Re: SUO: RE: Organization
Ian, Chris A., Chris M., Chris P., and Pat C.,
Some comments on recent notes:
Chris Partridge wrote:
> I suspect that one needs to distinguish between agent and person, though I
> am not sure of the exact distinction. The telling example for me is computer
> trading. The computer definitely is an agent (CYC says - An agent is
> something which can show independent action, whether conscious or not.) but
> it is not a person.
In addition to the concept types Agent and Person, I suggest that
we also throw in the purely biological notion HumanBeing. If you look
at the difference between HumanBeing and Person, that may help to
distinguish the other notions.
As we discussed in many other notes to SUO list, etymology is often
helpful as a guide (although it doesn't pay to push it too far).
1. The word 'agent' comes from the Latin 'ago', which means to do
or to act. So an agent would literally be some animate entity
that is playing the role of acting in some action. That agent
could be a human being, another animal, or some collection of
animals acting together.
2. The word 'person' comes from the Latin 'persona', which literally
means a mask worn in Roman plays (since the sound of the actor's
voice comes through 'personare' the mask). From that, the word
'persona' came to refer to the actor in a play and then to any
actor who plays a role in society. The dictionary definition
of 'persona' as an English word is "the social facade an individual
assumes."
In modern English, the word 'person' has become more generalized,
but it still retains some of the meaning of a human being when
considered in some social role (as opposed to the biological
notion, which is much more neutral).
Suggestion: Include three concepts: HumanBeing for the neutral
biological definition as a member of species Homo Sapiens; Person as
a HumanBeing or collection of HumanBeings when considered in some
social role; and Agent as any animal or robot in the role of
performing some action.
Ian Niles wrote:
JS> To avoid such confusions, I recommend that we drop the word 'class'
> > from SUMO and adopt the following conventions:
>
IN> I'm agreeable to this as long as no objects. I think the
distinction
> between Set and Class in the SUMO has created many more problems than it has
> solved.
I agree. Let's put this on a list of recommended changes, and see
whether anyone objects.
IN> The SUMO concepts that are relevant here are 'Collection' and
'member'. Are
> you proposing that these concepts be modifed in any way?
I would have to dig out the definitions and check.
IN> The SUMO predicates are 'hasPurpose' and 'hasPurposeForAgent'. Are
these
> adequate for your purposes?
Again, I would have to dig out the definitions. But the whole area
of purposes and intentions is very rich (i.e., important, but
complicated), and a lot more thinking is required. As an example,
John Searle wrote a whole book on this topic:
Searle, John R. (1995), _The Construction of Social Reality_,
Free Press, New York.
Then Barry Smith wrote a criticism of the book to which Searle
responded. Even though nothing was settled, the exchange was
interesting for the enormous gap between the two discussants:
http://wings.buffalo.edu/philosophy/faculty/smith/articles/dksearle.htm
I think that Searle got the better of this argument, but they were
mostly talking past one another without reaching a definitive agreement.
Bottom line: The whole notion of 'organization' is intimately bound
up with roles in society and interacting purposes. Just tossing in
a couple of predicates is going to open up many more related (and
equally thorny) questions.
Chris Angus wrote:
> "My new proposal is to cleanly separate the notions of agency and group.
> Rather than make 'Organization' a subclass of 'Group', I think we should
> make it a direct subclass of 'Agent', where it will be understood as a
> class of legal entities with certain rights, responsibilities,
> intentionality, etc. We should also, I think, remove the subclass link
> between 'Group' and 'Agent', because there are groups of animals and humans
> that do not exhibit agency of any sort, e.g. a group of cows grazing.
The cows are definitely "exhibiting agency": they are grazing.
That is certainly an act, and anything that acts is an agent.
John Sowa