SUO: Re: Building Ontologies Through Signs And Inquiries (BOTSAI)
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| Homage to thee, Osiris, Lord of Eternity, King of the Gods,
| whose names are manifold, whose forms are holy, thou being
| of hidden form in the temples, whose Ka is holy.
|
| http://www.lysator.liu.se/~drokk/BoD/Papyrus_Ani.txt
JA = Jon Awbrey
JM = Jean-Marc Orliaguet
JM: The same with the division of arguments:
you start by being very general, i.e. you
first consider triadic relations, in general,
then you consider those that are genuinely
triadic (signs), then you consider those where
the relation Sign, object Mind is genuine, i.e.
you leave aside "degenerate signs" such as the
index and the icons, then you ask yourself:
how does the interpretant represents the
relation between the sign and the object?
"The argument is a representamen which does
not leave the interpretant to be determined
as it may by the person to whom the symbol is
addressed, but separately represents what is
the interpreting representation that it is
intended to determine. This interpreting
representation is, of course, the conclusion"
(CP 5.76). Then you ask: "How does the
representamen represents the conclusion
of the argument?" -- "Does it suggest it
(abduction), does it impose it (deduction)
or does it give a provisional conclusion
subject to modifications in an indefinite
future (induction)?"
JA: This is a very 'a priori' way of proceeding.
I used to do a lot of that. It grew tire-some.
And in the end "the rubber has to meet the road" --
we talk like that in De Troit -- so why put it off? --
do some road-testing as you go. Who knows, it might
even prevent an accident.
JM: This is Peirce's way of proceeding as he
describes it in the first draft of L75:
JM, citing CSP:
| I at first saw that there must be three kinds of arguments
| severally related to the three categories; and I correctly
| described them. Subsequently studying one of these kinds,
| I found that besides the typical form, there was another,
| distinguished from the typical form by being related to
| that category relation to which distinguishes abduction.
| I hastily identified it with abduction, not being clear-headed
| enough to see that, while related to that category, it is not
| related to it in the precise way in which one of the primary
| divisions of arguments ought to be, according to the theory
| of the categories. This is the form of error to which my
| method of discovery is peculiarly liable. One sees that
| a form has a relation to a certain category, and one is
| unable for the time being to attain sufficient clearness
| of thought to make quite sure that the relation is of the
| precise nature required. If only one point were obscure,
| it would soon be cleared up; but the difficulty is at
| first that one is sailing in a dense fog, through an
| unknown sea, without a single landmark.
JM: I don't understand the point that you are trying to make about
this 'a priori' way of proceeding being not good enough. Isn't
'a priori' reasoning useful to sort out your conceptions, unless
you prefer the real fog? But besides that, it seems that you are
trying to say that if we start looking at abduction with concrete
examples, we will come to realize that it is only a blind formalism
that led people to believe (like Peirce) that it could actually be
linked to the first category? In what way?
JA, echoing JM, echoing CSP:
| DIVISION OF TRIADIC RELATIONS (CP 2.233)
|
| The principles and analogies of Phenomenology enable us to describe,
| in a distant way, what the divisions of triadic relations must be.
| But until we have met with the different kinds 'a posteriori',
| and have in that way been led to recognize their importance,
| the 'a priori' descriptions mean little; not nothing at all,
| but little.
There is no "supremely unique optimum" (SUO) path of approach for
a complex problem like that of signs and inquiry. I am presently
engaged in extensional and model-theoretic approaches to the task
for the principal reason that I already spent the first decade of
my work in the area exhausting what I personally could achieve by
way of categorical, essential, intensional, proof-theoretic means.
But even here, as far as Peirce's approaches, which are manifold, may go,
I can tell you from spending that first decade largely in CP 3 & 4, that
he wielded the labyris of in-&-ex-tensional methods wholly even-handedly.
All and all, it is crucially important to integrate the diverse tensions.
Have to break here -- will get to the rest maybe later.
Jon Awbrey
JM: I don't understand why in your example of missing the bus
you link expectation to deduction. You write:
JM, quoting JA:
| The name "reflection" seems to fit the process by which
| we can become aware of the previously automatic, implicit,
| and probably unconscious deduction that led to a current
| expectation, the one that is subject to conflict with
| a current observation, thereby generating a dilemma,
| a problem, or a surprise.
JM: This is where your mistake lies, abduction does not connect deduction
with induction because expectation has nothing to do with deduction in
the first place. For Peirce, expectation is a general idea whose being
is in futuro, of the nature of a habit. What you expect, you don't need
to deduce it from anything, you don't deduce your habits, do you?
"unconscious deduction"? What is that strange animal?
JM: PS: I must now subscribe to the other list to continue this discussion,
i.e. to the one not aimed at coming up with a standard.
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