RE: SUO: RE: RE: RE: 2000-7-26 example - nature of organisation
Dear Chris,
See comments below.
Matthew West
Principal Consultant
Shell Information Technology International Limited
Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
Email: matthew.r.west@is.shell.com
Internet: http://www.shell.com
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Chris Partridge [mailto:chris_partridge@csi.com]
> Sent: 31 August 2001 15:17
> To: West, Matthew R SITI-GREA-UK
> Cc: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> Subject: RE: SUO: RE: RE: RE: 2000-7-26 example - nature of
> organisation
>
>
> Matthew,
>
> Comments below marked CP>>
>
> Chris
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Matthew.R.West@IS.shell.com [mailto:Matthew.R.West@IS.shell.com]
> Sent: 31 August 2001 15:42
> To: 'mail@ChrisPartridge.net'; Patrick Cassidy
> Cc: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> Subject: RE: SUO: RE: RE: RE: 2000-7-26 example - nature of
> organisation
>
>
> Dear Chris,
>
> My reading of Peter Simons book "Parts" is that there are two
> types of mereological object.
>
> 1. Pure mereological sums, where the whole is precisely
> the sum of the parts. These are important theoretically,
> but in practice are generally uninteresting.
>
> 2. Mereological sums where the whole is something more
> than the sum of the parts. In this case there is at
> least one structuring relation that collects the
> parts together.
>
> The range of structuring relations varies enormously, and
> results in objects whose parts are more and less tightly bound to
> each other.
>
> So the parts of a lump of metal are more closely bound than
> the parts of a pump, which are more closely bound in turn
> to the assets of a company.
>
> As far as I can see there can be an almost infinite variety
> of structuring relations.
>
> I therefore see no need for a one size fits all approach
> for how people are parts of companies, and how companies
> are parts of other companies, and the basis certainly
> doesn't have to be one of legal responsibility.
>
> CP>> All agreed for now. My point works the other way. You
> seem to be saying
> that a single whole can be the mereological sum of two
> different collections
> of parts depending upon how you look at it. My (admittedly rusty)
> recollection of Peter Simons is that he does not cover this situation.
MW: This only applies if the spatio-temporal extent is the same, and is
then an accident, just as the vase and the clay possibly being the same
object is
an accident.
>
> More comments below.
>
> Matthew West
> Principal Consultant
> Shell Information Technology International Limited
> Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
>
> Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
> Email: matthew.r.west@is.shell.com
> Internet: http://www.shell.com
>
>
> snip
> > > I'd be interested to know what "the different ways things can
> > > be a "part""
> > > are.
> >
> > MW: I think I have answered this for companies. A company
> > would ordinarily
> > be considered a part of another company when its accounts are
> > consolidated
> > into the other company. The consolidation of accounts
> implies that the
> > activities performed are seen as a whole.
> >
> > CP> As I am sure you know, there are financial accounts and
> management
> > accounts. Do you mean just financial accounts?
>
> MW: In this case yes.
>
> > Shell is a
> > good example (as
> > usual). Do the two holding companies produce consolidated
> > accounts for their
> > partial holdings?
>
> MW: Royal Dutch and Shell Transport produce separate accounts. They
> each have a 60:40 share in a number (3 I think) of holding companies,
> which in turn own all the other companies in the Shell Group directly
> or indirectly. Neither Royal Dutch nor Shell Transport have any other
> interests, so for all practical purposes the companies are
> indistinguishable, except that the shares are quoted on different
> stock markets.
>
> Figures for the whole Group are also produced.
>
> CP>>Who produces the figures for the whole group? Presumably
> that they are
> produced implies that there is an entity (not legally
> recognized anywhere)
> which is Shell Group. Now, if the figures are the consolidation of the
> figures for the three holding companies (as I suspect is
> true), then these
> are the parts of the group. Let's also assume that these
> figures are not
> presented as figures consolidating the Royal Dutch and Shell Transport
> figures (if they in fact are, is there any reason why they
> have to be?) - so
> where does this leave them. Are they parts of the group? The
> consolidation
> criteria would seem to indicate not.
MW: Indeed. I think we would say that Royal Dutch and Shell transport
own indistinguishable shares of the group.
>
> > So are the subsidiaries part of both of the holding
> > companies (I hope I have got Shell's corporate structure
> > right) - this is an
> > example of shared ownership (financial parthood in your
> > terms?), something
> > not usually seen with material parthhood. Also consolidated
> > accounts may be
> > a good guide but are surely not the essence of parthood here.
>
> MW: I disagree, I believe they are exactly the basis of parthood
> for holding companies.
>
> > >
> > > I suspect we use the term 'part' loosely here - and it
> > needs a bit of
> > > regimentation.
> >
> > MW: I've just finished reading Peter Simon's "Parts" and one
> > of the things
> > that has struck me is how variable parthood can be.
> > >
> > > I would have thought that one is normally responsible for
> > > one's parts -
> > > particularly where one is involved in the actions they perform.
> >
> > MW: My father is a part of the same family I am. Is the
> family legally
> > responsible for what he does? In the case of family, parthood
> > seems to be
> > determined by kinship, not ownership, or legal
> > responsibility. This is of
> > course not true for companies.
> >
> > CP> This is interesting for me. I think under old Roman Law
> > (and also modern
> > Islamic Law) the family is a unit of which the members are
> > part - and the
> > paterfamilias is responsible for the family - which is
> > responsible for all
> > its parts. So if you belonged to an Ancient Roman family the
> > answer to your
> > question would be yes. The ties binding the modern British
> > nuclear family
> > are not so strong - but there may a good case for saying that
> > the family is
> > morally responsible.
>
> MW: You keep coming bakc to the legal aspect as if it is the only
> possible basis for parthood. Please, it is one of many possible
> bases. It obviously is not the case in the UK or US, certainly
> not when individuals have reached the age of majority.
> CP>>I am not sure that I have been saying that the legal
> aspect as if it is
> the only possible basis for parthood. In fact I am sure I
> have not. The law
> clearly does not describe all cases of parthood. An obvious case of
> non-legal parthood that I have mentioned a number of times is
> a section
> being part of a department. My interest in the law is that it
> is useful
> because it provides a reasonably regimented description of
> what it intends.
> And so saves time discussing interpretation.
>
>
> > CP>This is one of the few cases I have come across where
> > people are parts of
> > an 'organisation' - i.e. all the activities of the person (part) are
> > activities of the whole. It seems to me kinship, ownership etc. are
> > particular cases of a more general intentional relation -
> > which in some
> > cases implies parthood. And that ancient Rome is an example
> > of where kinship
> > implies parthood.
> >
> > > There is also the problem of different kinds of ownership.
> > > You may think of one of Shell's oil rigs as part of it, but
> > > is a subsidiary
> > > (and its assets).
>
> MW: Yes, certainly in practice. The ownership essentially reflects
> authority (who tells who to do what).
> CP>> You say "ownership" - is this because you regard
> ownership as one of
> the kinds of parthood?
>
> >
> > MW: Yes.
> >
> > > The problem is that the law says that one is not liable for
> > > the activities
> > > of a subsidiary in the same as an organization unit part or
> > > employee.
> >
> > MW: I hope I've made the point that this is a red herring.
> > CP> I missed this - and I cannot find it now. Sorry, but can
> > you remind me
> > (point me to it).
>
> MW: It is the whole point that there can be different structuring
> relations that give rise to different types of parthood, and legal
> responsibility is one of these, but far from the only one.
> CP>> I am still a bit lost. Is the point that legal
> responsibility is (not a
> red herring but only) one of many ways of being a part? So it
> is a good
> guide to legal part - but not to some other kind of part. NB
> So this means
> Shell can be decomposed (and re-composed) into many different kinds of
> parts - but is the same single Shell (my recollection of
> Simons (remember
> rusty) is that he would have different shells for each
> mereological sum -
> but allow the same parts to be fused into different wholes).
>
>
> > > The
> > > case always quoted is Kleinwort Benson vs Malaysian Mining
> > > Corp. (1989). KB
> > > had made a loan to a subsidiary of MMC. The situation is
> > > complicated by a
> > > letter of comfort sent by MMC to KB - which indicated it knew
> > > and approved
> > > of the loan. But the law said MMC was not responsible for its
> > > subsidiary. Is
> > > MMC's subsidiary a (legal) part of it? It seems to me that
> > > this is hard to
> > > argue for.
> >
> > MW: Clearly legal parthood, financial parthood, and kinship
> > parthood are subtly different, and apply on different occassions.
> > CP> Also for arguments about what constitutes parthood. If
> you regard
> > financial parthood as another name for ownership, then you
> > there can be no
> > argument. But I have a fundamental problem here. This means that
> > organizations can have different extents (under different kinds of
> > parthood) - so extension simpliciter becomes less reliable as
> > a mechanism
> > for identity.
>
> MW: In a 4D world it is still farily simple, since spatio-temporal
> extension is teh basis for identify. However, this just moves the
> problem to what classes is it a member of.
> CP>> I am not so sure - the parts have a spatio-temporal
> extent - and the
> fusion of the parts has only one spatio-temporal extent - or
> we have weird
> kind of space-time.
>
>
> MW: This implies that whn you look at a holding company, there would
> be two objects under the different sorts of parthood, the
> company itself
> and the group which it owned. This actually reflects pretty well how
> things are treated and talked about in Shell, where the Shell Group is
> seen as somethign different from either (or both of) Shell transport
> and Royal Dutch.
>
> CP>> This seems closer to my understanding where you multiply
> the wholes
> (with different sub-parthood relations) rather than the
> parthood relations
> to a single whole.
>
> CP>> No more comments.
>
> > CP> No more commernts.
> > >
> > > Chris
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Matthew.R.West@IS.shell.com
> > [mailto:Matthew.R.West@IS.shell.com]
> > > Sent: 31 August 2001 11:06
> > > To: 'mail@ChrisPartridge.net'; Patrick Cassidy
> > > Cc: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > > Subject: RE: SUO: RE: RE: RE: 2000-7-26 example - nature of
> > > organisation
> > >
> > >
> > > Dear Chris,
> > >
> > > I think that the different ways things can be a "part"
> > > of an organisation or a person are part of what makes them
> > > different.
> > >
> > >
> > > Matthew West
> > > Principal Consultant
> > > Shell Information Technology International Limited
> > > Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
> > >
> > > Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
> > > Email: matthew.r.west@is.shell.com
> > > Internet: http://www.shell.com
> > >
> > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: Chris Partridge [mailto:chris_partridge@csi.com]
> > > > Sent: 31 August 2001 08:53
> > > > To: West, Matthew R SITI-GREA-UK; Patrick Cassidy
> > > > Cc: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > > > Subject: RE: SUO: RE: RE: RE: 2000-7-26 example - nature of
> > > > organisation
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Matthew,
> > > >
> > > > I like your comment about slavery.
> > > >
> > > > I agree that there is a nice distinction to be made between
> > > > ownership and
> > > > part involving assets of a company.
> > > > However in a more general framework it makes sense to give
> > > > similar things a
> > > > similar treatment.
> > > > The problem I have been having with treating assets as part
> > > > of a company is
> > > > we do not seem to do this for people. Your car is not part of
> > > > you etc. Maybe
> > > > we should do this for people? Anyway, it would be pleasing to
> > > > get a way of
> > > > looking at these that treated them consistently across the
> > > > kinds of things
> > > > that can own things - or a good explanation why not.
> > > >
> > > > Regards,
> > > > Chris
> > > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
> > > > [mailto:owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org]On
> > > > Behalf Of West,
> > > > Matthew R SITI-GREA-UK
> > > > Sent: 29 August 2001 10:09
> > > > To: Adam Pease; mail@ChrisPartridge.net; Patrick Cassidy
> > > > Cc: iniles@teknowledge.com; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > > > Subject: RE: SUO: RE: RE: RE: 2000-7-26 example - nature of
> > > > organisation
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Dear Adam,
> > > >
> > > > I think the mistake in organisation is thinking that it consists
> > > > only of people. If that were so it would not be possible to sell
> > > > a company - Slavery is illegal in most places. On the other hand
> > > > when a company is sold, its assets pass to the new owner. This
> > > > suggests to me rather strongly that the assets of a company (at
> > > > least) are part of the company.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Matthew West
> > > > Principal Consultant
> > > > Shell Information Technology International Limited
> > > > Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
> > > >
> > > > Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
> > > > Email: matthew.r.west@is.shell.com
> > > > Internet: http://www.shell.com
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > From: Adam Pease [mailto:apease@ks.teknowledge.com]
> > > > > Sent: 27 August 2001 17:28
> > > > > To: mail@ChrisPartridge.net; Patrick Cassidy
> > > > > Cc: iniles@teknowledge.com; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > > > > Subject: RE: SUO: RE: RE: RE: 2000-7-26 example - nature of
> > > > > organisation
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Chris,
> > > > > This is a good issue. I appreciate your input. What I'm
> > > > > advocating
> > > > > here is possibly that there are two distinct notions. One is
> > > > > a common
> > > > > sense notion of an organization - companies have people and a
> > > > > legal shell
> > > > > with no people would be an unusual case. The other is a
> > > > > legal notion that
> > > > > allows legal entities without people to populate them (at
> > > > > least for defined
> > > > > periods). I agree with your legal examples but don't
> > see that it
> > > > > necessarily overrides the common sense one. But we do need
> > > > > both notions, I
> > > > > agree. Ian and I just talked about this and will try to come
> > > > > up with a
> > > > > proposed revision that might accommodate both notions. I'd
> > > > > also welcome
> > > > > any proposal from you on how we might revise the class
> > > > > hierarchy and axioms
> > > > > to support this.
> > > > >
> > > > > Adam
> > > > >
> > > > > At 10:14 AM 8/27/2001 +0200, Chris Partridge wrote:
> > > > > >Adam,
> > > > > >
> > > > > >I suspect Pat is closer to the actual way people use
> > > > > organization (certainly
> > > > > >in commercial practice) than you. In other words, trying to
> > > > > get to the
> > > > > >essentiality of organization through people does not seem a
> > > > > fruitful tack.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Why is an organization not an organization without people?
> > > > > >The legal definition is as a legal person - one that is
> > > > > legally regarded as
> > > > > >able to have rights and responsibilities. There is no
> > > > > mention of human
> > > > > >people here.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >In this scheme there are trusts that do not have to have
> > > > > people belonging to
> > > > > >them at all times. If that were so, then if all the officers
> > > > > of a trust were
> > > > > >to accidentally die - the trust would cease to exist (as Pat
> > > > > has pointed out
> > > > > >below).
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Also, on a similar topic on the EPISTLE email list someone
> > > > > from Holland
> > > > > >point out that it is perfectly legal to set up a company
> > > > > without naming any
> > > > > >of the directors etc.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >You seem to be talking about the people belonging to an
> > > > > organization -
> > > > > >these, obviously, have to be people - but an organization
> > > > > does not have to
> > > > > >have a non-empty group of them to exist.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Also this tack of trying to identify the organization with
> > > > > the people has to
> > > > > >deal with different organizations with the same people
> > > > > (CYC's group approach
> > > > > >has to deal with this as well). And how to recognize that
> > > > > organizations are
> > > > > >agents separate from the people (currently) belonging to the
> > > > > organization.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Things get even trickier when you start trying to explain
> > > > belong and
> > > > > >distinguish between owners, employees, contractors and
> > > > > agents (mercantile
> > > > > >agents). Are they all in a belong relationship - and if
> > > > not why not?
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Regards
> > > > > >Chris
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >-----Original Message-----
> > > > > >From: owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
> > > > > >[mailto:owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org]On
> > > > > Behalf Of Adam
> > > > > >Pease
> > > > > >Sent: 24 August 2001 21:33
> > > > > >To: Patrick Cassidy; Chris Partridge
> > > > > >Cc: iniles@teknowledge.com; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > > > > >Subject: Re: SUO: RE: RE: RE: 2000-7-26 example - nature of
> > > > > organisation
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Pat,
> > > > > > We should be a little careful here because it sounds
> > > > > like you may be
> > > > > >reading a bit into the names of terms - especially for Cyc
> > > > > since the axioms
> > > > > >aren't public.
> > > > > > Another issue which is on my mind because of discussions
> > > > > with Chris
> > > > > >Welty is the essential property of an Organization. An
> > > > > Organization is not
> > > > > >an Organziation without people but may still be one without
> > > > > anything other
> > > > > >than it's members.
> > > > > > But, overall, I think you're bringing up excellent
> > > > > issues. Could you
> > > > > >recommend a change in the axioms to accommodate these issues?
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Adam
> > > > > >
> > > > > >At 02:40 PM 8/24/2001 -0400, Patrick Cassidy wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > >Concerning organizations:
> > > > > > > In the SUMO and also in the CYC, Organization is a
> > > > > > >subclass of Group, which is some assemblage of
> > > > > > >entities -- distinguished from a Set, which is
> > > > > > >considered "timeless an abstract". This
> > > > > > >distinction can be useful, but since groups of
> > > > > > >physical objects can then be considered as physical
> > > > > > >objects, it seems inappropriate to classify an
> > > > > > >organization as a subclass of Group. The members
> > > > > > >of an Organization form part of the Organization,
> > > > > > >but not the whole part. The rules creating the
> > > > > > >organization and defining the relations of members
> > > > > > >to each other and to the group are an essential
> > > > > > >part of an organization -- that's why it is
> > > > > > >"organized". I would prefer to see an
> > > > > > >Organization defined as an agent that has
> > > > > > >a set of operating rules and a group of people
> > > > > > >as a *Part* of the organization. A lot
> > > > > > >of "organizations" have only one person as
> > > > > > >a member (e.g. sole proprietarship corporations
> > > > > > >with no employees other than the owner).
> > > > > > >Consider a legal organization -- it is possible
> > > > > > >for the sole member to die, but for the
> > > > > > >organization to continue as a legal entity,
> > > > > > >e.g. if it has property and debts
> > > > > > >(the heirs might have to clean up the mess).
> > > > > > >In CYC, a Group must have at least one member.
> > > > > > >This situation would create a contradiction,
> > > > > > >unless one were to specify that every owner is
> > > > > > >de facto a member, and even then there could be
> > > > > > >an ownerless corporation whose affairs are
> > > > > > >terminated by some appointeee of the courts.
> > > > > > > To clarify the distinction, we could consider
> > > > > > >a mob or a crowd as consisting solely of
> > > > > > >its members. A mob or a crowd, then, could be
> > > > > > >an Agent that *is* a subtype of Group. The useful
> > > > > > >(I think) distinction would be to consider an
> > > > > > >Organization as an Agent that has a Group as a part.
> > > > > > > The way to specify roles in an organization
> > > > > > >is a different issue.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Pat Cassidy
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >===========================================
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >=============================================
> > > > > > >Patrick Cassidy
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >MICRA, Inc. || (908) 561-3416
> > > > > > >735 Belvidere Ave. || (908) 668-5252 (if
> > > no answer)
> > > > > > >Plainfield, NJ 07062-2054 || (908) 668-5904 (fax)
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >internet: cassidy@micra.com
> > > > > > >=============================================
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Adam Pease
> > > > > >Teknowledge
> > > > > >(650) 424-0500 x571
> > > > >
> > > > > Adam Pease
> > > > > Teknowledge
> > > > > (650) 424-0500 x571
> > > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >
>