SUO: RE: Organization

[Ian Niles <iniles@teknowledge.com>]

Bob,

 

    OK, I understand your point better now, and I agree that some animals should be regarded as having rights and intentionality (I'd still argue, however, that non-human animals don't have responsibilities.  At least, I can't think of a case where I'd want to ascribe responsibility to a non-human animal.).  Accordingly, perhaps we should create a new concept in the SUMO called 'SentientAgent' and locate it between 'Agent' and 'CognitiveAgent'.  'Agent' would still encompass everything from software agents to people, and 'CognitiveAgent' would be reserved for rational agents, but the new class would cover animals like Koko and pet dogs which are not capable of cognition but which nevertheless are ascribed rights.  What do you think?

 

-Ian

-----Original Message-----
From: Robert Grayson Spillers [mailto:skydog@postoffice.pacbell.net]
Sent: Tuesday, August 28, 2001 12:48 PM
To: Ian Niles; 'Standard-Upper-Ontology '
Subject: Organization

Ian,
Consider a clan of bears (or wolves) that is protected in a certain geographical range that attack and kill several children  (This is unlikely for a historic building  - the roof could fall in,  but I agree that is distinguishable from animals).

They (the protected animals) do seem to have rights and responsibilities separate from humans who have their own rights and responsibilities vis-a-vis the animals.  The fate of such an animal(s) that was captured would depend (I think greatly, but at least to some degree) on (an assessment of) its future intentions towards people. - especially children and perhaps toward unprotected food supplies, etc. There would be no owner who could be called to account for its actions.  It's conceivable that the animal would find legal representation - in a different situation, the spotted owl did and with significant economic consequences.

I think wildlife can be distinguished from domestic animals.  Normally (domestic) animals are considered property and their owners are responsible for their behavior (and are prevented from being "cruel" to them - sending them to slaughter is not considered cruel).  In San Francisco there is a very well known case of two domestic dogs who killed a woman. One of the animals was put to death immediately, but the fate of the second dog is being litigated. The owners of the two dogs (both lawyers) have been criminally charged with the woman's death.

There have been numerous news stories (and scientific papers) about a gorilla (Koko) and her ability to communicate with humans using sign language. She is able to express emotions and  to some degree her desires and intentions.  A very interesting question is can she pass her language abilities to her off-spring.  After several unhappy attempts at mating (her potential mates beat her or showed no interest - sound like a country/western song?), Koko was allowed to pick her mate from video tapes of candidates that zoos or other institutions were willing to lend the foundation that cares for Koko.  I think this is a reasonable example of the ability (though limited) to express intention.  It is fairly easy for humans to understand many animals expression of emotions - fear, anger, depression.

I do not know the current law (in any case it would vary by jurisdiction) but for protected wildlife I believe a case can be made for rights,  responsibilities and (in some cases for some animals)  intention.  Their ability to express themselves may be extremely limited but this is also the case for certain humans (infants, retarded adults, people in a coma, etc.) and the law makes provisions for their circumstances. I think the key legal question would be a particular animal's standing to sue.  If this is established I think legal representation would be found.  In any event I believe we are talking about something broader than what a legislature might enact in a given political authority.

It would be interesting to know (I don't) what the Humane Society, Greenpeace or the International Wildlife Federation would say about this aspect of protected wildlife.

Bob

NOTE: I should disclose that I am pleading a special case.  I have long been a supporter of local, national and international humane and wildlife organizations.  I endowed an educational fund at the local humane society in memory of my wife.  Its purpose is to teach young children how to to physically handle pets, their responsibilities as a pet owner, etc. and how to enjoy wildlife without interfering with it. It is done in cooperation with the local schools and an award is given annually to recognize an outstanding teacher.

Bob,

 

    Thanks for your message.  Are you suggesting that being legally protected entails being a legal agent?  If so, I think that's wrong.  Tracts of land and historic buildings, for example, can have legal protection, but that doesn't make them legal agents.  The legal protection in these cases means, I think, that people and other sorts of agents have responsibilities vis-a-vis these things, even though these things aren't agents themselves. 

 

-Ian  

-----Original Message-----
From: Robert Grayson Spillers [mailto:skydog@postoffice.pacbell.net]
Sent: Monday, August 27, 2001 3:12 PM
To: Ian Niles
Cc: Standard-Upper-Ontology (E-mail)
Subject: Re: SUO: RE: Organization

Ian,
What about a flock of geese (or other creatures - e.g. a school of  fish, a pod of whales, etc.) that have a legally protected status as an endangered species -  both as individuals and as a protected class?   Maybe an old growth forest?  A clan of protected bears that raid camp sites?

Bob


Ian Niles wrote:

EE25484266A64A47AE06CFC47C64232B4CAE46@helium.teknowledge.com">

Hi Chris,

	Thanks for your message.  See my response below.

-Ian

-----Original Message-----
From: Chris Angus [mailto:chris.angus@btinternet.com]
Sent: Monday, August 27, 2001 2:16 PM
To: Ian Niles; Standard-Upper-Ontology (E-mail)
Subject: RE: Organization


Ian

You state:

"My new proposal is to cleanly separate the notions of agency 
and group.
Rather than make 'Organization' a subclass of 'Group', I 
think we should
make it a direct subclass of 'Agent', where it will be 
understood  as a
class of legal entities with certain rights, responsibilities,
intentionality,  etc.  We should also, I think, remove the 
subclass link
between 'Group' and 'Agent', because there are groups of 
animals and humans
that do not exhibit agency of any sort, e.g. a group of cows 
grazing.  We
can then use a new  function, defined as follows, to relate 
'Groups' to'Agents'."

and

 then go on to say:

"In some cases, the 'Agent' assigned will be identical to the 
group, e.g. a
flock of geese flying northward.".

How do you reconcile "where it will be understood as a class of legal
entities" with "a flock of geese" in the general case (i.e. wild geese
rather than my friend Paul's flock of geese)?

Well, a flock of geese would never be a "legal agent", at least I can't
imagine any case where a flock of geese would have formally assigned rights,
responsibilities, etc.  However, a flock of geese could exhibit the sort of
intentionality that is ascribed to a more general class of 'Agent', e.g.
when the flock is flying northward after migrating south for the winter.  On
the other hand, a flock of geese that are all individually going about their
own business, e.g. pecking at feed, preening themselves, etc., would not be
associated with an 'Agent' via the 'GroupAgentFn'!
.  In this case, the flock
would be a 'Group' and nothing more.  I hope this addresses your concern.
Let me know if it doesn't.  

Regards
Chris Angus