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Re: SUO: Continuants and Occurrents in 4D




>Pat,
>
>Your quotation from Bertie R. is apt.  I want to enjoy the
>fruits of "theft over honest toil."  In particular, I would
>like to define Nicola's ontology in terms of a process-based
>ontology a la Whithead.  In that way, I can "steal" any
>solution that Nicola proposes and map it into the terminology
>I prefer.
>That would resolve the issues about "fragmenting" the SUO
>ontology into multiple incompatible modules.  A Whiteheadian
>4D process-based ontology could serve as a foundation, which
>would accommodate other kinds of ontologies as approximations
>intended for special purposes.

I agree that kind of strategy has many attractions. The trouble with 
all such proposals however is that they amount to a proposal to win 
an intellectual war, whereas I think it would be more useful to look 
for ways in which workable truces can be negotiated.

> >> >.... And in fact, I think that the distinction
> >> >between the terms "continuant" and "occurrent" can be quite
> >> >nicely defined in Whitehead's terms: A continuant is something
> >> >that we can recognize at multiple encounters. An occurrent is
> >> >something that does not have enough distinctive characteristics
> >> >that we can be sure whether another encounter is with "the same"
> >> >or "a similar" entity.
>
> >PS. John's suggested definition (above) of continuant/occurrent is
> >faulty on at least three counts. First, it doesn't actually capture
> >the meaning, since one can easily recognize an occurrent when it is
> >seen a second time, eg if you ever go to use the rest room during a
> >football match, you will have no trouble recognising that you are at
> >the same match when you get back.  Second, even if it was adequate,
> >it isn't a definition of continuant, but a way to transcribe the
> >occurrent notion into a 4-d ontological framework without
> >acknowledging the continuant identity criteria, which we already know
> >is easy; and third, it uses scare-quotes, which is just a way of not
> >actually giving a real definition, but saying something that looks
> >like a definition, but isn't really: as Russell said (in a different
> >context), it has all the advantages of theft over honest toil.
>
>To answer your three points:
>
> 1. What you are actually recognizing are the "continuants"
>    such as particular players.

That is what Nicola would say also, I suspect, but I think such 
claims are suspicious. And I would add that in my view any claims 
about what people do and do not"actually recognize" are matters of 
empirical fact and should be referred to the practitioners of the 
relevant experimental science (perceptual psychology, in this case), 
and it is idle to speculate on them in the abstract.

> From that information and from
>    knowledge about the typical length of a game, you can infer
>    that you have returned to a continuation of the same
>    process.

I see no reason why these criteria of recognition apply differently 
to continuants that to occurrents. (And since you don't even believe 
in continuants, I rather think you ought to agree, right?)

> 2. That is exactly what I wanted to do:  map the other
>    terminologies into my preferred form.  I can also create
>    a special predicate named "NicolaIdentity", which would
>    satisfy Nicola's axioms.  That wouldn't be my preferred
>    version of identity, but it would simulate Nicola's.
>
> 3. Yes, I was using scare quotes to show that I was creating
>    an isomorphic model of the original (deprecated) system
>    in terms of my preferred system.  But the point is
>    that if you establish an isomorphism, you get full
>    interoperability, which is really the ultimate goal
>    of all our knowledge-sharing efforts.

I think that we can get full interoperability in this case without 
either side being declared the victor, in the way I sketched 
previously using flickerbook sets.

Pat

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