SUO: ification
¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤
Re: ification SIG,
Sometimes, when I cannot figure out what to think about a subject,
I resort to gathering together a deliberate or a desultory array
of source materials -- sometimes in a duly dedicated spirit to
make an "objective" (<- ScareQuotes) survey of the literature,
sometimes in a selectively biased frame of mind that is merely
meant to remind myself of what I am already inclined to think
about the matter. This will, of course, be one of the latter
sorts of resorts.
¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤
Accumulated Source Materials:
| Hypostasis: Literally the Greek word signifies that which stands under
| and serves as a support. In philosophy it means a singular substance,
| also called a supposite, 'suppositum', by the Scholastics, especially
| if the substance is a completely subsisting one, whether non-living
| or living, irrational or rational. However, a rational hypostasis
| has the same meaning as the term, 'person'. -- J.J.R. [J.J. Rolbiecki].
|
| Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), 'Dictionary of Philosophy',
| Littlefield, Adams, & Company, Totowa, NJ, 1972.
| Exceedingly important are the relatives signifying
| "- is a quality of -" and "- is a relation of - to -".
| It may be said that mathematical reasoning (which
| is the only deductive reasoning, if not absolutely,
| at least eminently) almost entirely turns on the
| consideration of abstractions as if they were objects.
| The protest of nominalism against such hypostatisation,
| although, if it knew how to formulate itself, it would
| be justified as against much of the empty disputation of
| the medieval Dunces, yet, as it was and is formulated, is
| simply a protest against the only kind of thinking that has
| ever advanced human culture. Nobody will work long with the
| logic of relatives -- unless he restricts the problems of his
| studies very much -- without seeing that this is true. (CP 3.509).
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "The Logic of Relatives",
| 'The Monist', Volume 7, pages 161-217, 1897.
| 'Collected Papers', CP 3.456-552.
| But the highest kind of synthesis is what the mind is compelled to make neither
| by the inward attractions of the feelings or representations themselves, nor by
| a transcendental force of necessity, but in the interest of intelligibility,
| that is, in the interest of the synthesizing "I think" itself; and this it
| does by introducing an idea not contained in the data, which gives connections
| which they would not otherwise have had. This kind of synthesis has not been
| sufficiently studied, and especially the intimate relationship of its different
| varieties has not been duly considered. The work of the poet or novelist is not
| so utterly different from that of the scientific man. The artist introduces a
| fiction; but it is not an arbitrary one; it exhibits affinities to which the
| mind accords a certain approval in pronouncing them beautiful, which if it is not
| exactly the same as saying that the synthesis is true, is something of the same
| general kind. The geometer draws a diagram, which if not exactly a fiction, is
| at least a creation, and by means of observation of that diagram he is able to
| synthesize and show relations between elements which before seemed to have no
| necessary connection. The realities compel us to put some things into very
| close relation and others less so, in a highly complicated, and in the [to? --
| my guess is "true" -- J.A.] sense itself unintelligible manner; but it is the
| genius of the mind, that takes up all these hints of sense, adds immensely to
| them, makes them precise, and shows them in intelligible form in the intuitions
| of space and time. Intuition is the regarding of the abstract in a concrete form,
| by the realistic hypostatization of relations; that is the one sole method of
| valuable thought. Very shallow is the prevalent notion that this is something
| to be avoided. You might as well say at once that reasoning is to be avoided
| because it has led to so much error; quite in the same philistine line of
| thought would that be; and so well in accord with the spirit of nominalism
| that I wonder some one does not put it forward. The true precept is not to
| abstain from hypostatization, but to do it intelligently ... (CP 1.383).
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce, "A Guess at the Riddle", circa 1890,
| 'Collected Papers', CP 1.354-416.
¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~~CUMULATIO~~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤
Previously under this skein, a sampler:
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg00739.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg00792.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg00815.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg00828.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg00829.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg00836.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg00892.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg00893.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg00894.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg00933.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg00977.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg00979.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg00980.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01010.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01011.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01680.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01684.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01689.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01791.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01837.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01842.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01845.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01890.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01891.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01901.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01902.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01931.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01940.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01955.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01964.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01965.html
http://ltsc.ieee.org/logs/suo/msg01968.html
References cited:
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ASC/
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ASC/Reification.html
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ASC/SYSTEM.html
http://www.bestweb.net/~sowa/ontology/
http://www.bestweb.net/~sowa/ontology/causal.htm
http://www.bestweb.net/~sowa/ontology/mthworld.gif
http://www.iso18876.org/
http://www.nist.gov/sc4/
http://www.iso18876.org/iso18876/
http://www.iso18876.org/architecture/index.html
http://www.pdtsolutions.co.uk/standard/wg10/n307/wg10n307.pdf
http://www.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/L75.htm
http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/generality/generality.html
http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/generality/node1.html
http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/generality/node2.html
http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/generality/node3.html
http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/generality/node4.html
http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/generality/node5.html
http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/generality/node6.html
http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/generality/node7.html
http://www.dcc.unicamp.br/~oliva/guarana/docs/design-html/design.html
http://www.dcc.unicamp.br/~oliva/guarana/docs/design-html/node1.html
http://www.dcc.unicamp.br/~oliva/guarana/docs/design-html/node2.html
http://www.dcc.unicamp.br/~oliva/guarana/docs/design-html/node3.html
http://www.dcc.unicamp.br/~oliva/guarana/docs/design-html/node4.html
http://www.dcc.unicamp.br/~oliva/guarana/docs/design-html/node5.html
http://www.dcc.unicamp.br/~oliva/guarana/docs/design-html/node6.html
http://www.dcc.unicamp.br/~oliva/guarana/docs/design-html/node15.html
http://www.dcc.unicamp.br/~oliva/guarana/docs/design-html/node16.html
http://www.dcc.unicamp.br/~oliva/guarana/docs/design-html/node17.html
http://www.dcc.unicamp.br/~oliva/guarana/docs/design-html/node18.html
http://blather.newdream.net/r/reification.html
¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~~OITALUMUC~~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤
Many Happy Returns,
Jon Awbrey
¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤~~~~~~~~~¤
- References:
- SUO: Hypostasize, Objectify, Personify, Reflect, Reify, Thingamajiffy, Fie, Foe, Fum, ...
- From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey@oakland.edu>
- SUO: Re: Hypostasize, Objectify, Personify, Reflect, Reify, Thematize, Thingify, ...
- From: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey@oakland.edu>