RE: SUO: Organization vs mob
Hi Pat,
See my comments below.
-Ian
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Patrick Cassidy [mailto:pcassidy@bellatlantic.net]
> Sent: Friday, August 31, 2001 3:28 PM
> To: Chris Partridge
> Cc: Ian Niles; Standard-Upper-Ontology (E-mail)
> Subject: Re: SUO: Organization vs mob
>
>
> Chris, Ian --
> Looking over Chris's and Ian's notes, I now agree that there
> may be at least one additional layer of "organization" (small "o")
> that might be useful to distinguish. Chris notes the possbility
> that a grop may achieve some action by independent individual
> actions withut coordination. That would be a completely
> unorganized group -- level 1.
> Then, there may be some degree of communication or coordination
> among the members of a group, such as a mob attacking a Police
> line in a spontaneous outburst. level 2 = a "CoordinatedGroup" ??
> This might include our WolfPack with a leader. Mob 1 can
> act as a group agent without becoming a mob2 -- a group of geese
> eating up and fouling a corporate headquarters lawn, for example.
>
> Then, there are what I would like to think of as true
> "Organizations" -- a group of agents bound by some set of
> agreed-upon rules. -- Level 3.
>
> Ian has made an even finer distinction:
>
> > OK, I guess we have at least three different senses of
> "mob". On one sense,
> > a mob is just a collection of people who are not acting in
> a concerted
> > fashion. On another sense, a mob is a collection of people
> who are acting
> > as a whole, but without the intention to do so. On the
> third sense, a mob
> > is a group of people who are intending to achieve a common
> aim, albeit
> > without any formal organization and perhaps with chaotic
> and even violent
> > methods. Now, one of Pat's points, as I understood him,
> was that a mob in
> > the first or second sense can become a mob in the third
> sense. Hence,
> > unless we want to relativize agency to a time frame, we
> should regard mobs,
> > in all three senses, as having the same sort of agency
> (because they are all
> > capable of the same degree of agency).
> I'm a little unclear as to the distinction between Ian's first
> and second "mob". My difficulty is, if we consider an Agent as
> something that has the potential of agency, all mobs will be potential
> agents, but will not exhibit agency in a specific situation unless
> acting as described by Ian's second or third scenario. Ian's third
> mob seems to be clearly enough distinguished from the first and
> second. The question I would have is whether there is something
> intrinsically different between mob 1 and mob 2, or is the
> difference due to the circumstances external to the nature of the mob?
I think this gets into a really interesting question about the nature of
intentionality that is almost certainly beyond the scope of this mailing
list, but I'd like to say a couple of words about it anyway. Traditional
philosophers would regard the difference between the two sorts of mobs as
being a product of the individual or collective mental constitutions of the
mobsters, where these mental constitutions are unequivocally related to the
objects of intention via some special internal mechanism. On the other
hand, the later Wittgenstein argued that we're inclined to regard
intentionality in this way only because we've been brain-washed by our
language. Wittgenstein would say that intentional notions are bound up with
features of physical context, because, like all words, they are part of an
elaborate language game that makes a variety of presuppositions about the
world.
Be that as it may, I now think that the distinction between accidentally
acting as a whole and intentionally acting as a whole probably will not
matter as far as the purposes of the upper-level ontology are concerned.
> Perhaps the question should be whether every group has the
> *potential*
> to act collectively, or can we distinguish some which cannot act
> collectively?
>
> Pat Cassidy
>
> ===============================
>
>
>
>
>
>
> I haven't tried formalizing level 2: does this seem a
> worthwhile distinction to make?
>
> Pat Cassidy
>
> ================
>
> Chris Partridge wrote:
> >
> > Ian,
> >
> > My comments:
> >
> > IN>Adam and I were talking about this the other day, and we
> both agreed that
> > mobs often act with agency. For example, a mob that is storming the
> > parliament gates is doing so presumably because they want
> to gain power (or
> > they want their representative to gain power). Hence, if
> you agree that any
> > group that is capable of agency is an agent, it would seem
> to follow that
> > mobs are agents.
> >
> > CP>We are using terms in a different way. I presumed that
> mob was being used
> > (as Pat confirmed in a later email) as a technical term
> meaning not organize
> > d in any way. There is a genuine problem here (well a
> number). There is firs
> > tly the problem of real vagueness, and then the problem of
> epistemological i
> > gnorance. Setting these aside.
> > Start with a group of people that are not organized in any
> way - call this a
> > mob (a CYC term I believe). Now, it seems to me a group of
> people can act as
> > a whole without intending to do so - just as a result of
> their individual wa
> > ys of acting. This is an agent. It is also the case that a
> group of people d
> > ue to the mysterious ways we communicate can intentionally
> decide to act tog
> > ether to do something "storming the parliament gates" -
> this is an organizat
> > ion/person/cognitiveagent.
> >
> > CP>>I suppose
> > > it all depends
> > > on what you call a mob. It seems to me that Ian's keeper
> > > lunging group is
> > > merely accidentally acting together and so a mob not a group.
> >
> > IN>We could argue for centuries about issues like this. I
> think at this poi
> > nt
> > we have to step back and ask whether getting clear about
> this issue is going
> > to further the overall aim of semantic interoperability.
> I'm inclined to
> > think that it won't.
> >
> > CP> If we cannot separate agency and intentionality we will
> not get semantic
> > interoperability. It seems to me that the problem arises
> because you are cha
> > nging the meaning of the terms. Pat made quite clear how he
> was using the te
> > rm mob - you seem to have decided to use it with a
> different meaning. Obviou
> > sly you will have problems in communication (semantic
> interoperability).
> >
> > No further comments.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Chris
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
> [mailto:owner-standar
> > d-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org]On Behalf Of Ian Niles
> > Sent: 28 August 2001 20:24
> > To: Standard-Upper-Ontology (E-mail)
> > Subject: RE: SUO: Organization
> >
> > Chris,
> >
> > See my comments below.
> >
> > -Ian
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Chris Partridge [mailto:chris_partridge@csi.com]
> > > Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2001 8:05 AM
> > > To: Ian Niles; Standard-Upper-Ontology (E-mail)
> > > Cc: "mailto:pcassidy"@bellatlantic.net
> > > Subject: RE: SUO: Organization
> > >
> > >
> > > Ian (Pat)
> > >
> > > You wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Thus, I think, every Group should still be an Agent,
> > > > though the GroupAgentFn could still be useful to
> > > > generate Agents from other collections, which
> > > > might not necessarily be Agents. (this assumes
> > > > that non-living things can be Agents. We discussed
> > > > before such a general type of Agent.)
> > >
> > > I'm inclined to agree with you. I tried to think of an
> > > example of a 'Group'
> > > which would not be capable of agency, but I can't imagine
> one. Even a
> > > random group of animals at the local pound might act with
> > > agency, e.g. if
> > > all of them lunged at a keeper who had been mistreating them.
> > >
> > > I understand that TOVE used the notion of Group in their
> > > ontology to deal
> > > with things like - all senior managers working in Sales
> > > Departments. Here
> > > the group will typically have no collective intentionality
> > > and so - it seems
> > > to me - unlikely to qualify as an agent. I think we need to
> > > be clear about
> > > what we mean as a group - as I recall Pat specifically
> > > excluded mobs from
> > > groups, to try and deal with this.
> >
> > Adam and I were talking about this the other day, and we
> both agreed that
> > mobs often act with agency. For example, a mob that is storming the
> > parliament gates is doing so presumably because they want
> to gain power (or
> > they want their representative to gain power). Hence, if
> you agree that any
> >
> > group that is capable of agency is an agent, it would seem
> to follow that
> > mobs are agents.
> >
> > >If this is so then I think
> > > group at some
> > > levels corresponds well enough with organization.
> >
> > It seems to me that organization is a more specific concept
> than group. An
> > organization is a group that is institutionalized to some
> degree - it
> > typically has a relatively long duration, its members have
> a common purpose,
> > it has policies and procedures, there is a chain of command, etc.
> >
> > >I suppose
> > > it all depends
> > > on what you call a mob. It seems to me that Ian's keeper
> > > lunging group is
> > > merely accidentally acting together and so a mob not a group.
> >
> > We could argue for centuries about issues like this. I
> think at this point
> > we have to step back and ask whether getting clear about
> this issue is going
> > to further the overall aim of semantic interoperability.
> I'm inclined to
> > think that it won't.
> >
> > >
> > > Regards
> > > Chris
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
> > > [mailto:owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org]On
> > > Behalf Of Ian
> > > Niles
> > > Sent: 28 August 2001 01:37
> > > To: Standard-Upper-Ontology (E-mail)
> > > Subject: RE: SUO: Organization
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Pat,
> > >
> > > Thanks for helping to clarify things. See my
> comments below.
> > >
> > > -Ian
> > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: Patrick Cassidy [mailto:pcassidy@bellatlantic.net]
> > > > Sent: Monday, August 27, 2001 4:20 PM
> > > > To: Ian Niles
> > > > Cc: Standard-Upper-Ontology (E-mail)
> > > > Subject: Re: SUO: Organization
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Ian --
> > > > Your proposed changes seem to answer some of the
> > > > questions raise, but there is one clarification of the
> > > > meaning of "Agent" that I think is needed. I think
> > > > there is an important distinction that needs to be
> > > > made between physical entities that *can* show
> > > > agency, the *predicate* of agency, and the designation
> > > > of a specific agent as the agent of a specific action.
> > > >
> > > > The CYC #$Agent starts with the statement that an
> > > > #$Agent is something that *can* show independent action;
> > > > but the Docs then exclude plants.
> > > >
> > > > In SUMO there is a class "Agent" and a predicate
> > > > "agent" which relates the role to the class. The
> > > > question is how to interpret the class "Agent".
> > > > The documentations says, like the CYC:
> > > > "An agent is something or someone that can
> > > > act on its own and produce changes in the world"
> > > >
> > > > And the axiom indicates that there has to be some
> > > > action that an agent is agent of:
> > > >
> > > > (<=>
> > > > (instance-of ?X Agent)
> > > > (exists (?Y)
> > > > (agent ?Y ?X)))
> > > >
> > > > This still leaves open the interpretation
> > > > (which I prefer) that an Agent does not have
> > > > to be an agent *at every point in time*,
> > > > merely to *have been* in the role of agent at some
> > > > time, with a potential to be so again. I think
> > > > that is consistent with the axiom above.
> > >
> > > I agree. I think things would become needlessly complex
> if we had to
> > > relativize the notion of agency to a particular time frame,
> > > and the only
> > > alternative to this, as I see it, is to make agency
> > > equivalent to capability
> > > of agency.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > If this interpretation is what is intended, then
> > > > every life form should be an agent, and every
> > > > group of living things should also be an agent,
> > > > because they are capable of agency -- though they
> > > > may not exhibit obvious agency at every point
> > > > in time. At the very least, they are agents of
> > > > the metabolism of nutrients, and of biochemical
> > > > processes; in fact, for every living thing
> > > > there is probably some biochemical process at
> > > > every point in time of which it is an agent.
> > >
> > > I agree with everything you say here, and I was not proposing
> > > that we remove
> > > the 'subclass' link between 'Organism' and 'Agent' in the SUMO.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Thus, I think, every Group should still be an Agent,
> > > > though the GroupAgentFn could still be useful to
> > > > generate Agents from other collections, which
> > > > might not necessarily be Agents. (this assumes
> > > > that non-living things can be Agents. We discussed
> > > > before such a general type of Agent.)
> > >
> > > I'm inclined to agree with you. I tried to think of an
> > > example of a 'Group'
> > > which would not be capable of agency, but I can't imagine
> one. Even a
> > > random group of animals at the local pound might act with
> > > agency, e.g. if
> > > all of them lunged at a keeper who had been mistreating them.
> > >
> > > I'll add back in the 'subclass' link between 'Agent' and
> > > 'Group', unless
> > > someone can think of a good reason not to do this. I'll also
> > > think about
> > > how to refine the proposed 'GroupAgentFn' so that it does
> > > exactly what we
> > > want it to do, viz. generating an agent in cases where an
> > > agent seems to be
> > > lacking.
> > >
> > > Thanks again for your comments.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > On the question of the relations of an Organization
> > > > to its members, I am trying to put together a short
> > > > comment relevant to that, in response to Chris
> > > > Partridge's note.
> > > >
> > > > Pat Cassidy
> > > >
> > > > ===============================
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Ian Niles wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > Hi All,
> > > > >
> > > > > I wanted to summarize the various criteria that people have
> > > > proposed for any
> > > > > adequate formalization of the concept of organization and
> > > > then sketch a
> > > > > formalization that satisfies these criteria.
> > > > >
> > > > > Here, then, are the various criteria that an
> > > > organization satisfies.
> > > > >
> > > > > 1. An organization has agency, e.g. it exhibits
> > > > intentionality, and
> > > > > it has rights, responsibilities, and obligations.
> > > > >
> > > > > 2. An organization may have members, but it is not
> > > > required to have
> > > > > members. There are many examples of organizations, e.g.
> > > > corporations and
> > > > > churches, that have assets are liable for certain claims
> > > > etc, even though
> > > > > they have no members.
> > > > >
> > > > > 3. An organization has temporal extent. It comes
> > > > into being at a
> > > > > certain point in time, and it goes out of existence
> > > > at another
> > > > > point.
> > > > >
> > > > > 4. An organization can have various sorts of
> > > > members. Owners are
> > > > > members of organizations, and employees, directors,
> > > > and other
> > > > > stakeholders may also be members of organizations
> > > > (although perhaps in
> > > > > different senses). An organization may also have other
> > > > organizations as
> > > > > members.
> > > > >
> > > > > All of these criteria have been extracted from Pat
> > > > Cassidy's and Chris
> > > > > Partridge's emails on the subject. The current SUMO
> > > > formalization of
> > > > > 'Organization' as a subclass of 'Collection' satisfies
> > > > points 1 and 3,
> > > > > because 'Organization' is a subclass of 'Group' and 'Group'
> > > > is a subclass of
> > > > > 'Agent' (point 1) and because 'Organization' is indirectly
> > > > a subclass of
> > > > > 'Physical' (point 3). However, since 'Organization' is a
> > > > subclass of
> > > > > 'Collection', it is required to have members, so point 2 is
> > > > not satisfied
> > > > > completely. Furthermore, there is no provision for the
> > > > different sorts of
> > > > > members that may make up an 'Organization', so point 4 is
> > > > also apparently
> > > > > not satisfied.
> > > > >
> > > > > My new proposal is to cleanly separate the notions of
> > > > agency and group.
> > > > > Rather than make 'Organization' a subclass of 'Group', I
> > > > think we should
> > > > > make it a direct subclass of 'Agent', where it will be
> > > > understood as a class
> > > > > of legal entities with certain rights, responsibilities,
> > > > intentionality,
> > > > > etc. We should also, I think, remove the subclass link
> > > > between 'Group' and
> > > > > 'Agent', because there are groups of animals and humans
> > > > that do not exhibit
> > > > > agency of any sort, e.g. a group of cows grazing. We can
> > > > then use a new
> > > > > function, defined as follows, to relate 'Groups' to 'Agents'.
> > > > >
> > > > > (instance GroupAgentFn UnaryFunction)
> > > > > (domain GroupAgentFn 1 Group)
> > > > > (range GroupAgentFn Agent)
> > > > > (documentation GroupAgentFn "Assigns an instance of 'Agent'
> > > > to an instance
> > > > > of 'Group'. In some cases, the 'Agent' assigned will be
> > > > identical to the
> > > > > group, e.g. a flock of geese flying northward. In some
> > > > cases, the 'Agent'
> > > > > will be different from the 'Group', e.g. the
> > > > 'GroupOfPeople' making up an
> > > > > 'Organization' is distinct from the legal entity that is
> > > > the 'Agent'. Note
> > > > > that this is a partial function. There are many cases of
> > > > 'Groups' which do
> > > > > not exhibit agency.")
> > > > >
> > > > > I think this proposal addresses points 1, 2, and 3 above,
> > > > and I think it has
> > > > > the advantage of making the overall structure of the
> > > > ontology cleaner and
> > > > > clearer. It is important to note, however, that this
> > > > proposal does nothing
> > > > > in the way of answering point 4. We are still stuck with
> > > > the problem of
> > > > > defining various sorts of relations between organizations
> > > > and the different
> > > > > classes of members that make them up. However, this
> > > > problem seems to me to
> > > > > be separable from the problem of figuring out what an
> > > > "organization" is. In
> > > > > fact, as I see it, we can take it as the problem of
> > > > defining subrelations of
> > > > > 'member', since 'member' encompasses all of the relations
> > > > that we would ever
> > > > > want to define between an organization and a person who
> > > > belongs to the
> > > > > organization. The only exception to this, as I see it, is the
> > > > > 'subOrganizations' relation. In this case, the relation
> > > > could be redefined
> > > > > so that it is no longer a subrelation of 'subCollection'.
> > > > >
> > > > > I hope this proposal makes sense. Let me know if and where
> > > > you disagree
> > > > > with it.
> > > > >
> > > > > -Ian
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > =============================================
> > > > Patrick Cassidy
> > > >
> > > > MICRA, Inc. || (908) 561-3416
> > > > 735 Belvidere Ave. || (908) 668-5252 (if
> no answer)
> > > > Plainfield, NJ 07062-2054 || (908) 668-5904 (fax)
> > > >
> > > > internet: cassidy@micra.com
> > > > =============================================
> > > >
> > >
> > >
>
> --
> =============================================
> Patrick Cassidy
>
> MICRA, Inc. || (908) 561-3416
> 735 Belvidere Ave. || (908) 668-5252 (if no answer)
> Plainfield, NJ 07062-2054 || (908) 668-5904 (fax)
>
> internet: cassidy@micra.com
> =============================================
>