SUO: Re: Abstractions, Universals, and Signs
Aristotle wrote:
| a. The theories of the soul (psyche)
| handed down by our predecessors have
| been sufficiently discussed; now let
| us start afresh, as it were, and try to
| determine (diorisai) what the soul is,
| and what definition (logos) of it will
| be most comprehensive (koinotatos).
|
| b. We describe one class of existing things as
| substance (ousia), and this we subdivide into
| three: (1) matter (hyle), which in itself is
| not an individual thing, (2) shape (morphe) or
| form (eidos), in virtue of which individuality
| is directly attributed, and (3) the compound
| of the two.
|
| c. Matter is potentiality (dynamis), while form is
| realization or actuality (entelecheia), and the
| word actuality is used in two senses, illustrated
| by the possession of knowledge (episteme) and the
| exercise of it (theorein).
|
| d. Bodies (somata) seem to be pre-eminently
| substances, and most particularly those
| which are of natural origin (physica),
| for these are the sources (archai)
| from which the rest are derived.
|
| e. But of natural bodies some have life (zoe)
| and some have not; by life we mean the
| capacity for self-sustenance, growth,
| and decay.
|
| f. Every natural body (soma physikon), then,
| which possesses life must be substance, and
| substance of the compound type (synthete).
|
| g. But since it is a body of a definite kind, viz.,
| having life, the body (soma) cannot be soul (psyche),
| for the body is not something predicated of a subject,
| but rather is itself to be regarded as a subject,
| i.e., as matter.
|
| h. So the soul must be substance in the sense of being
| the form of a natural body, which potentially has life.
| And substance in this sense is actuality.
|
| i. The soul, then, is the actuality of the kind of body we
| have described. But actuality has two senses, analogous
| to the possession of knowledge and the exercise of it.
|
| j. Clearly (phaneron), actuality in our present sense
| is analogous to the possession of knowledge; for both
| sleep (hypnos) and waking (egregorsis) depend upon the
| presence of the soul, and waking is analogous to the
| exercise of knowledge, sleep to its possession (echein)
| but not its exercise (energein).
|
| k. Now in one and the same person the
| possession of knowledge comes first.
|
| l. The soul may therefore be defined as the first actuality
| of a natural body potentially possessing life; and such
| will be any body which possesses organs (organikon).
|
| m. The parts of plants are organs too, though very
| simple ones: e.g., the leaf protects the pericarp,
| and the pericarp protects the seed; the roots are
| analogous to the mouth, for both these absorb food.
|
| n. If then one is to find a definition which will apply
| to every soul, it will be "the first actuality of
| a natural body possessed of organs".
|
| o. So one need no more ask (zetein) whether body and
| soul are one than whether the wax (keros) and the
| impression (schema) it receives are one, or in
| general whether the matter of each thing is
| the same as that of which it is the matter;
| for admitting that the terms unity and being
| are used in many senses, the paramount (kyrios)
| sense is that of actuality.
|
| p. We have, then, given a general definition
| of what the soul is: it is substance in
| the sense of formula (logos), i.e., the
| essence of such-and-such a body.
|
| q. Suppose that an implement (organon), e.g. an axe,
| were a natural body; the substance of the axe
| would be that which makes it an axe, and this
| would be its soul; suppose this removed, and
| it would no longer be an axe, except equivocally.
| As it is, it remains an axe, because it is not of
| this kind of body that the soul is the essence or
| formula, but only of a certain kind of natural body
| which has in itself a principle of movement and rest.
|
| r. We must, however, investigate our definition
| in relation to the parts of the body.
|
| s. If the eye were a living creature, its soul would be
| its vision; for this is the substance in the sense
| of formula of the eye. But the eye is the matter
| of vision, and if vision fails there is no eye,
| except in an equivocal sense, as for instance
| a stone or painted eye.
|
| t. Now we must apply what we have found true of the part
| to the whole living body. For the same relation must
| hold good of the whole of sensation to the whole sentient
| body qua sentient as obtains between their respective parts.
|
| u. That which has the capacity to live is not the body
| which has lost its soul, but that which possesses
| its soul; so seed and fruit are potentially bodies
| of this kind.
|
| v. The waking state is actuality in the same sense as the
| cutting of the axe or the seeing of the eye, while the
| soul is actuality in the same sense as the faculty of
| the eye for seeing, or of the implement for doing its
| work.
| w. The body is that which exists potentially; but just as
| the pupil and the faculty of seeing make an eye, so in
| the other case the soul and body make a living creature.
|
| x. It is quite clear, then, that neither the soul nor
| certain parts of it, if it has parts, can be separated
| from the body; for in some cases the actuality belongs
| to the parts themselves. Not but what there is nothing
| to prevent some parts being separated, because they are
| not actualities of any body.
|
| y. It is also uncertain (adelon) whether the soul as an
| actuality bears the same relation to the body as the
| sailor (ploter) to the ship (ploion).
|
| z. This must suffice as an attempt to determine
| in rough outline the nature of the soul.
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Here is a study aid to assist with the reading of
the text. What I think is especially relevant to
our purposes -- aside from the content of these
fundamental categories or "basemental concepts"
that echo in the everyday constitutions of our
minds and still support, if a bit contingently,
the greater parts of our thinking even today --
is the method that Aristotle uses, working through
analogy and prototype, or the well-chosen example,
to articulate, build, construe, derive, and apply,
in a recursive process, his system of abstractions.
So consider the following "Alignments of Capacities"
as you read Aristotle's text:
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Matter | Form
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Potentiality | Actuality
Receptivity | Possession | Exercise
Life | Sleep | Waking
Wax | Impression
Axe | Edge | Cutting
Eye | Vision | Seeing
Body | Soul
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Ship? | Sailor?
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Bon Voyage!
Jon
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