SUO: Re: The Story So Far
Chris Partridge wrote:
>
> Jon,
>
> See below CP>
>
> Regards,
> Chris
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: jawbrey@oakland.edu [mailto:jawbrey@oakland.edu]
> Sent: 10 March 2001 09:00
> To: Chris Partridge
> Cc: sowa@bestweb.net;
> standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> Subj: SUO: Re: The Story So Far
>
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>
> Chris Partridge wrote:
> >
> > John,
> >
> > You are right that people are using 3-D and 4-D -- and by association
> > E(ndurantist) and P(erdurantist) -- to cover a wide variety of things.
> > However, I think you would be wrong to dismiss the terms -- however
> > ugly they are. They are terms of art in philosophical ontology and,
> > while related to the points you make below, are not these points.
> >
> > It is plain that commonsense objects *persist* through time.
> > The question is how to explain this (and so, at least partly,
> > explain a number of other things). One answer is that these
> > objects *perdure* through time -- so only a (temporal) part is
> > present at any one time. Another answer is to say they *endure*
> > through time -- where they are wholly present (whatever that means)
> > at any time at which they are present. This is the *only* question
> > that the E and P words deal with. It seems to me that this is a
> > legitimate question -- even if we think the answer is obviously
> > that objects *perdure* -- getting agreement on this would be
> > a substantial step forward.
>
> Chris,
>
> I am wondering about the notions
> of "explanation" and "legitimacy"
> that you have in mind when you say:
>
> CP> Nothing special, over and above ordinary usage.
>
> > The question is how to explain this (and so,
> > at least partly, explain a number of other things).
>
> and
>
> > It seems to me that this is a legitimate question --
>
> For instance, do you have in mind any sort of experiment that
> would conceivably distinguish the "ostensible options" (OO's)?
>
> In other words, can you name any effects that might conceivably have
> practical bearings and actual consequences that you can conceive the
> options of these two conceptions to have? (-- To coin a phrase --)
>
> CP> Yes. I think these two conceptions lead to different ways of
> organizing our knowledge about the world -- and this is reflected,
> in KIF type ontologies, by different axioms. In the business systems,
> I am used to working with, it leads to very different structures.
>
> From a commercial point of view, it is important as the Perdurantist
> systems tend to be significantly (in large systems, orders of magnitude)
> simpler, with the usual economic consequences. The types of experiment
> you can do have already been outlined a number of times -- for example
> by Pat. One standard academic example is the Statue/Clay one described
> by Matthew -- it is a useful test of one's metaphysical position.
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Chris,
OK, this is good, because I think that what we have just now
recreated here is the very sort of misunderstanding -- or is
more like a skewed transversal "talking past each other" way
of understanding? -- that occurred long ago between Peirce
and James at the very heart of what pragmatic thinking is
all about. Dewey, I think that he was kind of caught in
the middle, the muddle, or the crossfire between them,
but then, he was graced with a longer time to try and
sort it all out. So, given the auspiciousness of the
eternally returning occasion, I want to slow down and
be careful, and maybe we can turn out smarter than them,
having their mistakes to stand on, of curse, and maybe we
can get it right this time, at least clear a few things up.
Roughly speaking, just off the top of my head,
by an "explanation" I mean, first and foremost,
a proposition that resolves a "surprise", and
a surprise is any experienced situation where
we find a difference between what we expected
to happen, coming into it, and what actually
happens, as we encountered, experienced, felt,
found, learned, knew, or observed it to happen.
Just as roughly, by a "legitimate question"
I would probably mean one that has answers,
I mean, answers that can be tested for how
they satify the question, and this implies
that the corresponding proposition that is
being put in question, as if to say at risk,
really has anything to risk, that is to say,
is the sort of proposition that is falsifiable.
Now here is the rub.
When we go about trying to survey of the diversity of
effects that might conceivably have practical bearings
and actual consequences that each of us can conceive the
objects or the options of our various conceptions to have,
it occurs to me that we need to make a distinction between
the sorts of "effects" that arise under a "concept" because
they are "owned" by each "object" or "option" under that idea,
and those sorts of "effects" that not free and clear, as we say,
but are encumbered or entangled by other circumstances aside from
the object or the option in question, in its own right, as we say.
Now, this kind of thinking makes me really tired,
so I am going to take a little break and reflect
a bit more casually on what I just said, to see
if I really believe it, and to try to anticipate
what its effects may really be in actual practice.
Until Later,
Jon Awbrey
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