@is.shell.com>
> wrote:
>
> >
> > Dear Colleagues,
> >
> > I was recently sent a copy of Axiomathes, and noticed a paper
> > with the above title.
> >
> > Cocchiarella, Nino B.; "Logic and Ontology", Axiomathes 12: 117-150, 2001
> >
> > The part of the paper that interested me was the different
> > interpretations that could be made of predication, depending on
> > whether your basic ontology is based on nominalism, conceptualism,
> > or realism (or some graduation between).
> >
> > One of these, attributed to Quine, sems to coincide with my own
> > interpretation of predication, and I repeat it here.
> >
> > "Quine's understanding of his ontology as platonistic and of sets
> > as universals is based on a rather involuted argument, the essentials
> > of which are as follows: if we were to adopt platonism as a theory of
> > universals as represented by higher order logic in which predicate
> > as well as individual variables can be bound, then
> >
> > 1. predicate quantifiers can be given a referential ontological
> > interpretation only if predicates are (mis)construed as singular
> > terms (i.e. terms that can occupy the argument or subject positions
> > of predicates); and
> >
> > 2. assuming extensionality,
>
> That's a big assumption. I have to think this through better but if you
> make this move then you're committed to something like Lewis' view where a
> predicate like "Beer" applies to all the beer there is, anywhere, at any
> time (thus extensional). On this view "Beer" can't apply conditionally to
> individuals at worlds or at times.
>
> So, accepting the view of predication that you want is asking a lot from
> those who don't buy extensionality (this extensionalism carries several not
> insignificant ontological burdens of its own in exchange for a clean theory
> of predication) or who are actualists but still want statements like "There
> could be more beer than what there is" to come out as true. Given that,
> there is no basis to call the basis of predication in KIF into question.
> After all, it's just a logic and you're being a little hard on it, don't you
> think?
>
> That said, I think you've raised a good issue to think about. Those who
> know a lot about Lewis and Quine please chime in here, but I think I have
> the basics right.
>
> .bill
--
_____________________________________________
Dr. Leo Obrst The MITRE Corporation
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