SUO: Re: Focus & Horizon
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Formerly_1: "Focus & Horizon"
Formerly_2: "Social Constructions"
CL = Cathy Legg
CM = Chris Menzel
JA = Jon Awbrey
JM = Jean-Marc Orliaguet
LW = Ludovico Wittgenstein
PG = Pierre Grenon
PM = Pierluigi Miraglia
RM = Robert Marty
JA: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07245.html
JM: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07247.html
RM: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07258.html
PG: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07263.html
CM: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07264.html
LW: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07317.html
CL: http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07335.html
RM: I think that we can agree that, especially about non physicist ontologies, the
very question (if we are convinced that the reality is a social construction)
is "how we build ontologies" rather that "what ontologies we are building"
because "what" is determined by "how". I me deceived?
PM: Robert, sorry to take your message as a stimulus for criticism,
because it is certainly one of the most reasonable in this thread.
However, I feel that the line of thought you are pushing here, though
entirely worthy in principle, has floated along in a space virtually free
of criticism or clarifications. I'm sure you agree with me that this must
be remedied.
PM: So I hope you don't mind taking up, in a cooperative spirit,
a few critical remarks in regard to your stated position.
I regard these remarks as rather trivial, but it appears
that none of the people who seem to agree with you are
willing to provide at least the hint of a rebuttal.
As a point of order, please note that:
PM: (i) I suggest that, if anyone is interested, we continue ensuing discussion
as much as possible in a private manner off this list, as the connection to
the instutional goal of SUO is rather tenuous here.
Earmark 5. Critical reflection on actual practice is incidental to institutional goals.
PM: (ii) I will simply ignore any and all responses that advert
to soi-disant 'graphical solutions', quotations of obscure
and/or unexplained musings by historical figures and such.
So don't bother.
Earmark 6. The game must be played on our board.
Everything else is out of bounds.
Earmark 7. Writers we do not read are "obscure".
Earmark 8. What we do not know is not important.
PM: This said, here are a few points which I believe you should consider further:
PM: 1) There is a vast and growing analytic-tradition literature on the basic problem(s)
of realism in philosophy: in some of the most technical areas, such as philosophy
of mathematics or physics, there is virtually no other problem that draws so much
interest and effort. The view that social conventions and such play a role,
perhaps a primary one, in the understanding and/or constitution of reality
is debated hotly even in these areas.
PM: So the prejudice -- if that be yours or anyone else's -- that analytic philosophy
(the work of 1,000s of people) can be collectively reduced to tinkering with
'ideal language' fantasies from fin-de-siecle Vienna or some other, equally
narrow parochial venture is worse than wrong: it's pure and simple ignorance.
Please, let's stop even pretending that analytic, logically minded philosophers
subscribe sheepishly to _uncritical_ realism.
PM: 1.5) Some of the most important philosophers discussed in analytic settings
around the world today are far from being the crude realists you imagine:
how about Wittgenstein, Quine, Kuhn, Dummett, Wright, Van Fraassen,
Putnam, Brandom and almost anyone at Pitt, ...?
PM: 2) This, of course, is not say that many -- or any -- are 'convinced that reality
is a social construction'. One of the great merits of the analytic tradition is
that of forcing its practitioners to endlessly strive, at the very least,
towards clear explanations and analysis of their own views.
PM: The thesis that 'social construction' is at the heart of reality is extremely unclear
on its face. Some people tend to interpret it as 'it's optional what to believe', which
in my view is utter nonsense (and, to be sure, no one really believes that _one's_ own
beliefs are optional...). Others, e.g. R. Rorty, have much more to say.
PM: Whatever it is, this is one of the greatest problems in philosophy, and I find it weird
that somebody can really be 'convinced' of it firmly. Aside from my prejudices, though,
the point is: what's philosophically interesting are the details, not the proclamation.
What exactly do you mean by it? What consequences do you think the thesis has for specific
problems, like the truth of this or that scientific theory? What consequences might it have
for ontologies, etc?
PM: Sorry, but neither you nor (let alone) anyone else with fondness for the same sort of views
have so far put forth anything interesting in this regard. (The whine -- from others, not
from you -- that 'those bad and ugly analytic philos wouldn't listen to me anyway' is pathetic,
as I hope point (1) also conveyed.)
PM: 3) Does it seem to you controversial that the 'what' is determined by the 'how' --
in ontology or in any field? Put it in this form, who can deny it? This is much
too vague to mean anything terribly exciting.
PM: If, otoh, you are suggesting that a standard ontology ought to be arrived at merely
through some form of 'democratic' process involving public demonstrations and such,
then I say that's a joke.
PM: The normative standards for evaluating truth or falsity are not the same as
the standards for making a politically sensible decision -- and note that
this is perfectly compatible with seeing such standards as, ultimately,
socially determined ...
PM: Finally, should you feel that some thoughts are best expressed in French,
feel free to reply in French (I don't speak French, but I think that it
should certainly be possible to have more than one language accepted in
a 'standards' list such as this).
PM: Thank you for your patience
PM: I don't speak for Cycorp, Inc.
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