SUO: RE: Re: Logic & Programming Languages
This response seems a little harsh, Seth was clearly talking about
identification rather than identity (in its strict sense). So substitute
"the epistemological problem of identification" as appropriate. Perhaps FOL
is nothing but mere mathematical jiggling without some connection
(presumably epistemic) to the real world? John was arguing (more or less)
that any intelligence that 'worked' on reasoning would converge on FOL, as
this is fundamental system underlying everything, Seth (more or less) doubts
the universality of this, and at present I can't think of a strong counter
to the subjectivity argument. What's your opinion?
---
Danny Ayers
http://www.isacat.net
>-----Original Message-----
>From: owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
>[mailto:owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org]On Behalf Of
>Chris Menzel
>Sent: 02 August 2001 20:50
>To: Seth Russell
>Cc: IEEE Standard Upper Ontology List
>Subject: SUO: Re: Logic & Programming Languages
>
>
>
>> Danny, I think you have put your finger on the biggest problem with the
>> notion that FOL was 'standardized by a higher authority'.
>Logic is based
>> on identity; but identity is relative to the observer and the observer's
>> context. Frequently the more detailed and precise we attempt to identify
>> something, the more we realize its identity is dependant on our
>subjective
>> evaluations and are not objectively on the thing itself.
>
>Seth, you really ought to learn some logic before you start theorizing
>about it. Be that as it may, (a) the theory of identity is only one small
>(but important) part of predicate logic; to say logic is "based on"
>identity is rather badly mistaken. And anyway, (b) you are not even
>talking about the logical notion of identity but (near as I can tell) the
>epistemological problem of identification.
>
>-chris
>
>--
>
>Christopher Menzel # web: philebus.tamu.edu/~cmenzel
>Philosophy, Texas A&M University # net: chris.menzel@tamu.edu
>College Station, TX 77843-4237 # vox: (979) 845-8764
>
>