RE: SUO: Organization
Chris,
See my comments below.
-Ian
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Chris Partridge [mailto:chris_partridge@csi.com]
> Sent: Thursday, August 30, 2001 1:44 AM
> To: Ian Niles; Standard-Upper-Ontology (E-mail)
> Subject: RE: SUO: Organization
>
>
> Ian,
>
> My comments:
>
> IN>Adam and I were talking about this the other day, and we
> both agreed that
> mobs often act with agency. For example, a mob that is storming the
> parliament gates is doing so presumably because they want to
> gain power (or
> they want their representative to gain power). Hence, if you
> agree that any
> group that is capable of agency is an agent, it would seem to
> follow that
> mobs are agents.
>
> CP>We are using terms in a different way. I presumed that mob
> was being used
> (as Pat confirmed in a later email) as a technical term
> meaning not organize
> d in any way. There is a genuine problem here (well a
> number). There is firs
> tly the problem of real vagueness, and then the problem of
> epistemological i
> gnorance. Setting these aside.
> Start with a group of people that are not organized in any
> way - call this a
> mob (a CYC term I believe). Now, it seems to me a group of
> people can act as
> a whole without intending to do so - just as a result of
> their individual wa
> ys of acting. This is an agent. It is also the case that a
> group of people d
> ue to the mysterious ways we communicate can intentionally
> decide to act tog
> ether to do something "storming the parliament gates" - this
> is an organizat
> ion/person/cognitiveagent.
OK, I guess we have at least three different senses of "mob". On one sense,
a mob is just a collection of people who are not acting in a concerted
fashion. On another sense, a mob is a collection of people who are acting
as a whole, but without the intention to do so. On the third sense, a mob
is a group of people who are intending to achieve a common aim, albeit
without any formal organization and perhaps with chaotic and even violent
methods. Now, one of Pat's points, as I understood him, was that a mob in
the first or second sense can become a mob in the third sense. Hence,
unless we want to relativize agency to a time frame, we should regard mobs,
in all three senses, as having the same sort of agency (because they are all
capable of the same degree of agency).
>
> CP>>I suppose
> > it all depends
> > on what you call a mob. It seems to me that Ian's keeper
> > lunging group is
> > merely accidentally acting together and so a mob not a group.
>
> IN>We could argue for centuries about issues like this. I
> think at this poi
> nt
> we have to step back and ask whether getting clear about this
> issue is going
> to further the overall aim of semantic interoperability. I'm
> inclined to
> think that it won't.
>
> CP> If we cannot separate agency and intentionality we will
> not get semantic
> interoperability. It seems to me that the problem arises
> because you are cha
> nging the meaning of the terms. Pat made quite clear how he
> was using the te
> rm mob - you seem to have decided to use it with a different
> meaning. Obviou
> sly you will have problems in communication (semantic
> interoperability).
I agree that we were perhaps using the term differently, but see my argument
above about why this difference does not make a difference.
>
> No further comments.
>
> Regards,
> Chris
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
> [mailto:owner-standar
> d-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org]On Behalf Of Ian Niles
> Sent: 28 August 2001 20:24
> To: Standard-Upper-Ontology (E-mail)
> Subject: RE: SUO: Organization
>
>
>
> Chris,
>
> See my comments below.
>
> -Ian
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Chris Partridge [mailto:chris_partridge@csi.com]
> > Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2001 8:05 AM
> > To: Ian Niles; Standard-Upper-Ontology (E-mail)
> > Cc: "mailto:pcassidy"@bellatlantic.net
> > Subject: RE: SUO: Organization
> >
> >
> > Ian (Pat)
> >
> > You wrote:
> > >
> > > Thus, I think, every Group should still be an Agent,
> > > though the GroupAgentFn could still be useful to
> > > generate Agents from other collections, which
> > > might not necessarily be Agents. (this assumes
> > > that non-living things can be Agents. We discussed
> > > before such a general type of Agent.)
> >
> > I'm inclined to agree with you. I tried to think of an
> > example of a 'Group'
> > which would not be capable of agency, but I can't imagine
> one. Even a
> > random group of animals at the local pound might act with
> > agency, e.g. if
> > all of them lunged at a keeper who had been mistreating them.
> >
> > I understand that TOVE used the notion of Group in their
> > ontology to deal
> > with things like - all senior managers working in Sales
> > Departments. Here
> > the group will typically have no collective intentionality
> > and so - it seems
> > to me - unlikely to qualify as an agent. I think we need to
> > be clear about
> > what we mean as a group - as I recall Pat specifically
> > excluded mobs from
> > groups, to try and deal with this.
>
> Adam and I were talking about this the other day, and we both
> agreed that
> mobs often act with agency. For example, a mob that is storming the
> parliament gates is doing so presumably because they want to
> gain power (or
> they want their representative to gain power). Hence, if you
> agree that any
>
> group that is capable of agency is an agent, it would seem to
> follow that
> mobs are agents.
>
> >If this is so then I think
> > group at some
> > levels corresponds well enough with organization.
>
> It seems to me that organization is a more specific concept
> than group. An
> organization is a group that is institutionalized to some degree - it
> typically has a relatively long duration, its members have a
> common purpose,
> it has policies and procedures, there is a chain of command, etc.
>
> >I suppose
> > it all depends
> > on what you call a mob. It seems to me that Ian's keeper
> > lunging group is
> > merely accidentally acting together and so a mob not a group.
>
> We could argue for centuries about issues like this. I think
> at this point
> we have to step back and ask whether getting clear about this
> issue is going
> to further the overall aim of semantic interoperability. I'm
> inclined to
> think that it won't.
>
> >
> > Regards
> > Chris
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
> > [mailto:owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org]On
> > Behalf Of Ian
> > Niles
> > Sent: 28 August 2001 01:37
> > To: Standard-Upper-Ontology (E-mail)
> > Subject: RE: SUO: Organization
> >
> >
> >
> > Pat,
> >
> > Thanks for helping to clarify things. See my
> comments below.
> >
> > -Ian
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Patrick Cassidy [mailto:pcassidy@bellatlantic.net]
> > > Sent: Monday, August 27, 2001 4:20 PM
> > > To: Ian Niles
> > > Cc: Standard-Upper-Ontology (E-mail)
> > > Subject: Re: SUO: Organization
> > >
> > >
> > > Ian --
> > > Your proposed changes seem to answer some of the
> > > questions raise, but there is one clarification of the
> > > meaning of "Agent" that I think is needed. I think
> > > there is an important distinction that needs to be
> > > made between physical entities that *can* show
> > > agency, the *predicate* of agency, and the designation
> > > of a specific agent as the agent of a specific action.
> > >
> > > The CYC #$Agent starts with the statement that an
> > > #$Agent is something that *can* show independent action;
> > > but the Docs then exclude plants.
> > >
> > > In SUMO there is a class "Agent" and a predicate
> > > "agent" which relates the role to the class. The
> > > question is how to interpret the class "Agent".
> > > The documentations says, like the CYC:
> > > "An agent is something or someone that can
> > > act on its own and produce changes in the world"
> > >
> > > And the axiom indicates that there has to be some
> > > action that an agent is agent of:
> > >
> > > (<=>
> > > (instance-of ?X Agent)
> > > (exists (?Y)
> > > (agent ?Y ?X)))
> > >
> > > This still leaves open the interpretation
> > > (which I prefer) that an Agent does not have
> > > to be an agent *at every point in time*,
> > > merely to *have been* in the role of agent at some
> > > time, with a potential to be so again. I think
> > > that is consistent with the axiom above.
> >
> > I agree. I think things would become needlessly complex if
> we had to
> > relativize the notion of agency to a particular time frame,
> > and the only
> > alternative to this, as I see it, is to make agency
> > equivalent to capability
> > of agency.
> >
> > >
> > > If this interpretation is what is intended, then
> > > every life form should be an agent, and every
> > > group of living things should also be an agent,
> > > because they are capable of agency -- though they
> > > may not exhibit obvious agency at every point
> > > in time. At the very least, they are agents of
> > > the metabolism of nutrients, and of biochemical
> > > processes; in fact, for every living thing
> > > there is probably some biochemical process at
> > > every point in time of which it is an agent.
> >
> > I agree with everything you say here, and I was not proposing
> > that we remove
> > the 'subclass' link between 'Organism' and 'Agent' in the SUMO.
> >
> > >
> > > Thus, I think, every Group should still be an Agent,
> > > though the GroupAgentFn could still be useful to
> > > generate Agents from other collections, which
> > > might not necessarily be Agents. (this assumes
> > > that non-living things can be Agents. We discussed
> > > before such a general type of Agent.)
> >
> > I'm inclined to agree with you. I tried to think of an
> > example of a 'Group'
> > which would not be capable of agency, but I can't imagine
> one. Even a
> > random group of animals at the local pound might act with
> > agency, e.g. if
> > all of them lunged at a keeper who had been mistreating them.
> >
> > I'll add back in the 'subclass' link between 'Agent' and
> > 'Group', unless
> > someone can think of a good reason not to do this. I'll also
> > think about
> > how to refine the proposed 'GroupAgentFn' so that it does
> > exactly what we
> > want it to do, viz. generating an agent in cases where an
> > agent seems to be
> > lacking.
> >
> > Thanks again for your comments.
> >
> > >
> > > On the question of the relations of an Organization
> > > to its members, I am trying to put together a short
> > > comment relevant to that, in response to Chris
> > > Partridge's note.
> > >
> > > Pat Cassidy
> > >
> > > ===============================
> > >
> > >
> > > Ian Niles wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Hi All,
> > > >
> > > > I wanted to summarize the various criteria that people have
> > > proposed for any
> > > > adequate formalization of the concept of organization and
> > > then sketch a
> > > > formalization that satisfies these criteria.
> > > >
> > > > Here, then, are the various criteria that an
> > > organization satisfies.
> > > >
> > > > 1. An organization has agency, e.g. it exhibits
> > > intentionality, and
> > > > it has rights, responsibilities, and obligations.
> > > >
> > > > 2. An organization may have members, but it is not
> > > required to have
> > > > members. There are many examples of organizations, e.g.
> > > corporations and
> > > > churches, that have assets are liable for certain claims
> > > etc, even though
> > > > they have no members.
> > > >
> > > > 3. An organization has temporal extent. It comes
> > > into being at a
> > > > certain point in time, and it goes out of existence
> > > at another
> > > > point.
> > > >
> > > > 4. An organization can have various sorts of
> > > members. Owners are
> > > > members of organizations, and employees, directors,
> > > and other
> > > > stakeholders may also be members of organizations
> > > (although perhaps in
> > > > different senses). An organization may also have other
> > > organizations as
> > > > members.
> > > >
> > > > All of these criteria have been extracted from Pat
> > > Cassidy's and Chris
> > > > Partridge's emails on the subject. The current SUMO
> > > formalization of
> > > > 'Organization' as a subclass of 'Collection' satisfies
> > > points 1 and 3,
> > > > because 'Organization' is a subclass of 'Group' and 'Group'
> > > is a subclass of
> > > > 'Agent' (point 1) and because 'Organization' is indirectly
> > > a subclass of
> > > > 'Physical' (point 3). However, since 'Organization' is a
> > > subclass of
> > > > 'Collection', it is required to have members, so point 2 is
> > > not satisfied
> > > > completely. Furthermore, there is no provision for the
> > > different sorts of
> > > > members that may make up an 'Organization', so point 4 is
> > > also apparently
> > > > not satisfied.
> > > >
> > > > My new proposal is to cleanly separate the notions of
> > > agency and group.
> > > > Rather than make 'Organization' a subclass of 'Group', I
> > > think we should
> > > > make it a direct subclass of 'Agent', where it will be
> > > understood as a class
> > > > of legal entities with certain rights, responsibilities,
> > > intentionality,
> > > > etc. We should also, I think, remove the subclass link
> > > between 'Group' and
> > > > 'Agent', because there are groups of animals and humans
> > > that do not exhibit
> > > > agency of any sort, e.g. a group of cows grazing. We can
> > > then use a new
> > > > function, defined as follows, to relate 'Groups' to 'Agents'.
> > > >
> > > > (instance GroupAgentFn UnaryFunction)
> > > > (domain GroupAgentFn 1 Group)
> > > > (range GroupAgentFn Agent)
> > > > (documentation GroupAgentFn "Assigns an instance of 'Agent'
> > > to an instance
> > > > of 'Group'. In some cases, the 'Agent' assigned will be
> > > identical to the
> > > > group, e.g. a flock of geese flying northward. In some
> > > cases, the 'Agent'
> > > > will be different from the 'Group', e.g. the
> > > 'GroupOfPeople' making up an
> > > > 'Organization' is distinct from the legal entity that is
> > > the 'Agent'. Note
> > > > that this is a partial function. There are many cases of
> > > 'Groups' which do
> > > > not exhibit agency.")
> > > >
> > > > I think this proposal addresses points 1, 2, and 3 above,
> > > and I think it has
> > > > the advantage of making the overall structure of the
> > > ontology cleaner and
> > > > clearer. It is important to note, however, that this
> > > proposal does nothing
> > > > in the way of answering point 4. We are still stuck with
> > > the problem of
> > > > defining various sorts of relations between organizations
> > > and the different
> > > > classes of members that make them up. However, this
> > > problem seems to me to
> > > > be separable from the problem of figuring out what an
> > > "organization" is. In
> > > > fact, as I see it, we can take it as the problem of
> > > defining subrelations of
> > > > 'member', since 'member' encompasses all of the relations
> > > that we would ever
> > > > want to define between an organization and a person who
> > > belongs to the
> > > > organization. The only exception to this, as I see it, is the
> > > > 'subOrganizations' relation. In this case, the relation
> > > could be redefined
> > > > so that it is no longer a subrelation of 'subCollection'.
> > > >
> > > > I hope this proposal makes sense. Let me know if and where
> > > you disagree
> > > > with it.
> > > >
> > > > -Ian
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > =============================================
> > > Patrick Cassidy
> > >
> > > MICRA, Inc. || (908) 561-3416
> > > 735 Belvidere Ave. || (908) 668-5252 (if no answer)
> > > Plainfield, NJ 07062-2054 || (908) 668-5904 (fax)
> > >
> > > internet: cassidy@micra.com
> > > =============================================
> > >
> >
> >
>
>