RE: SUO: More Documentation, Please
Dear Phil,
This looks like a good idea. Do I take it you are offering to take
maintaining this on as a task?
Regards
Matthew
============================================
Matthew West
Operations & Asset Management
Shell Services International
H3229, Shell Centre, London, SE1 7NA, UK.
Tel: +44 207 934 4490 Fax: 7929
Mobile: +44 7796 336538
E-mail: Matthew.R.West@is.shell.com
http://www.shellservices.com/
============================================
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Philip Jackson [mailto:phil.jackson@computer.org]
> Sent: 10 February 2001 13:36
> To: West, Matthew MR SSI-GREA-UK
> Cc: standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
> Subject: RE: SUO: More Documentation, Please
>
>
> Dear Matthew, and SUO Group in general,
>
> Along the lines that you have proposed below, I think it
> would also be a
> good idea for the SUO group to collectively, iteratively
> develop a web-based
> SUO Glossary of specialized ontological terminology (e.g.
> defining phrases
> like "4D Endurantist") including any terms that might be
> invented and then
> used frequently within SUO correspondence...
>
> One way to do this would be to use www.quickbase.com, to very
> easily set up
> a database of terms that people could update dynamically....
> I thnk I could
> do this very easily -- Do others think this is a good idea,
> and if so, is
> there another, better way that it should be done?
>
> Regards,
>
> Phil Jackson
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is
> limited. Imagination encircles the world." - Einstein
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
> Standard Disclaimers. www.philjackson.prohosting.com
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: owner-standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > [mailto:owner-standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org]On Behalf Of West,
> > Matthew MR SSI-GREA-UK
> > Sent: Saturday, February 10, 2001 7:01 AM
> > To: Horn, Graham
> > Cc: standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org;
> 'John.Velman@HSC.com';
> > pat hayes; '"Thompson, John A"<John.Thompson@PSS.Boeing.com>'; Niles
> > Teknowledge Ian (E-mail)
> > Subject: RE: SUO: More Documentation, Please
> >
> >
> >
> > Dear Graham,
> >
> > I think some of the things we need to do is to write down
> the "fundamental
> > principles" of the different metaphysical paradigms which
> different people
> > use. Pat (with interjections from Nicola) has been doing a lot of
> > good work
> > educating us on some of the issues.
> >
> > I'm reasonably comfortable my "notes on the nature of
> things" makes a good
> > start point for doing this for the 4D viewpoint. It would be
> > useful to have
> > something similar for the continuant/occurrent approach
> (perhaps Pat or
> > Nicola could oblige?) and for the Piercean viewpoint (John?).
> >
> > Regards
> > Matthew
> > ============================================
> > Matthew West
> > Operations & Asset Management
> > Shell Services International
> > H3229, Shell Centre, London, SE1 7NA, UK.
> > Tel: +44 207 934 4490 Fax: 7929
> > Mobile: +44 7796 336538
> > E-mail: Matthew.R.West@is.shell.com
> > http://www.shellservices.com/
> > ============================================
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Horn, Graham [mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au]
> > > Sent: 09 February 2001 04:08
> > > To: West, Matthew MR SSI-GREA-UK
> > > Cc: standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org;
> 'John.Velman@HSC.com';
> > > pat hayes; '"Thompson, John
> A"<John.Thompson@PSS.Boeing.com>'; Niles
> > > Teknowledge Ian (E-mail)
> > > Subject: RE: SUO: More Documentation, Please
> > >
> > >
> > > Matthew,
> > > . I take it your documentation is aimed
> > > at clearing
> > > this sort of thing up, amongst other things?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Cheers Graham Horn
> > > National Data Standards Unit
> > > Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
> > > ================================================
> > > Phone: 02.6244.1094
> > > Fax: 02.6244.1199
> > > Email: Graham.Horn@aihw.gov.au
> <mailto:graham.horn@aihw.gov.au>
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: John.Velman@HSC.com [mailto:John.Velman@HSC.com]
> > > Sent: Friday, February 09, 2001 12:26 PM
> > > To: pat hayes
> > > Cc: standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
> > > Subject: Re: SUO: More Documentation, Please
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Good! The last paragraph provides a test as to whether one
> > > is an endurantist!.
> > >
> > > John V.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > pat hayes <phayes@ai.uwf.edu>@ieee.org on 02/08/2001 04:54:08 PM
> > >
> > > Please respond to pat hayes <phayes@ai.uwf.edu>
> > >
> > > Sent by: owner-standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > >
> > >
> > > To: "Thompson, John A" <John.Thompson@PSS.Boeing.com>,
> Ian Niles
> > > <iniles@teknowledge.com>
> > > cc: standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
> > >
> > > Subject: Re: SUO: More Documentation, Please
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > >In a message today, Ian Niles includes many of his documentation
> > > >strings, such as:
> > > >---------------------
> > > > > >(documentation Continuant "A continuant is any entity whose
> > > > > parts are wholly
> > > > > >present whenever it is present.")
> > > >----------------------
> > > >
> > > >And later in the same message he writes:
> > > >---------------------
> > > >These docu-strings are supposed to make the meaning
> > > >of the concepts clear to people who weren't involved in
> > > constructing the
> > > >ontology.
> > > >----------------------
> > > >
> > > >I agree with the stated goal, but I offer all of our current
> > > >documentation strings as evidence that we are nowhere
> near that goal.
> > > >
> > > >To pick on this one example, a "man on the street" (and
> most of us)
> > > >would have no idea of what a Continuant is based on this
> definition.
> > > >Let's see, ...an entity whose parts are wholly present
> whenever it
> > > >is present. I first strain to think of anything that doesn't fit
> > > >this category.
> > >
> > > Well, an example might be a football match. It has a
> first half and a
> > > second half, and when one of them is present the other isn't.
> > >
> > > Here are more explanatory docu-strings, but they are more like
> > > mini-essays. Is this the kind of thing you had in mind?
> > >
> > > (documentation Continuant " Intuitively, an object-like thing as
> > > opposed to an event-like thing; something that endures rather than
> > > something that happens. A continuant is thought of as continuing
> > > through time, but at any particular time is all there at
> that time,
> > > in contrast to something that is thought of as being divided into
> > > stages (contrast "Occurrent"). Examples include normal physical
> > > objects, geographical regions, things like corporations
> or nations,
> > > and locations of occurrents. The formal definition is that all the
> > > parts of a continuant are present at the same time that the
> > > continuant is; in other words, a continuant cannot have
> 'parts' which
> > > are separated in time, such as the first and second halves of a
> > > football game.
> > > Note that the parts of a continuant may change from time
> to time, and
> > > that every continuant occupies exactly the same space and
> time as an
> > > occurrent (its lifetime).
> > > In a 4-d ontology, a continuant is something whose spatiotemporal
> > > extent is thought of as dividing into spatial parts
> roughly parallel
> > > to the time-axis.
> > > See Occurrent/Continuant-contrast-note.")
> > >
> > > (documentation Occurrent "Intuitively, an event-like
> thing as opposed
> > > to an object-type thing; something that happens rather
> than something
> > > that endures. An occurrent is thought of as having
> temporal parts or
> > > stages, and it so cannot have all these parts together at one time
> > > (contrast "Continuant"). Examples include extended
> 'events' such as a
> > > football match or a race, processes of various kinds, states of
> > > motion and lifetimes of continuants, which occupies the same space
> > > and time but is thought of as having stages instead of parts. The
> > > formal definition is: anything that lasts for a time but is not a
> > > continuant.
> > > Note that an occurrent may have participants 'inside' it which are
> > > continuants, such as the players in a football match.
> > > In a 4-d ontology, a continuant is something whose spatiotemporal
> > > extent is thought of as dividing into temporal stages roughly
> > > perpendicular to the time-axis.
> > > See Occurrent/Continuant-contrast-note.")
> > >
> > > > Well, maybe it means something that's not missing any
> of its parts,
> > > >so a car that's missing its back seat would not be a
> Continuant (?).
> > > >But what does "wholly present" mean? Does it mean the parts are
> > > >correctly assembled and not just lying in a pile? If my
> car's back
> > > >set is sitting on the ground beside it, is it wholly present? If
> > > >it's in the same garage, or the same city, or the same
> state, is it
> > > >wholly present? How close does it have to be to be present?
> > > >
> > > >It turns out that the author is apparently not using the word
> > > >"parts" in any normal sense,
> > >
> > > Ironically, it IS being used in pretty much the normal
> sense in that
> > > definition of continuant; the sense in which your hand
> and your liver
> > > are parts of you , but your childhood isn't part of you
> (its a stage
> > > - temporal part- of your lifetime, in this way of talking.)
> > >
> > > >but probably means it to refer to temporal parts (a completely
> > > >foreign usage to anyone but us). Or does it also refer
> to physical
> > > >parts at the same time? If a set is an entity, do
> members of a set
> > > >count as its parts,
> > >
> > > NO! Wash your mouth out with soap!
> > >
> > > >and how can we tell whether they are "present" or not, or whether
> > > >the set itself is present? These are the sorts of
> questions anyone
> > > >might have when reading this definition.
> > > >
> > > >My recommendation is that we should focus on getting rich
> > > >definitions written for these concepts, so that we can all
> > > >understand them before we go any further. The definitions should
> > > >include all the explanatory text we can create, including
> > > >discussions of where the boundaries of each concept are
> (i.e., what
> > > >barely fits this definition, and what just misses?).
> There should
> > > >be plenty of examples of the full range of entities that fit the
> > > >category, and of some that don't, and why not. Perhaps we want a
> > > >second relation like "discussion" where all the issues and subtle
> > > >problems with each concept are stored.
> > >
> > > Yes, Cyc has these extended mini-essays in places, and
> they are very
> > > useful for giving a kind of survey of a connected bunch of tricky
> > > concepts. For example, Cyc has about seven (ten?)
> distinct ways that
> > > one thing might 'cover' something else, and without the
> guide nobody
> > > could possibly follow exactly what they mean. Here's one
> that might
> > > be useful:
> > >
> > > (documentation Occurrent/Continuant-contrast-note " The
> question of
> > > deciding whether something is a continuant or an occurrent can be
> > > subtle. Notice it only arises for entities that are
> located in space
> > > and time: abstract things like sets and numbers are not
> classified in
> > > either of these ways. (Note in particular that a set of physical
> > > things is not itself physical.) The basic test is to ask
> whether the
> > > thing in question is best thought of as something that
> can be said to
> > > be 'happening' or whether one thinks of it as something
> that endures
> > > for a time and participates in happenings. As an alternative
> > > criterion, consider a time just before the thing in
> question exists.
> > > Do you think of it as just going to start (occurrent), or as just
> > > going to be created (continuant)?
> > > Many physical things, however, can be thought of as being either a
> > > continuant or an occurrent. Examples include localized processes
> > > forming objects whose identity arises from dynamic
> equilibrium, such
> > > as a rainstorm, an ocean wave, a flame, a fountain plume,
> a river or
> > > even a human body. In such cases the ontologist may need
> to introduce
> > > two kinds of entities, one to express the continuant or enduring
> > > nature and the other the occurrent or process nature of
> the thing in
> > > question. For example, an ocean wave can be thought of as a moving
> > > continuant which at each moment is manifested by a local occurrent
> > > consisting of the motion of a part of the ocean surface. A
> > > thunderstorm viewed in a satellite image can be seen as a moving
> > > continuant, but seen from one position on the ground may
> be thought
> > > of as an occurrent (with stages of the sky darkening,
> rain beginning
> > > to fall, etc.). A similar duality is seen in the contrast
> between a
> > > motion and the thing moving, and the contrast between a continuant
> > > such as a person and that person's lifetime, which must
> be thought of
> > > as an occurrent. In general, if one is unsure how to classify some
> > > piece of a complex system, the safest strategy is to treat it as
> > > having both aspects and introduce them both into the ontology, so
> > > that enduring things always have lifetimes during which
> things happen
> > > to them, and happenings are always happening to something.
> > > In a 4-d ontology there is no sharp contrast between occurrent and
> > > continuant, and the same thing may be spatiotemporally
> divided up in
> > > several different ways. In particular, a continuant can
> be identified
> > > with its lifetime. This makes for fewer entities, but
> requires that
> > > one specify carefully how properties are distributed with
> respect to
> > > spatiotemporal divisions. One way to view the
> continuant/occurrrent
> > > contrast is as a crude but useful system for making such
> > > specifications.")
> > >
> > > This last paragraph might be too controversial to be included,
> > > however, as it would ruffle endurantist feathers.
> > >
> > > Pat Hayes
> > >
> > >
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > IHMC (850)434 8903 home
> > > 40 South Alcaniz St. (850)202 4416 office
> > > Pensacola, FL 32501 (850)202 4440 fax
> > > phayes@ai.uwf.edu
> > > http://www.coginst.uwf.edu/~phayes
> > >
> > >
> > >
> >
>