SUO: RE: RE: Logic & Programming Languages
John Sowa wrote:
>
> That is because there is no information that could logically
> be used to increase the probability of either side of the coin
> over the other. It's not a failure of logic -- it's simply
> a lack of information.
>
> Suppose I gave you a problem: use logic to determine the
> date when the first living cell arose on planet earth.
>
> If you fail to answer that question, it is not because you
> aren't logical, but because you have no information to use
> as the original premises and axioms for a proof.
To further elaborate: flipping a coin seems random, but since it is a
macroscopic, non-quantum-level process, it may be possible to have enough
information to predict. Thus, it should be technically possible to construct
a coin-flipping robot, which could reliably flip a coin to be either heads
or tails, if the coin lands on a hard, flat surface. Likewise, it should be
technically possible to construct a robot that could observe a coin toss and
reliably predict whether the coin would end up heads or tails. In either
case, the robots would need information about the physical characteristics
and motion of the coin and information about its environment, e.g. wind
velocity, hardness of the surface, etc.
Phil Jackson
-------------------------------------------------------------------
"Strange to say, there are many people who will have a difficulty in
conceiving of an element of lawlessness in the universe, and who may perhaps
be tempted to reckon the doctrine of the perfect rule of causality as one of
the original instinctive beliefs, like that of space having three
dimensions. Far from that, it is historically altogether a modern notion, a
loose inference from the discoveries of science. Aristotle often lays it
down that some things are determined by causes while others happen by
chance. Lucretius, following Democritus, supposes his primordial atoms to
deviate from their rectilinear trajectories just fortuitously, and without
any reason at all. To the ancients, there was nothing strange in such
notions; they were matters of course; the strange thing would have been to
have said that there was no chance. So we are under no inward necessity of
believing in perfect causality if we do not find any facts to bear it
out." - CSP, CP1:403
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard Disclaimers. www.philjackson.prohosting.com