SUO: RE: Criteria that an ontology must satisfy
John,
I think we must be talking at cross-purposes.
Your notion of some entry criteria seems sensible - though I suspect you may
have set the bar so high that nothing will be able to get in (though this
does depend on how you interpret 'satisfy').
As to the rest - see comments below, marked CP>.
Regards,
Chris
-----Original Message-----
From: sowa@bestweb.net [mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]
Sent: 09 March 2001 13:19
To: Chris Partridge; sowa@bestweb.net; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
Subject: Criteria that an ontology must satisfy
Chris,
Although I believe that we should tolerate many different
points of view, I don't believe that we need to support them.
Pat suggested that we "go out and shoot" certain people who
disagree with us, but I think that he is too lazy to go
through all the effort required to take such action.
I recommend a simpler approach: state some criteria that any
adequate ontology must meet. If some proposal can't satisfy
them, then there is no need for us to consider it any further
until the proposer comes back with a revised version that does.
Recommended criteria:
1. The ability to define any and all terms used in well
established laws and theories of the major scientific
fields, especially physics, chemistry, and biology. That
may also include defining some terms, such as phlogiston
and ether, which eventually become obsolete, but which
are reasonable hypotheses at the time they are proposed.
2. The ability to define any and all terms used in major
areas of business, engineering, agriculture, and other
fields that do enough useful work that people are willing
to pay them to keep doing it.
3. The ability to support inferences with those definitions
that agree with established usage in the fields in which
the terms are used.
As a test, I suggest that we must be able to support the
definitions of terms and the inferences that use those terms
in well-edited publications such as the Wall Street Journal,
Scientific American, the Economist, etc. Any metaphysical
theories that cannot support such definitions and inferences
can safely be discarded.
>You are right that people are using 3-D and 4-D - and by association
>E(ndurantist) and P(erdurantist) - to cover a wide variety of things.
>However, I think you would be wrong to dismiss the terms - however ugly
they
>are. They are terms of art in philosophical ontology and, while related to
>the points you make below, are not these points.
The words "perdure" and "endure" are much less objectionable
to me than the words "perdurantist" and "endurantist". I can
reasonably argue for, against, or about a single term, but the
corresponding "-ism" and "-ist" terms have vague boundaries
that create enormous confusion.
CP> I am not sure why you say the "the corresponding "-ism" and "-ist" terms
have vague boundaries" - as the original terms are perfectly well-defined,
so surely they inherit this property. And they have been found useful tools,
by people exploring this area.
CP> In fact, I would have thought they are a useful way of characterizing an
aspect of the Whiteheadian view and contrasting it with the opposing
Enduring-Continuant view. In your case, you can use it to record your
ontological preference - which, like Pat, you see as overwhelmingly
obvious - for a particular choice. In fact, if you are looking for lattice
of theories, it seems to me that these could usefully form two (disjoint)
nodes on the lattice, even if one of the nodes is left to wither, as you
recommend.
>It is plain that commonsense objects *persist* through time. The question
is
>how to explain this (and so, at least partly, explain a number of other
>things).
That is exactly the point of Whitehead's notion of recurring
event type. An object is recognized by certain recurring
event types, and its recognizable form remains stable for
some period of time. That kind of definition is perfectly
adequate for science, business, engineering, and ordinary life.
>One answer is that these objects *perdure* through time - so only a
>(temporal) part is present at any one time. Another answer is to say they
>*endure* through time - where they are wholly present (whatever that means)
>at any time at which they are present.
Statements of this kind and the words in them do not belong to
the areas which I believe we must support (i.e., points #1,
#2, and #3 above). They are terms that are bound to a theory
that cannot support modern physics, chemistry, and biology.
CP> John, this is where I think we part company - in terms of understanding.
I (and if I read them correctly, Pat and Matthew - to name a couple) think
that we *have* to make decisions on exactly these points. My experience with
business systems - systems that do things - over the last few decades
confirms this. As does my work with Matthew on the EPISTLE standard. One's
choice on this question has far-reaching implications on the classification
structure you end up with (one just has to look at the before and after
status of the systems that have been subjected to ontological analysis). And
if you do not make a choice (but leave it to intuition (=chance) ) then you
get a mixture of different structures. One of the requirements for something
like the SUO is some kind of guarantee/confidence that if two groups start
from the SUO to describe a domain, that they will end up with something
reasonably similar. Or people working in overlapping domains will end up
with consistent descriptions of their overlapping areas. This *does* not
happen at all currently in commercial systems - and is costing everyone a
lot of money. It is my experience that unless one is prepared to get down to
nitty-gritty issues such as the E vs P question, we cannot hope to achieve
this.
> This is the *only* question that the
>E and P words deal with. It seems to me that this is a legitimate question
-
>even if we think the answer is obviously that objects *perdure* - getting
>agreement on this would be a substantial step forward.
But this is not our problem. We have to support science,
engineering, and ordindary language as they are used. We
don't have to support everybody's crackpot metaphysical theory.
And by "crackpot", I mean any metaphysics that cannot be used
to define modern physics, chemistry, and biology, and the work
in engineering and business that applies them.
CP> Agreed - the ontology has to be useful for something.
>As Pat has said in another email, for the Perdurantist there seems to be no
>real distinction between process and object - so the question of which is
>more fundamental only arises for the Endurantist who has to explain the
>relationship between his category of continuant and occurrent.
Whitehead defines the distinction between process and object
very well. His definition is consistent with modern science,
business, and engineering. And you can use that definition
for the distinction between continuant and occurrent. The
only problem arises when you try to define metaphysical terms
from inadequate theories. But that is only a problem for those
people who want to maintain those theories.
CP> Reading the Whitehead article and your book (e.g. pp 70 onwards), it
would seem to me that for both of you everything extended in time can be
considered either as a process or an event. The only things that would seem
to qualify as neither, by your definitions, are Whitehead's
'event-particle's' - as "[s]uch an event is a mere spatial point-flash of
instantaneous duration", it has no temporal duration and so cannot "have
stable attributes" or be "in a state of flux". It is unclear to me what
these 'event-particles' would be in your scheme of things. It is also
unclear to me how Whitehead would distinguish an object from a process -
apart from how one considers it. And this seems to be your approach. I am,
of course, quite happy with this. But it seems to me then that the
'distinctions' are not fundamental.
>On the question of identity, I think philosophers (and Nicola) are right to
>ask the question.
That is fine. And I can answer their questions very nicely
in a way that agrees with points #1, #2, and #3. If their
answers disagree with them, then they can be safely dismissed
as crackpot.
>And it seems to me that adopting an extensionalist
>viewpoint (for both objects and properties) enables one to have a formal
>principle of identity.
That is another issue. I believe that the intension of "clay"
is different from the intension of "statue". But when you
apply those terms to the "same thing" they happen to coincide.
> I am not sure how any real ontological analysis can
>proceed without some consideration of principles of identity.
Whitehead and I have perfectly fine definitions of identity
that agree with usage in both science and ordinary language.
I don't see any reason why we should adopt Nicola's argument,
which disagrees with both science and ordinary language.
CP> Whitehead's view is characterized as mereological essentialism by Peter
Simons - where, if two things have the same events as parts, they are the
same thing. Right?
>To summarise - I think the meanings of the E and P words are quite clear
and
>simple - and well established. And that despite their ugliness, we should
>stick with them as they are established in the literature.
There are enormous numbers of obsolete terms in every branch of
philosophy. I don't believe that there is any need to keep them
in the SUO glossary of recommended terms. I have no objection
to including those terms in a footnote, citing some people who
use them, and suggesting a better way of talking about ontology.
CP> Just a small point - as a point of fact, something actually easy to
check, these terms (and the distinctions they describe) are not normally
regarded as obsolete. One can find them in most of the recent introductory
textbooks on metaphysics.
John