SUO: Re: Re: Sign Relations & Communication
From: "Jon Awbrey" <jawbrey@oakland.edu>
> In so far as any agent is acting as an interpreter of a formal language M
c A*,
> according to the dictates of the sign relation L c OxSxI, where S = I = M,
then
> signs of M might be regarded as being "in the memory" of that interpretive
agent.
>
> But what that does really mean?
>
> We have a habit of saying that signs are "in" the memory
> and that the memory is "in" the agent, but really it would
> make more sense to say that the agent is "in" the memory and
> that the memory is "in" a certain sign. Let me explain this.
Oh I see .. you want to open up the whole 'Is the mind in the body or the
body in the mind?' Pandora's box here. Well I don't think we need to open
it. I like to think very simply and concretely ... i'm not as comfortable
with thinking in ideal abstract spaces as you are. I can put a specific
record *in* a computer's memory ... those and only those records I ~want~ to
consider to be our beloved Interertant for the purposes of the computer. So
then everything the agent knows of itself must needs be a record in the
computer's memory. This space inside the computer is a real world natural
space, it is not an ideal space. It seems to me that you keep on trying to
make it some kind of platonic ideal space. My question again (recoded here)
is: Can you in good conscience *agree* to do that with me or not ? And if
not, why not? Specifically what fears beset you?
> SR: Ok, if that be it, then fine. Perhaps, then, could we peruse your way
> of thinking in another train? (... and I would, ok ok ?) But, Jon,
in
> this train, whether the Interpretant column can be exactly represented
in
> a computer's database memory *is* of paramount importance. What is
important
> to this train is not that an object, x, is somehow a member of each of
the three
> ideal sets {O, S, I} and hence that the sets can be somehow dealt with
equivalently,
> but rather what relationships *can be* reasonably depicted in the
three different
> domains of this ~new~ sign relationship which I am proposing. The
~newness~
> coming exclusively from the idea that we are considering the
Interpertant
> column to be (and only be) that which we can be effectively put in
> a computer's database and control its behavior.
>
> I have read this paragraph 3 times and cannot tell
> if I have yet answered the questions in it or not.
> Please let me know.
No, it appears to me that you are still avoiding answering my specific
question directly. My question goes to our intent and purpose here in this
dialogue. It is of the form: "Do you want to go to New York with me or
not?"
> SR: [1] http://robustai.net/mentography/intensionExtension.gif
>
> This picture still looks off to me.
>
> 1. What are the red boxes with x_1 written over i in them?
Well they are certainly in the Venn Diagram circle labeled Objects ... so
they are objects. I put labels on them so that you could pick them out ...
as far as I know that would be all that I can do with such objects when I
have identified the domain as being of the o in our sign relation {s, i, o}.
> 2. '"x_j" connotes x_j' seems wrong.
>
> Signs connnote other signs, roughly.
I will be glad to use whatever term you prefer ... you know the literature
on the subject far better than I ... since I have found no consensus in my
reading, I am at a loss to choose a term. You had used the term previously
(I forget where) in a way that I though I knew that at least the blunt end
of the reference would need to be in the Interpertant domain ...
consequently I had thought you would understand me. But whatever word we
do use to label it, there is such an arrow of which we can speak that has it
blunt end in the Interpertant domain and its sharp end on a corresponding
object in the Object domain. So, what label would you prefer for that
arrow?
>3. 'i intension of y'? and 'y extension of i'?
> Should be that i is a common intension of x_1, x_2, x_3,
> also that x_1, x_2, x_3 are in the extension of "i", y,
> where the later are taken as terms or as concepts.
I am a bit confused here as to why you think those restraints are not
explicit in my diagram. 'Should be that i is a common intension of x_1,
x_2, x_3' is expressed by the arrows labeled with 'hasProperty' which is
common to all of those. Also 'that x_1, x_2, x_3 are in the extension of
[... intentional snip of "i"...] y' is similarly represented in the
mentograph by the arrows labeled with 'isa'. Putting "i" in that sentence
as you did would for my graph break the rules ... and I don't know why you
did it. The whole point of the arrows labeled with 'intension of' and
'extension of' was to distinguish the Interpertant nodes labeled
respectively with i and with y. Since the whole graph is named
"intensionExtension.gif" and its purpose was to illuminate the distinction
between intension and extension, I felt it was absolutely necessary that I
distinguish the concepts. To distinguish concepts requires that some arrow
between them exists and screams for us to label it.
> 4. 'x_j isa y'? Will need some concreteness:
>
> x_j = cat_j, an object.
Me thinks the equality copula here is quite out of place.
> y = "Cat", a string of char.
True, look for signs (strings) in the domain appropriately labeled 'Signs'.
> 'x_j isa "Cat"' >>>--->>> syntax error.
Agree. Where in the mentograph do you find such an arrow?
> I think this is right -- could be tiredness, though.
>
> I will have to "jog my memory" about that augmented sign relation
> and what all we were talking about on the "Factorization" thread:
Please don't bother ... I kinda interloped on the Factorization thread ...
such a connection will probably not have much to do with this dialogue.
> SR: In other words, ~cats~ are just a figment of the computer's
imagination,
> we'll never find ~cats~ in reality. So if we want to talk about
~cats~,
> we had better look into the computer's imagination.
>
> Don't know what "~cats~" means.
Well If I had said "Cats are just a figment of your imagination." you would
have held me crazy and have pointed at the tabby on your lap screaming
"Foul". Cats like the node labeled y in our discussion and in my mentograph
resides *exclusively* in the computer's memory (also in a human's memory) as
a concept ... this concept can not be found in the natural world where your
Tabby lives out it's life of comfort. Now, please don't take my saying this
here as indicating that I thought you didn't know it .. in fact I'm sure you
have pointed out such distinctions frequently ... and your epistles of such
have helped me clarify this distinction in my mind. I have just quoted this
understanding here so that we might know explicitidly of what we mutually
speak. Point being that this concept ~cats~ must needs be put exclusively
in the Interpertant column ... you assertion that S=I=M notwithstanding.
Seth Russell