RE: SUO: RE: Reductions Among Relations
Dear Lee,
> Matthew,
>
> I don't think anyone has ever argued that the power of
> logical atomism, to
> which you seem devoted, extends to areas where meanings are
> plural, where
> polysemy rules, and where repurposing also involves reconceiving (as
> opposed to merely recombining or reconfiguring) the selfsame
> "units" of
> information.
MW: I just looked Logical Atomism up (Blackwell Companion to Metaphysics
- Kim and Sosa, recommended to others trying to bluff their way here).
MW: I would certainly not describe myself as a logical atomist, though
I can see why you might detect leanings in that direction. But hey, I
was recently accused of being nominalist. But I think I should address
this issue in a positive statement, and try to explain my position,
rather than issue a string of denials. Watch for an exposition.
> To the extent that any upper level ontology is concerned
> with such difficulties your underlying logical base will prove
> inadequate,
MW: What particular inadequacies do you claim?
> though as a practical matter in a computational
> database this
> can be partially corrected.
>
> Do you remember this contribution by Adam Pease a while back?
>
> > > In a long ago thread, I suggested that the SUO need to
> support stating
> > > things such as
> > >
> > > Hamlet the fictional character
> > > Hamlet an edition of the printed play
> > > A performance of Hamlet
> > > A performance of Hamlet captured on video and encoded as
> a bit stream
> > > The text of Hamlet as character strings
> > > What Fritz Lehmann has called a "conceptual work" - the timeless
> > > informational content of the play
> > >
> > > These notions require a well worked out theory of
> semiotics but this would
> > > have a practical focus rather than being an academic exercise.
> > >
> > > Adam
> >
> >
> >
MW: Yes, and I have no difficulty in dealing with any of these things.
We recognise signs in their own right, they are just other things with
relations to things of particular types. I also agree that they are very
important. In any instantiation of our model they are the most heavily
used part.
>
> What the primitive informational unit can be, if it is not a
> sign, escapes
> me. And if it is a sign, then the underlying position for
> accommodating
> it is not the one on which you rely and in which you seem very well
> versed.
MW: You seem to have a view that says that there is only "One Way" in
which signs can be approached. We worked out an approach to signs
(without using that name) without any knowledge of e.g. Peirce, coming
form a world of engineering rather than logic. However, I am quite pleased
to note that from my point of view I see no major incompatibilities.
>
> I would respectfully submit that the position you take is a
> limited one
> for an upper level ontology.
MW: I think you have a limited perspective of what our position is.
> I would at the same time
> recognize that it
> fits neatly with a conception of the world as composed of
> 'things',
MW: What do you think "things" are, and what else do you think there is?
> that
> it falls naturally into tuples notation where a thing is the relate of
> each symbol, that it draws on a static theory of prediciation
> assumed in
> such a system, and-- most persuasively for computational
> purposes-- that
> it fits nicely with the physical primitive of relational
> databases: the
> Boolean bit. So within a certain range it is workable, and on its own
> terms invincible.
>
> It will predictably prove decreasingly useful as we move away from the
> range populated by technical speicialities with normalized
> and relatively
> static terminology toward sciences of discovery, toward
> deliberation, and
> toward attempts to traverse wide swaths of meaning.
MW: We always have a standing challenge to anyone to find some example
that the EPISTLE Core Model cannot handle. It isn't that we think that
there isn't anything we can't handle, but it doesn't happen very often.
When it does we adjust the model, or as in the move from 3D to 4D
practically throw the whole thing away and start again.
>
> To me, your last sentence seems to argue more in favor of a
> triadic than a
> diadic position for the underlying logical approach: we can
> translate the
> dyadic relation between some object and the sign representating it, in
> terms of the interpretant this effects in some mind or
> quasi-mind, but the
> interpretant-sign-object relation is not adequately
> translatable into a
> concatenation of sign-object dyads with is-a relations. But whoever
> claimed that logical atomism was designed to deal with problems of
> meaning, anyway?
MW: This is no problem as long as you remember that dyads are objects
too that can participate in relations.
>
> Best,
>
> Lee
>
Regards
Matthew
===============================================================
Matthew West http://www.matthew-west.org.uk/
Principal Consultant Shell Visiting Professor
Operations & Asset Management The Keyworth Institute
Shell Services International The University of Leeds
http://www.shellservices.com/ http://www.keyworth.leeds.ac.uk/
H3229, Shell Centre, London, SE1 7NA, UK.
Tel: +44 207 934 4490 Fax: 7929 Mobile: +44 7796 336538
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