re:re:Re: SUO: Continuants and Occurrents in 4D
Pat and Robert,
I completely agree with the following statement:
PH>.... Now, you might object that lots of our pramatic usage
>of signs is in fact intimately tied up with their meaning, and of
>course I would agree; but my point is that one cannot get a useful
>*analysis* of the semantic nature of sign usage without first having
>some account of the semantic nature of the signs themselves.
But I am sure that both of you are well aware of the fact
that there is an enormous amount of disagreement among various
schools of thought in philosophy, linguistics, AI, and other
varieties of cognitive science about the definitions of and
borderlines between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.
For the record, I will state my preferred definitions, which
are based on Peirce's original three-way distinction, for
which he used the terms "pure grammar", "logic proper", and
"pure rhetoric". The terms "syntax", "semantics", and
"pragmatics" were bequeathed to us by Charles Morris, who was
trying to make Peirce's distinctions acceptable to Carnap and
the Vienna Circle. Following is the passage from my ontometa paper:
http://www.bestweb.net/~sowa/peirce/ontometa.htm
The words in quotes are by CSP, and the other words are by me:
1. Syntax. "The first is called by Duns Scotus grammatica speculativa.
We may term it pure grammar." Syntax is the
study that relates signs to one another.
2. Semantics. "The second is logic proper," which "is the
formal science of the conditions of the truth of
representations." Semantics is the study that relates signs
to things in the world and patterns of signs to
corresponding patterns that occur among the things the
signs refer to.
3. Pragmatics. "The third is... pure rhetoric. Its task is to
ascertain the laws by which in every scientific intelligence
one sign gives birth to another, and especially one thought
brings forth another." Pragmatics is the study that relates
signs to the agents who use them to refer to things in the
world and to communicate their intentions about those things
to other agents who may have similar or different intentions
concerning the same or different things.
I have no quarrel with equating "syntax" with Peirce's term
"pure grammar". But Morris created enormous confusion for
posterity by equating "semantics" with "logic proper", which
for Peirce meant something very close to Tarski's definition
of truth in terms of model theory. That equation is generally
accepted by logicians, but it creates major consternation
among linguists.
Morris replaced Peirce's term "pure rhetoric" with "pragmatics",
because he wanted to pay lip service to Peirce's "pragmatism",
but CSP himself changed the name of his own philosophy from
"pragmatism" to "pragmaticism" to distinguish his philosophy
from what William James was promoting. He even said that he
chose the term "pragmaticism" because it was "so ugly" that
no one else would be tempted to steal it.
Bottom line: I believe that we need a general theory of signs
that makes the three distinctions that Peirce originally made
without the accretion of all the confusions caused by Morris's
choice of words (of which the equation of "pure rhetoric" with
"pragmatics" was probably the worst).
John Sowa