SUO: RE: Foundations for Ontology
Slip of the pen or not ?
John Sowa : " Peirce also applied his trichotomy to subdivide these
subfields. In analyzing the techniques of logical reasoning, he observed
that deduction exemplifies Firstness because it depends only on the syntax
of propositions. Induction exemplifies Secondness because it depends on a
dyadic relation between propositions and reality. In looking for the missing
third, he discovered the principle of abduction, which generates new
hypotheses, which are further tested by the techniques of deduction and
C.S. Peirce : CP 2.85 :"Originality, or Firstness, is another of my
CP 2.96: "2.96 This probational adoption of the hypothesis was an
Abduction. An Abduction is Originary in respect to being the only kind of
argument which starts a new idea."
CP 2.89: "Obsistence (suggesting obviate, object, obstinate,
obstacle, insistence, resistance, etc.) is that wherein secondness differs
from firstness; or, is that element which taken in connection with
Originality, makes one thing such as another compels it to be."
CP 2.96 : "Deduction is Obsistent in respect to being the only kind
of argument which is compulsive"
CP 2.89 :"Transuasion (suggesting translation, transaction,
transfusion, transcendental, etc.) is mediation, or the modification of
firstness and secondness by thirdness, taken apart from the secondness and
firstness; or, is being in creating Obsistence"
CP 2.96 : "2.96 A Transuasive Argument, or Induction, is an
Argument which sets out from a hypothesis, resulting from a previous
Abduction, and from virtual predictions, drawn by Deduction, of the results
of possible experiments, and having performed the experiments, concludes
that the hypothesis is true in the measure in which those predictions are
verified, this conclusion, however, being held subject to probable
modification to suit future experiments."
De : firstname.lastname@example.org
[mailto:email@example.com]De la part de
John F. Sowa
Envoyé : vendredi 19 octobre 2001 09:17
À : firstname.lastname@example.org; email@example.com
Objet : SUO: Foundations for Ontology
Following is the abstract for a paper that I presented at
ICCS'2001 at Stanford in August. Unfortunately, the paper
was not ready in time for the proceedings (or even for the
It clarifies and extends many of the philosophical issues
I discussed in my KR book, and it responds to some criticisms
raised by various people, including Nicola G.
Section 7 is still not completely finished, but it will be
completed with some material that has already been presented
in Chapter 6 of the KR book.
Signs, Processes, and Language Games
Foundations for Ontology
John F. Sowa
Systems, scientific and philosophic, come and go. Each method
of limited understanding is at length exhausted. In its prime
each system is a triumphant success: in its decay it is an
Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas
Abstract. According to Heraclitus, panta rhei -- everything is
in flux. But what gives that flux its form is the logos -- the
words or signs that enable us to perceive patterns in the flux,
remember them, talk about them, and take action upon them even
while we ourselves are part of the flux we are acting in and on.
Modern physics is essentially a theory of flux in which the
ultimate building blocks of matter maintain some semblance of
stability only because of conservation laws of energy, momentum,
spin, charge, and more exotic notions like charm and
strangeness. Meanwhile, the concepts of everyday life are
derived from experience with objects and processes that are
measured and classified by comparisons with the human body,
its parts, and its typical movements. Yet despite the vast
differences in sizes, speeds, and time scale, the languages
and counting systems of our stone-age ancestors have been
successfully adapted to describe, analyze, and predict the
behavior of everything from subatomic particles to clusters of
galaxies that span the universe. Any system of ontology that
is adequate for defining the concepts used in natural languages
must be at least as flexible as the languages themselves: it
must be able to accommodate all the categories of thought that
are humanly conceivable and to relate them to all possible
experiences, either directly by human senses or indirectly by
whatever instrumentation any scientist or engineer may invent.
As a foundation for such an ontology, this paper proposes the
philosophies of three logicians who understood the limitations
of logic in dealing with the both the flux and the logos:
Charles Sanders Peirce, Alfred North Whitehead, and Ludwig