Re: SUO: Re: Logic & Programming Languages
From: "Chris Menzel" <cmenzel@philebus.tamu.edu>
> Seth wrote:
> > From: "Leo Obrst" <lobrst@mitre.org>
> >
> > > I tend to agree with John, as far as I can discern your original
issues.
> > > Much (most?) of what humans and other animals do are based on logical
> > > inferential processes, it seems to me (although this is disfavored in
> > > many literatures).
> >
> > Well me thinks you and John are playing fast and loose with this word
> > 'logical'. I don't think what happens when we flee from danger is
> > anything even remotely akin to an inferential process.
>
> Neither does Leo, I suspect. Fleeing is not reasoning. Leo is talking
> about the inferential process that leads to the fleeing.
Sorry I also meant the process leading up to the fleeing
>Action flows
> from both belief and desire. The belief component at least -- e.g., "a
> tiger is near", "tigers eat things like me", "if I run, the tiger won't
> see me", "tiger bad", etc -- requires reasoning.
Yes, I would call that sequence of conscious events reasoning. But I am
simply saying that nothing like that sequence would ever happen in the
reality of this example, and if it did, it would have nothing to do with
triggering the actual fleeing.
>You do some
> reasoning (very quickly) that leads to beliefs that, together with your
> desires (not to be tiger lunch, for example), lead to action.
Your assumption seems to be (=> (and (belief a b) (desire b c)) (action
flee)). I am just saying there is no such implication. The action is not
triggered by such a structure, however coded. The action is triggered by a
different process having to do with the nature of triggering actions, and
not with the nature of beliefs and desires. Thinking yourself into action,
however reasonable your beliefs, never works. Just doing it, does. I
suspect that actions and their triggers, and beliefs and their reasons are
manifested by different parts of our brains; and have very little if
anything to do with each other. If I was studious I site actual neurology,
but that is not my field. I've cc Sergio Navega on this, perhaps he can
fill in the gap, or correct me if I am wrong.
> > > Have these been compiled down to very quick responses? Yes. So one
> > > doesn't have to infer at run-time: jump from the set of premises to
> > > the conclusion (through the long intermediate chains, which have
> > > been compiled away) and run from the tiger.
> >
> > Again i doubt that a habitual (or conditioned) respons is anything
> > like being logical ... nor was the original response on which the
> > habit was formed logical.
>
> Granted, the inferential component no doubt becomes less prominent with
> regard to habitual behavior, but reasoning will arguably still be
> involved -- one needs at least to belief one is in the sort of situation
> where a certain habitual response can kick in.
Well yes, one needs to recognize that one is in a situation before the
situation can trigger the behavior. But the recognition does not need to be
conscious. My thesis is that the conscious part of the recognition is
irrelevant to the actual action.
> > I think logic is a game of rules for describing what happens after the
> > fact.
>
> Hm, where to start. Do you mean that we arrived at our logical "laws"
> simply by obvserving how people reason?
No, logicians work out these 'laws' with pencil and paper.
> But people reason in all sorts
> of ways, often bizarrely, as anyone can see by reading letters to the
> Editor of your local paper or listening to Rush Limbaugh. Why is it we
> only incorporate some of the things we observe and not others?
I don't believe that the formal logic we practice today has stemmed from
such observations.
>And,
> exactly who made up this game, and when?
Well shucks it started with Aristotle, didn't it?
He made a big mistake too ...
http://robustai.net/ai/notnota.htm
>And why is it so hard to
> change the rules?
I think it has something to do with the way professors are tenured.
Seth