SUO: Re: Re: Founderings On Behalf Of Ontology
Thanks for the very enlightening dialogue. I would like to submit my
mentograph of Pierce's insight for your comments:
http://robustai.net/mentography/abductionDeductionInduction.gif
Do you all agree that it captures the essence of Pierce's idea? Do you
think that Pierce saw the symmetry in a similar diagram and formed his
thoughts from that symmetry?
Please note that the diagram uses only binary relations and reifications of
same (the blue nodes are reifications of the arrows beneath them).
Seth Russell
----- Original Message -----
From: "Jon Awbrey" <jawbrey@oakland.edu>
>
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> JS = John Sowa
>
> JS: Some further comments on Robert Marty's citations from CSP:
>
> CP 2.85: "Originality, or Firstness, is another of my Categories."
>
> CP 2.96: "This probational adoption of the hypothesis was an Abduction.
> An Abduction is Originary in respect to being the only kind
> of argument which starts a new idea."
>
> JS: Originality and Originary are not synonyms. So you can't
> equate Abduction = Originary = Originality = Firstness.
>
> JS: The point to make is that every argument is a kind of Thirdness
> in three different ways. (See Peirce's 10 kinds of signs.)
> As the third kind of argument, abduction is Thirdness in
> one additional way. But of the three kinds of arguments,
> it is the only one that is "originary" in the sense of being
> the origin of a new idea (a hypothesis).
>
> CP 2.89: "Obsistence (suggesting obviate, object, obstinate, obstacle,
insistence,
> resistance, etc.) is that wherein secondness differs from
firstness;
> or, is that element which taken in connection with Originality,
makes
> one thing such as another compels it to be."
>
> CP 2.96: "Deduction is Obsistent in respect to being the only kind of
argument
> which is compulsive"
>
> JS: This merely says that deduction is obsistent in respect
> to its effect on some previously unconvinced listener.
> That may be an aspect of Secondness in its effect, but
> not in respect to the way it generates its conclusion.
>
> CP 2.89: "Transuasion (suggesting translation, transaction, transfusion,
transcendental, etc.)
> is mediation, or the modification of firstness and secondness by
thirdness, taken
> apart from the secondness and firstness; or, is being in
creating Obsistence"
>
> CP 2.96: "A Transuasive Argument, or Induction, is an Argument which sets
out
> from a hypothesis, resulting from a previous Abduction, and from
> virtual predictions, drawn by Deduction, of the results of
> possible experiments, and having performed the experiments,
> concludes that the hypothesis is true in the measure in
> which those predictions are verified, this conclusion,
> however, being held subject to probable modification
> to suit future experiments."
>
> JS: Indeed, that is so. But that is only when the induction is
> used to test a previous abduction. Induction or deduction
> can be done by themselves without being linked to a specific
> abduction. However, abduction remains unconfirmed unless it
> is tested by deduction (which makes predictions) and induction
> (which tests them). In that sense, abduction is mediating
> because it brings deduction and induction into the arena
> to confirm the hypothesis.
>
> JS: In an earlier note, Jon A. defined abduction by the pattern
>
> Given B and A=>B, assume A.
>
> JS: However, this pattern, by itself, is a classical fallacy.
> It only becomes a productive form of reasoning, when the
> other two modes of reasoning, deduction and induction,
> are used to confirm A.
>
> Let me focus on the mediate end in view and see if I clear up one thing --
> my "state of clarity regarding all things entering sight" (SOCRATES?)
> is of course a factor here.
>
> The semiotic operation or the style of inference
> that is indicted here, namely, the one that says:
>
> | Presented with a question of fact that takes the form [V => T]?,
> | and granted a presumption of rule that takes the form [U => T]!,
> | it is a rational question of case that takes the form [V => U]?.
> |
> | T
> | o
> | ^^
> | |.\
> | | \
> | | . \
> | | \
> | | . \
> | | \
> | | . \
> | | \
> | ? | . o U
> | | ^
> | | v /
> | | /
> | | /
> | | / ?
> | | /
> | | /
> | | /
> | |/
> | o
> | V
> |
> | [V => T]? [U => T]
> | ----------------------.
> | [V => U]?
>
> The operation in question is neither true nor false in itself.
> It becomes a veridical argument or a fallacious argument only
> if it is presented in relation to some objective of reasoning.
>
> As it stands, the rational number 22/7 is a perfectly good number.
> There is nothing that is true or false about the number in itself.
> Only if it is presented as the ratio of the circumference to the
> diameter of a circle does that presentation become more or less
> true as an approximation to the exact value being in question.
>
> Likewise, the syntactic operation of the form [V => T], [U => T] |- [V =>
U]
> is neither veridical nor fallacious in itself, but only as applied in
relation
> to some objective of reasoning. It would be fallacious if it were
presented as
> a deductive argument, one that achieves an abduction by apodictic,
demonstrative,
> exact means, that is, a deduction that is adequate to exact the case in
every case,
> but it is not being presented as that, indeed, it is not sufficient for
that purpose,
> and it is not intended to be used as anything like that. It is only a
measure that is
> necessary to rationalize the appropriate hypothesis when and if one is
found by any means.
>
> Jon Awbrey
>
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