RE: SUO: Re: Ballot Comment - 3D versus 4D.
Graham,
In whatever time you do have available, we might still be able to make
progress with a sort of informal restricted English. As long as you use
terms from SUMO which are still consistent with their definitions, folks
that are more conversant with logic could translate them. That might also
have the benefit that as you see your sentences translated, you may pick up
logic, much as watching foreign TV with subtitles can be a way to learn a
new language. My statements about "Joe's arm" were a sort of restricted
English.
Adam
At 03:33 PM 8/28/2001 +1000, Horn, Graham wrote:
>Pat and Adam,
> . I agree there is a need for a formalisation for this
>principle. What's more, you are correct in implying that this is a very
>important aspect.
>
> . Unfortunately, I am not up on the logic practices well
>enough to be able to suggest which formalisations comply with current
>standard approaches, and would need to put quite a few hours into studying
>the area in order to come up with one. I'm afraid I just don't have the time
>to do this, much as I would, in an ideal world, love to take it on and be
>employed in such an area.
>
> . All I can volunteer at this stage is that I see this as
>another of the principles I see as part of a sound approach, along with my
>recent contributions about metaphor and breaking categorisations down into
>orthogonal conceptual structures. (I'll try to find the contributions, and
>attach them at the bottom, separated by double rows of +++++++++++++s.)
>
> . Basically, my thoughts about information management over
>the decades have come to a view that we can usually make most progress by
>exploiting the principles and devices human and animalkind have devised
>and evolved over the past few million years. (Actually it's much longer than
>that, as some of them I observe in reptiles and even arthropods.) These have
>evidently already withstood considerable tests of time, and so are
>demonstrably quite robust.
>
> . The ones I mention above are some of the more useful ones I
>see for this stage of development. Others will be appropriate in the more
>esoteric areas I hinted at below, but also include the evolution of emotions
>and emotional responses.
>
> . So, I suggest the best approach is to mimic how the
>principles I suggested are most consistently, logically and successfully
>implemented among various societies of the genus of Homo Sapiens Sapiens.
>
> . Incidentally, with a bit of thought, you should be able to
>see from this why I was such a strong advocate of a modified and restricted
>version of English for the project. That's also part of the same principle.
>
> . Sorry I can't give a more nuts and bolts answer.
>
>
>
>Cheers Graham Horn
>National Data Standards Unit
>Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
>================================================
>Phone: 02.6244.1094
>Fax: 02.6244.1199
>Email: Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Adam Pease [mailto:apease@ks.teknowledge.com]
>Sent: Tuesday, 28 August 2001 13:57
>To: cassidy@micra.com; Horn, Graham
>Cc: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org; 'John F. Sowa'; Chris Partridge;
>West, Matthew R SITI-GREA-UK; 'pat hayes'
>Subject: Re: SUO: Re: Ballot Comment - 3D versus 4D.
>
>Graham and Pat,
>I agree with Graham's message as well as Pat's interest in suggestions for
>formalization.
>Adam
>At 11:07 PM 8/27/2001 -0400, Patrick Cassidy wrote:
>Graham-
>I agree that the use of approximation and stated tolerances for quantitative
>measures (which, however, could be zero in an ideal abstraction) must be an
>essential part of the SUO. I would be interested in how you think it should
>be formalized.
>Pat Cassidy
>======================
>
>"Horn, Graham" wrote:
>Dear all,
> . Let me suggest a conceptual approach for looking at this,
>and many other problematic areas in development of practical ontologies for
>everyday use.
>
> . The fact is, of course, that the world is quite complicated.
>Naturally there are issues like the longevity of items (3D vs 4D), when
>all physical objects transform over time, not to mention issues like
>timespace etc. Also, there are issues of purity, corrosion, deformation
>form the ideal shape and so forth. And I haven't even touched on more
>esoteric areas like reasoning and motives, etc.
>
> . The nature of human endeavour is evidently that mankind
>makes hypothetical models about the universe that seem to explain
>observations and facilitate planning, etc. We then modify these, generally
>to more complicated models, as shortcomings are found in the earlier ones.
>Of course some, such as Phlogiston being replaced by Oxygen, are abandoned
>as erroneous. Others, such as the geological principles of vulcanism,
>sedimentarianism and metamorphism, are incorporated side by side, once
>recognised as portions of an overarching system rather than the competing
>alternatives they were originally seen to be.
>
> . Furthermore, the earlier and simpler models often provide
>convenient approximations that suit many purposes. Newtonian physics is a
>classic example used by most engineers, even though we know the truer model
>is Einsteinian. Classical chemistry vs nuclear physics vs quantum physics is
>another.
>
> . So, I suggest that the ontology, to be practically useful,
>will need to accommodate approximation.
>
> . I suggest the above little word picture as an initial
>suggestion for a basis for this. I would be happy for it to be modified,
>corrected, etc, by what the group feels makes it more accurate and/or
>practical.
>
> . Again, at the risk of attracting the vehement ire of some
>participants, what do others think?
>
>
>
>Cheers Graham Horn
>National Data Standards Unit
>Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
>================================================
>Phone: 02.6244.1094
>Fax: 02.6244.1199
>Email: Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: John F. Sowa [mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]
><mailto:[mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]>
>Sent: Tuesday, 28 August 2001 9:43
>To: Chris Partridge
>Cc: Adam Pease; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;
><mailto:standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;> West, Matthew R SITI-GREA-UK;
>'pat hayes'
>Subject: Re: SUO: Re: Ballot Comment - 3D versus 4D.
>
>
>Chris and Adam,
>
>This is another of the very many reasons why the goal of a monolithic
>ontology is hopeless:
>
> > I never suggested - or hoped I did not - that there was a simple
> > single answer to this question. Philosophers will be arguing about
> > this for decades - they have a vested interest in doing so - and
> > one of the standard arguments will be that the distinction is
> > misguided. My point is that the issue is well enough understood to
> > recognize some of its important features - one of which is that there
> > are serious problems in having a single consistent way of talking
> > about 3D and 4D - along with a variety of other metaphysical
> > positions. And that deciding on these points is a particularly
> > important aspect of any top ontology.
>
>I believe that there are strong arguments for both sides (and maybe there
>are even more than just 2 options on this and many related issues). The
>lattice of all theories very nicely accommodates all of these views; it can
>show exactly what axioms are common to both, and what axioms are
>contradictory.
>
>All the effort spent in arguing over these issues could have been much more
>profitably spent in making a clean division of the axioms for both
>approaches and giving developers a choice.
>
>John Sowa
>
>
>============================================
>Patrick Cassidy
>MICRA, Inc. || (908) 561-3416
>735 Belvidere Ave. || (908) 668-5252 (if no answer)
>Plainfield, NJ 07062-2054 || (908) 668-5904 (fax)
>
>internet: cassidy@micra.com <mailto:cassidy@micra.com>
>============================================
>
>Adam Pease
>Teknowledge
>(650) 424-0500 x571
>
>+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Horn, Graham
>Sent: Wednesday, 15 August 2001 21:57
>To: 'John F. Sowa'; 'standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org'; 'cg@cs.uah.edu'
>Cc: 'phayes@ai.uwf.edu'; West SSI-GREA-UK Matthew (E-mail)
>Subject: RE: Foundations for ontology
>
>John,
> . In my previous response I inadvertently omitted the word
>"more".
>
> . I have had a chance to go through the presentations at home
>last night.
>
> . I see a major shortcoming in the lack of preparedness to
>accommodate more sophisticated meaning analyses and interpretations. In
>particular, most of the examples of multiple meanings you quoted amounted to
>metaphorical ones.
>
> . I realise that having an information processing paradigm
>that separates out the metaphorical applications implies processing, rather
>than just database access. Nevertheless, it greatly simplifies the basic
>vocabulary. With computer power ever expanding, I suggest that processing
>can be accommodated.
>
> . The advantage is that most word have only a single basic
>meaning, and the application of metaphor is then assessed separately.
>Furthermore, I suggest there aren't overly many common metaphorical
>transmutations.
>
> . This is a bit like my criticism of your examples of
>conceptual graphs many months ago, whereby I felt you weren't breaking the
>options down by fundamental and orthogonal categories. If one does apply
>such information management approaches, the task is significantly
>simplified, though it does require assessment by logical thinkers, rather
>than just anybody. (I have included my email on this below yours). I feel
>that in part, because the CG I commented on then is the same as in your two
>latest papers.
>
> . Furthermore, I suggest orthogonal analysis, including
>separation of basic and metaphorical meanings, lends itself to automation.
>
> . I feel significant leverage is being lost through lack of a
>willingness to undertake this sort of systematic analysis.
>
> . For you to ponder and possibly respond.
>
>
>
>Cheers Graham Horn
>National Data Standards Unit
>Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
>================================================
>Phone: 02.6244.1094
>Fax: 02.6244.1199
>Email: Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Horn, Graham
>Sent: Monday, 13 August 2001 14:18
>To: 'John F. Sowa'; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;
><mailto:standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;> cg@cs.uah.edu
><mailto:cg@cs.uah.edu>
>Cc: phayes@ai.uwf.edu <mailto:phayes@ai.uwf.edu>
>Subject: RE: Foundations for ontology
>
>John,
> . I wish I could spend time digesting the work you have done.
>It is evidently significant and perspicacious.
>
> . Might I suggest you put a motion to the SUO group (or a
>modification to an existing one) for us to consider.
>
> . I suspect you are bringing issues to the forum that
>transcend the considerations most of us have made to date.
>
> . I believe we would be well served by considering our way
>ahead in terms of the issues you have raised, as well as considering your
>recommendations.
>
> . What do others think?
>
>
>
>Cheers Graham Horn
>National Data Standards Unit
>Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
>================================================
>Phone: 02.6244.1094
>Fax: 02.6244.1199
>Email: Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: John F. Sowa [mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]
><mailto:[mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]>
>Sent: Monday, 13 August 2001 13:42
>To: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;
><mailto:standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org;> cg@cs.uah.edu
><mailto:cg@cs.uah.edu>
>Cc: phayes@ai.uwf.edu <mailto:phayes@ai.uwf.edu>
>Subject: SUO: Foundations for ontology
>
>
>As I have said in many notes to SUO list, I have some concerns about any
>ontology that is developed by hand. In two recent talks, I presented my
>views of how ontologies should be developed. The first talk, which I
>presented at ICCS on August 3, surveys the philosophical foundations.
>Following are the slides:
>
> http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signtalk.htm
><http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signtalk.htm>
>
>The second talk, which I presented at an IJCAI workshop on knowledge
>discovery on August 6, suggests automated or semiautomated methods of aiding
>in ontology development. Following are the slides for that talk:
>
> http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/autotalk.htm
><http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/autotalk.htm>
>
>I had originally intended to make this one talk, but as it kept getting
>longer, I split it in two. There will also be a paper, which I'll announce
>later (when it is finished).
>
>At IJCAI, I also attended a talk by Stuart Shapiro. The paper for that talk
>included some comments about Cyc, which are very relevant to ontology
>development by hand. The problems with keeping Cyc consistent indicate why
>I believe that more autotmated and semiautomated tools are essential for
>ontology development. I scanned the paragraphs about Cyc from the paper and
>included them at the end of this note.
>
>As I said at the SUO workshop at IJCAI, I believe that something along the
>lines that Robert Kent has been proposing for IFF is a necessary component
>of any ontology project. I would prefer to see SUMO split up into multiple
>smaller theories that could be combined by belief revision methods.
>
>John Sowa
>
> Some Observations about Cyc
>
>[The following comments on Cyc have been extracted from a paper that was
>presented by Stuart Shapiro at an IJCAI Workshop (citation below). The
>evaluation of Cyc is based on Cycorp documentation and on experience by the
>first author (Frances Johnson) during a Cyc training course.]
>
>Doug Lenat and Cycorp have developed Cyc [Cycorp, 200la] -- a large
>knowledge base and inferencing system that is built upon a core of over a
>million hand-entered assertions or rules about the world and how it works.
>This system attempts to perform commonsense reasoning with the help of this
>large corpus of beliefs (mostly default with some that are monotonic). It
>divides its knowledge base into smaller contexts called microtheories which
>contain specialized information regarding specific areas (such as troop
>movement, physics, movies, etc.). Belief revision is performed within
>microtheories or within a small group of microtheories that are working
>together, and the system is only concerned with maintaining consistency
>within that small group (as opposed to across the entire belief space). For
>example: in an everyday context, a table is solid, but within a physics
>context, it is mostly space (between atoms).
>
>A belief can have only one truth value, so no microtheory can contain both p
>and ~p. For example, ~p could be expressed as the proposition p with a
>truth value of false. The technique for maintaining consistency is to check
>for contradictory arguments whenever a proposition is derived or asserted
>into a microtheory. When contradictions are found, their arguments are
>analyzed, and a decision is made regarding the truth value of the
>propositions involved. Rankings of beliefs, however, is not a part of the
>system -- it uses specificity to determine the truth value of a default
>belief. For example: Opus the penguin does not fly, even though he is a
>bird, because penguins don't fly. If there can be no decision based on
>specificity, the truth value of the default belief is unknown. A default
>belief loses out to a monotonic one. And, lastly, according to Cyc trainers
>and other contacts, contradictions that are purely monotonic bring the
>system to a halt until they are fixed. During Cyc training, Johnson
>attempted to prove this last statement and failed -- revision was performed.
>The instructors were surprised, but thought the training interface might be
>the cause. We plan to explore this further, but it is an example of a
>system behaving differently than it is described.
>
>As mentioned [above], Cyc did not perform as described, and there must be
>some question as to other possible differences from design theory. Most
>specifically, Cyc literature [Cycorp, 2001b] claims to keep the
>microtheories consistent, for lack of a better word. When asked, contacts
>agreed that, in spite of a cursory check, it was possible that unknown
>contradictions might exist that had not, yet, been derived. In this sense,
>Cyc can only guarantee that its microtheories are not known to be
>inconsistent (or KS-consistent). Ideal terminology, such as consistent and
>derivable, is often not appropriate for use with a large or complex
>implemented system.
>
>References
>
>Cycorp [2001a] _Cycorp, Creators of the Cyc Knowledge Base_,
>http://cyc.com <http://cyc.com>
>
>Cycorp [2001b] _Features of CycL_, http://cyc.com/cycl.html
><http://cyc.com/cycl.html>
>
>The original article from which these paragraphs were extracted:
>
>Frances L. Johnson and Stuart C. Shapiro, "Redefining belief change
>terminology for implemented systems," _Inconsistency in Data and Knowledge_,
>Working Notes from IJCAI'01, Seattle, Washington, 6 August 2001, pp. 11-21
>
>
>
>
>+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Horn, Graham
>Sent: Wednesday, 3 January 2001 13:06
>To: 'John F. Sowa'; pat hayes; West, Matthew MR SSI-GREA-UK;
>standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
><mailto:standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org>
>Cc: Awbrey Jon (E-mail); Fuchs E. Norbert (E-mail); Whitten David
>(E-mail)
>Subject: SUO: Ontology Structure & Content
>
>John,
> . Your mention of lattices at the bottom of your e-mail below
>prompted me to return to your "Mathematical Background" at
>www.bestweb.net/~sowa/misc/mathw.htm
><http://www.bestweb.net/~sowa/misc/mathw.htm> . I continue to be frustrated
>at the apparent lack of comprehension by anyone in the SUO group at what I
>have been speaking of as "conceptual dimensionality" and the like.
>
> . Taking your Section 7, I see something close to what I am
>addressing.
>
> . Basically, I would group Erdmann and your beverage types in
>a different way. The basic attributes I see are:
>* temperature,
>* constituents:
>* minerals,
>* plant extracts:
>* leaf,
>* fruit,
>* bean,
>* wood,
>* bark, and
>* root,
>* animal extracts:
>* meat, and
>* milk,
>* brewed extracts:
>* alcohol, and
>* bacilli; and
>* "aeration":
>* "fizz", and
>* froth.
>
> . This provides a far more comprehensive structure, without
>even ranging beyond the beverages you mentioned other than to add the
>logical additional alternatives. It allows further elaboration, such as from
>what species the extracts derived, and what particular extract compositions
>are involved. It would thus more readily accommodate such beverages as
>cappuccino, cocoa, soy milk, Irish coffee, kava, Bovril, yoghurt and so on,
>even flat beer and champagne.
>
> . This involves breaking things up into logical groups that
>are independent of each other, and goes into multiple layers of depth.
>
> . The next problem comes when one begins looking at various
>perspectives. For example some people may wish to look at stimulant
>categories, and wish to group caffeine and taeine together even though one
>is a bean extract (coffee, cola, etc), and the other a leaf extract (tea).
>(Alternatively, sugar can be either a wood or root extract.) So, does one
>break down along the above structure - in which the next level would be the
>species of plant from which the stimulant derived, or should one go directly
>from the next higher level, and then branch directly into extract types?
>Even with this simple example, one can get different structures for such a
>reason.
>
> . However, this structural difficulty can be reduced if one is
>prepared to allow multiple branchings. For example, the constituents
>category above could instead be broken directly down into chemical
>categories (eg. some plant extracts are actually minerals, and some
>biologically based industrial processes deliberately exploit such an
>approach). This would be able to be visualised as the second branching
>coming off the page at right angles, because the issue of chemical
>composition is conceptually independent of the issue of extraction source.
>The two issues are conceptually "orthogonal".
>
> . Please note that this approach does not inherently simplify
>the whole universe into a nice easy to read structure. After all, most
>beverages are artificial, and we are really breaking out portions of the
>ontologies (is this term appropriate here?) of the animal, plant and mineral
>kingdoms, etc., at our convenience. Really we should have developed those
>more fundamental ontologies, and then chosen to exploit them and their
>structures for this beverage classification exercise.
>
> . But I hope this shows some of the power I suggest we can be
>using to structure and populate the SUO in a reasonably optimal way.
>
> . Reactions welcomed (Gees, I must be a masochist, going by
>the previous reactions I have gotten with this project).
>
>
>
>Cheers Graham Horn
>Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
>================================================
>Phone: 02.6244.1094
>Fax: 02.6244.1199
>Email: Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: John F. Sowa [mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]
><mailto:[mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]>
>Sent: Friday, December 22, 2000 9:52 PM
>To: pat hayes; West, Matthew MR SSI-GREA-UK;
>standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
><mailto:standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org>
>Subject: RE: SUO: More KIF-ified Ontology Content
>
>
>Matthew and Pat,
>
>I believe that you have both made some very important points. Rather than
>criticizing the ideas I don't fully agree with, I will comment on some that
>I like very much.
>Then I'll present my preferred way of viewing things, which allows for
>multiple viewpoints to coexist (even when they couldn't be simultaneously
>asserted without contradiction).
> >MW: It is my experience that indeed the things people argue about the most
> >are at the highest levels, where as the day to day things people find
>easier
> >to agree on, because we can point at things to see whether we mean the same
> >thing or not. So for example, I doubt if any difficulty we might have on
> >agreeing what we meant by "red" would have anything to do with whether we
> >saw it as a property, that things could take up, or as a class whose
>members
> >were states, either individuals, or temporal parts of individuals. I would
> >expect the discussion to be around where the border was between red and
> >other adjacent colours. So "red" can fit into different frameworks with
> >different ways of understanding what being red means.
>
>This is a very clear statement of a position, which I agree with, but which
>is more often expressed in a more muddled way, which I don't agree with.
>The simpler, more muddled, and to my mind, more dangerous way is the
>following:
>It is easier for people to agree on the lower-level concepts than on the
>higher-level ones. Therefore, the high-level concepts aren't important, and
>it doesn't matter if we haven't done a good job on the top levels.
>The point where I stop agreeing in such an enthusiastic way is at the next
>sentence:
> >MW: I would further expect
> >to be able to translate between the different frameworks.
>
>Pat has stated my concerns very nicely:
> >PH: Obviously the interesting case is where they are referring to
> >different concepts. But the difficult case is where A's concept
> >cannot even be expressed in B's overall ontological framework, and
> >vice versa.
>
>I also like Pat's succinct summary of an important distinction, which I use
>as one of the top three in my top-level ontology:
> >PH: In the
> >continuant/occurent way of thinking, one refers to existence *at a
> >time*. This means that the four-dimensional entities simply do not
> >exist in this ontology. A continuant is something which continues to
> >exist through time and retains its identity through time, and is such
> >that (this is the characterising property) all its parts are present
> >whenever it is present. Thus a person is a continuant, since if I am
> >here then all my parts are here (now), while a race, say, is not a
> >continuant - it is in fact an occurrent - since it has parts which
> >are temporally distinguished: it has a beginning, a middle and an
> >end. The distinction is like that between a person (a continuant) and
> >that person's life (an occurrent).
>
>And this is a good summary of the problem:
> >PH: Both occurrents and continuants 'map' into 4-d entities in the 4-d
> >histories ontology, but there is no principled way there to
> >distinguish them. The nearest you can get is to say that continuants
> >have isotemporal parts while occurents have isospatial parts, but in
> >the 4-d histories ontology one can cut 'parts' any way one chooses,
> >including along boundaries which slant in time (ie which are
> >'moving', as someone who thinks non-4-dimensionally would say.) And
> >the defining criteria for the distinction in the other ontology is
> >literally incoherent in the 4-d ontology, since *nothing* is such
> >that all its parts are present whenever it is present: the 'whenever'
> >here is meaningless in the 4d ontology.
>
> >As evidence for the idea of a continuant in intuitive thinking,
> >consider the claim that I am the same person I was 10 years ago. This
> >is literally false in the 4-d ontology (it can be expressed there by
> >saying that me-now and me-1990 are both slices of the me-history, but
> >that raises the question of what distinguishes one history from
> >another, since these are also both slices of completely unrelated
> >histories) Statements like this seem to depend on the idea of
> >something retaining its identity through time, even though its
> >properties may change. This 'locus of identity' is what constitutes
> >the basic idea of a continuant, I think.
>
>To summarize:
>1. Pat says that the 4-D viewpoint allows ways of cutting up the
>universe that cannot be mapped into the viewpoint of 3-D plus time.
>2. Matthew points out that it is easier to map the 3-D plus time
>viewpoint into the 4-D viewpoint.
>
>I agree with both, but only with the caveat that "easier" does not imply
>"possible to translate each and every distinction that anyone would ever
>want to make."
> >>MW: Until recently I used as my baseline a viewpoint that said
>that there
> >>were individual things like you, my car, classes, and
>associations, where
> >>an association is a relationship that understands that it lasts
>for a period
> >>of time. I have moved to a 4D approach, replacing individual
>things with
> >>spatio-temporal extents, and associations with timeless relations.
>However,
> >>I know very well how to take something from my old model and
>represent it
> >>in the new model, and vice-versa.
>
>But Pat points out the problem some distinctions vanish in the 4-D ontology,
>and I agree:
> >I wonder if you really can do this, if you think hard about it. Ive
> >been living within a 4-d ontology for a long time and mapping other
> >ontologies to it, and what I find is that many distinctions simply
> >vanish, rather than being 'translated'. This is fine with me, of
> >course, but it tends to get the other folk a little upset, especially
> >when they have written entire books about these distinctions. And in
> >the other direction, I find that perfectly reasonable-seeming things
> >in my ontology, like 'moving' (sloping in space/time) boundaries,
> >simply cannot be admitted into the other ontologies without producing
> >unacceptable confusions.
>
>I also agree very strongly with the following:
> >PH: I think that what seems to me to be overoptimism about the
> > prospects of the SUO among some folk might arise from their failure
> > to appreciate that such incompatible conceptualizations can even
> > exist, let alone all have their uses.
>
>I agree with Matthew's last sentence, but not the first one:
> >MW: I have a simple attitude towards incompatible conceptualisations: they
> >mean we do not understand the world around us. The world around us is not
> >incompatible with itself.
>
>There may be very good reasons for using incompatible representations even
>when a single unified one is understood, as Pat explained with his example
>of quantum electrodynamics. I also believe that there are a very large
>number of other examples that one could use, as I tried to explain in the
>Knowledge Soup chapter of my KR book.
>Although I agree with a great deal of what Pat says, I would quibble with
>the following:
> >PH: the
> >world around us IS incompatible with itself, in that we have to use
> >two incompatible ways of conceptualizing it in order to fully
> >describe it. There is no single underlying theory of the world, and
> >some of the best minds who have thought about the matter during the
> >last century have concluded that there is no way to produce one.
>
>On the contrary, quantum electrodynamics is a single coherent
>conceptualization, and it is possible (at least in principle) to use it to
>solve problems without breaking it apart in incompatible ways.
>Unfortunately, for most practical problems, QED is so computationally
>difficult that different (and incompatible) simplifications are necessary to
>get useful results in an acceptable amount of time.
>I strongly agree with Pat's point:
> >PH: I think that you believe that there is a single, universally
> >acceptable, ontology, and that all others can be mapped into it. I
> >think this will happen only when science stops.
>
>But I still believe that there is something useful that we can
>accomplish even before science stops. My best cut at what
>that may be is summarized in the Knowledge Soup chapter of
>my KR book. Summarizing even more briefly,
>1. An open-ended lattice of theories, which could be extended
>arbitrarily far to accommodate any possible way of conceptualizing the world
>in any finite set of concepts. A complete lattice would have to be
>infinite, but any particular version that might be implemented at any one
>time is finite. However, there is no restriction on what anyone might add
>to it, given enough time, effort, and ingenuity.
>2. Methods for navigating the lattice to find theories that are
>approximately true or "good enough" for many problems, and with methods for
>revising and extending theories to make them better adapted to solving new
>problems.
>
>For more about the lattice of theories, see Section 6 of my paper on
>processes and causality:
>http://www.bestweb.net/~sowa/ontology/causal.htm
><http://www.bestweb.net/~sowa/ontology/causal.htm>
>And by the way, I believe that causality is a very important concept that is
>central to a large number of issues in the SUO. But that is another topic.
>John Sowa
>
>
>+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Adam Pease
Teknowledge
(650) 424-0500 x571