SUO: Re: Founderings On Behalf Of Ontology
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JS = John Sowa
JS: Some further comments on Robert Marty's citations from CSP:
CP 2.85: "Originality, or Firstness, is another of my Categories."
CP 2.96: "This probational adoption of the hypothesis was an Abduction.
An Abduction is Originary in respect to being the only kind
of argument which starts a new idea."
JS: Originality and Originary are not synonyms. So you can't
equate Abduction = Originary = Originality = Firstness.
JS: The point to make is that every argument is a kind of Thirdness
in three different ways. (See Peirce's 10 kinds of signs.)
As the third kind of argument, abduction is Thirdness in
one additional way. But of the three kinds of arguments,
it is the only one that is "originary" in the sense of being
the origin of a new idea (a hypothesis).
CP 2.89: "Obsistence (suggesting obviate, object, obstinate, obstacle, insistence,
resistance, etc.) is that wherein secondness differs from firstness;
or, is that element which taken in connection with Originality, makes
one thing such as another compels it to be."
CP 2.96: "Deduction is Obsistent in respect to being the only kind of argument
which is compulsive"
JS: This merely says that deduction is obsistent in respect
to its effect on some previously unconvinced listener.
That may be an aspect of Secondness in its effect, but
not in respect to the way it generates its conclusion.
CP 2.89: "Transuasion (suggesting translation, transaction, transfusion, transcendental, etc.)
is mediation, or the modification of firstness and secondness by thirdness, taken
apart from the secondness and firstness; or, is being in creating Obsistence"
CP 2.96: "A Transuasive Argument, or Induction, is an Argument which sets out
from a hypothesis, resulting from a previous Abduction, and from
virtual predictions, drawn by Deduction, of the results of
possible experiments, and having performed the experiments,
concludes that the hypothesis is true in the measure in
which those predictions are verified, this conclusion,
however, being held subject to probable modification
to suit future experiments."
JS: Indeed, that is so. But that is only when the induction is
used to test a previous abduction. Induction or deduction
can be done by themselves without being linked to a specific
abduction. However, abduction remains unconfirmed unless it
is tested by deduction (which makes predictions) and induction
(which tests them). In that sense, abduction is mediating
because it brings deduction and induction into the arena
to confirm the hypothesis.
JS: In an earlier note, Jon A. defined abduction by the pattern
Given B and A=>B, assume A.
JS: However, this pattern, by itself, is a classical fallacy.
It only becomes a productive form of reasoning, when the
other two modes of reasoning, deduction and induction,
are used to confirm A.
Let me focus on the mediate end in view and see if I clear up one thing --
my "state of clarity regarding all things entering sight" (SOCRATES?)
is of course a factor here.
The semiotic operation or the style of inference
that is indicted here, namely, the one that says:
| Presented with a question of fact that takes the form [V => T]?,
| and granted a presumption of rule that takes the form [U => T]!,
| it is a rational question of case that takes the form [V => U]?.
|
| T
| o
| ^^
| |.\
| | \
| | . \
| | \
| | . \
| | \
| | . \
| | \
| ? | . o U
| | ^
| | v /
| | /
| | /
| | / ?
| | /
| | /
| | /
| |/
| o
| V
|
| [V => T]? [U => T]
| ----------------------.
| [V => U]?
The operation in question is neither true nor false in itself.
It becomes a veridical argument or a fallacious argument only
if it is presented in relation to some objective of reasoning.
As it stands, the rational number 22/7 is a perfectly good number.
There is nothing that is true or false about the number in itself.
Only if it is presented as the ratio of the circumference to the
diameter of a circle does that presentation become more or less
true as an approximation to the exact value being in question.
Likewise, the syntactic operation of the form [V => T], [U => T] |- [V => U]
is neither veridical nor fallacious in itself, but only as applied in relation
to some objective of reasoning. It would be fallacious if it were presented as
a deductive argument, one that achieves an abduction by apodictic, demonstrative,
exact means, that is, a deduction that is adequate to exact the case in every case,
but it is not being presented as that, indeed, it is not sufficient for that purpose,
and it is not intended to be used as anything like that. It is only a measure that is
necessary to rationalize the appropriate hypothesis when and if one is found by any means.
Jon Awbrey
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