RE: SUO: 2000-7-26 example
Matthew,
I agree that "Defects don't stop being defects just because the person
who finds a defect doesn't have a fix." When my car doesn't start, it
still won't start even if I can't fix it. However, if I want to get to
work, I still have to find someone who does know how to fix it, or else I'm
stuck.
Adam
At 10:09 AM 8/29/2001 +0200, West, Matthew R SITI-GREA-UK wrote:
>Dear Adam,
>
> > I think my stance is simply the as you say that "anyone who
> > proposes a new
> > feature has a responsibility
> > to explain the importance of that feature and why it should be
> > adopted". I'm not defending SUMO, just requesting that whoever says
> > something is wrong with it must say precisely what it wrong
> > (in terms of
> > its terms or axioms), and provide a revision to the document.
>
>The first of these is reasonable. The second isn't. Defects don't stop
>being defects just because the person who finds a defect doesn't have
>a fix.
>
>
>Matthew West
>Principal Consultant
>Shell Information Technology International Limited
>Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
>
>Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
>Email: matthew.r.west@is.shell.com
>Internet: http://www.shell.com
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Adam Pease [mailto:apease@ks.teknowledge.com]
> > Sent: 26 August 2001 23:43
> > To: John F. Sowa; Philip Jackson
> > Cc: West, Matthew R SITI-GREA-UK; Yang Yun;
> > standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org; phayes@ai.uwf.edu
> > Subject: Re: SUO: 2000-7-26 example
> >
> >
> > John,
> >
> > At 02:44 PM 8/26/2001 -0400, John F. Sowa wrote:
> > >Phil,
> > >
> > >I agree that anyone who proposes a new feature has a responsibility
> > >to explain the importance of that feature and why it should be
> > >adopted. Right now, I'm busy with several papers that I'm trying
> > >to finish, including two that are based on my ICCS talk and my
> > >IJCAI talk. The first goes into more detail about Peirce and
> > >Whitehead, and the second goes into more detail about the lattice
> > >of all theories and its implications.
> > >
> > >I also agree that Ian and his colleagues (and manager) have been
> > >open to considering a lot of valuable contributions, and they have
> > >quite properly asked for justification before throwing them into
> > >the general pot.
> > >
> > >But if SUMO is to become a general SUO project instead of just
> > >a working paper, then I also believe that Adam has to take the
> > >position of a neutral moderator rather than a staunch defender
> > >of the status quo.
> >
> > I think my stance is simply the as you say that "anyone who
> > proposes a new
> > feature has a responsibility
> > to explain the importance of that feature and why it should be
> > adopted". I'm not defending SUMO, just requesting that whoever says
> > something is wrong with it must say precisely what it wrong
> > (in terms of
> > its terms or axioms), and provide a revision to the document.
> >
> > >Some comments:
> > >
> > >I have no quarrel with the following comment by Adam, since I
> > >recognize the need to provide more detail about how and why
> > >Peirce's triads would contribute to a general ontology.
> > >
> > > > [AP:]
> > > > > I'm not interested in Peirce per se, but only to the extent
> > > > > that he or any
> > > > > other source has elucidated clear distinctions that help us
> > > > > create formal
> > > > > logical models of the world.
> > >
> > >The following is a good question, which I am currently working on
> > >in the paper that elaborates my talk at ICCS:
> > >
> > > > [PJ:]
> > > > Perhaps the issue is not so much the openness of SUMO to
> > inclusion of
> > > > Peircean concepts per se, but rather the extent to which
> > the concepts of
> > > > Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness can be effectively
> > modeled in SUMO, or
> > > > in any other framework. These particular concepts may be
> > very difficult to
> > > > define and model. While it could be a worthy objective to
> > model them, the
> > > > necessity and possibility of doing so seems to be at issue...
> > >
> > >The following quotation is very good, but it only emphasizes one
> > >aspect (although it is an important aspect) of his work. He wrote
> > >thousands of pages about these topics, and it is hard to summarize
> > >them in any short discussion (or single quotation).
> > >
> > > > To illustrate the difficulty, I've given a quote from CSP
> > below. While this
> > > > quote seems quite reasonable in itself, I am not sure
> > that it fully
> > > > encompasses the meanings of these terms...Would you say
> > that it does, or
> > > > would you say it only describes one particular kind of Firstness,
> > > Secondness
> > > > and Thirdness?
> > >
> > >I would say that it describes the basic characteristics of the
> > >three categories (first is possibility, seond is actuality, and
> > >third is generality). But then you have to demonstrate how those
> > >three aspects are iterated and reiterated throughout the whole
> > >ontology. Since I am the proposer, I realize that I have a
> > >responsibility to demonstrate that point. I'm not complaining
> > >about anyone asking me for further "proof of concept". All that
> > >I'm asking for is a willingness to consider the point.
> >
> > For my part, I'll certainly consider the point, and since the
> > document is
> > under control of the group, if there's consensus on a
> > specific change then
> > it will be made, regardless even of what my personal opinion might be.
> >
> > Adam
> >
> > >John Sowa
> > >
> > >-------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >"But when I feel the sheriff's hand on my shoulder, I shall begin to
> > >have a sense of actuality. Actuality is something brute. There is
> > >no reason in it.... We have a two-sided consciousness of effort and
> > >resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably near to a pure sense
> > >of actuality. On the whole, I think we have here a mode of being of
> > >one thing which consists in how a second object is. I call that
> > >Secondness.
> > >
> > >Besides this, there are two modes of being that I call Firstness
> > >and Thirdness. Firstness is the mode of being which consists in its
> > >subject's being positively such as it is regardless of aught else.
> > >That can only be a possibility. For as long as things do not act
> > >upon one another there is no sense or meaning in saying that they
> > >have any being, unless it be that they are such in themselves that
> > >they may perhaps come into relation with others. The mode of being
> > >a redness, before anything in the universe was yet red, was
> > >nevertheless a ositive qualitative possibility. And redness
> > in itself,
> > >even if it be embodied, is something positive and sui generis. That I
> > >call Firstness....
> > >
> > >Now for Thirdness. Five minutes of our waking life will hardly pass
> > >without our making some kind of prediction; and in the majority of
> > >cases these predictions are fulfilled in the event. Yet a prediction
> > >is essentially of a general nature, and cannot ever be completely
> > >fulfilled....
> > >
> > >A rule to which future events have a tendency to conform is
> > ipso facto
> > >an important thing, an important element in the happening of those
> > >events. This mode of being which consists, mind my word if
> > you please,
> > >the mode of being which consists in the fact that future facts of
> > >Secondness will take on a determinate general character, I call a
> > >Thirdnes." (CSP, CP 1:24-26)
> >
> > Adam Pease
> > Teknowledge
> > (650) 424-0500 x571
> >
Adam Pease
Teknowledge
(650) 424-0500 x571