SUO: Re: Abstractions, Universals, and Signs
John F. Sowa wrote:
>
> In the following note, I discuss some issues concerning the top-level
> ontology for abstract, information-like entities.
>
> John Sowa
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> The SUO participants have characterized some basic issues in different
> ways, using terms such as "information", "abstract, non-physical things",
> "signs" or "sign types", and "universals" vs. "particulars". Following
> are some quotations from recent discussions.
>
> Adam Pease wrote:
>
> > (comment Information "A class of abstract, non-physical things,
> > which are object-like (rather than stuff-like) and atemporal.
> > Important subclasses include numbers and mathematical theories.
> > Since any string of characters can be represented as a number,
> > and numbers are atemporal, then in an abstract sense, all the
> > world's novels have always existed, just have not been committed
> > to paper or human perception.")
>
> Jon Awbrey wrote:
>
> > The way I understand it, sign-tokens are physical things --
> > they are actually another set of "outcomes" that "occur"
> > in the real world, and so they have to have some sort of
> > physical basis, but sign-types are classes of sign-tokens,
> > what statistical folks called "events", that is, subsets
> > of some sample space, and so they have an abstract quality
> > to them. We "typically" intend the token as a representative
> > of its class, and so there is almost always some ambiguity here.
> >
> > So when I hear people talking about a category of being that
> > they call "information", I have to stop and say to myself:
> > Okay, they mean a sign that is given in a setting where it
> > posseses and potentially conveys a quantity of information.
>
> > From AAAI-2000 tutorial, slide 130, by Nicola Guarino and Chris Welty
> >
> > http://www.cs.vassar.edu/faculty/welty/aaai-2000/sld130.htm
>
> > A Minimal Top-Level Ontology
> >
> > Entity
> > Particular
> > Concrete
> > Location
> > Object
> > Abstract
> > Set
> > Structure
> > ...
> > Universal
> > Property
> > Property kinds...
> > Relation
>
> We all seem to agree that if any distinction belongs in an "upper" level
> of the ontology, the one that involves information, abstractions, or
> universals certainly qualifies. The main question is how to define it
> precisely and how to reconcile the divergent views.
>
> At the MIT Media Lab, they describe the distinction with the succinct
> phrase "atoms vs. bits". The following quotation from the director
> of the lab, Nicholas Negroponte, illustrates the point:
>
> > Thomas Jefferson introduced public libraries as a fundamental American
> > right. What this forefather never considered was that every citizen
> > could enter every library and borrow every book simultaneously, with
> > a keystroke, not a hike. All of a sudden, those library atoms become
> > library bits and are potentially accessible to anyone on the Net.
> > This is not what Jefferson imagined. This is not what authors imagine.
> > Worst of all, this is not what publishers imagine.
>
> This quotation comes from an article in _Wired_ magazine:
>
> http://www.media.mit.edu/people/nicholas/Wired/WIRED3-01.html
>
> The terms "atoms" and "bits" are fairly good ways of describing the
> distinction, but they are too closely tied to a particular technology.
> Besides atoms, physicists talk about photons, quarks, and hypothetical
> superstrings, which might someday be observable or might be replaced by
> some totally different hypothesis. And bits are the units of digital
> encodings, but analog encodings, such as grooves on a vinyl record or
> FM radio transmissions, can represent the same information or a close
> approximation to it. A more general pair of terms, which do not depend
> on any particular technology, are "physical" vs. "abstract".
>
> The next question that comes up is how the physical and abstract entities
> are related. Plato called the abstractions the eternal forms or ideas,
> of which the physical things are imperfect copies. Aristotle adopted
> Plato's terminology, but he maintained that the physical things are
> the ultimate reality, and the abstractions exist only insofar as they
> are embodied in some physical entity. Alfred North Whitehead based
> his philosophy on Plato "as corrected by Aristotle". He used the
> term "actual entity" for the physical things, and "eternal object"
> for the abstractions. For the relationship between the physical and
> the abstract, Whithead coined the word "ingression", which roughly
> corresponds to "encoding" (but with further qualifications in W's
> own highly specialized and technical vocabulary).
>
> In the ontology of my KR book, I used "physical" vs. "abstract" with
> the term "characterize" for the relation between the two: the abstract
> entity x characterizes the physical entity y. For example, one could
> say that the abstract form "sphere" characterizes the earth to a good
> approximation. If you need a better approximation, you could use the
> form "oblate spheroid" to characterize the earth. And if you need an
> even better approximation, you could use satellite data to construct
> a topographical map that would characterize the earth's surface to
> an accuracy of a meter or so. The general term "characterize" would
> have to be specialized to a family of more specific terms, such as
> "x has a one-to-one mapping to y that preserves metrical relationships
> to a tolerance z" or "x can drive a sound system that can recreate a
> pattern of sound waves that approximates y within a tolerance z(f)
> for frequencies f within the range 20 to 20K hertz".
>
> I would make essentially the same distinctions as Nicola G. and Chris W.
> in their slide #130. The differences would be in the choice of terms
> and in the arrangement of subtrees in the diagram. Following is my
> rearrangement of slide #130 (with my terms on the left and the terms
> used by NG & CW in parentheses):
>
> > Entity (also Entity in #130)
> Physical (Concrete particulars only)
> > Object (also Object in #130))
> > Process (not listed in #130)
> > Nexus (space-time locations, as well as situations...)
> > ...
> Abstract (including universals and abstract particulars)
> > (Universal)
> > Property
> > Property kinds...
> > Relation
> > (Abstract particulars)
> > Set
> > Structure
> > ...
>
> The major difference between this diagram and slide #130 is that
> abstract particulars are grouped with universals instead of concrete
> particulars. (There are also other differences in the subtrees, but
> that is another topic.) The reason for that move is that I would say
> that all abstractions correspond to predicates. If an abstraction x
> characterizes a physical entity y, you can define a monadic predicate
>
> (lambda (y) (x characterizes y))
>
> The difference between a universal and an abstract particular is similar
> to the distinction that Bertrand Russell drew between a general predicate
> that applies to zero or more entities and a "definite description" that
> applies to exactly one entity. The idea of grouping universals with
> abstract particulars was also common among the medieval logicians (who
> invented the terminology of "universal" vs. "particular"). They made
> the observation that the individual named Socrates could be described
> by a predicate socratizes(x), which is true of exactly one x (although
> they didn't use the modern notation "socratizes(x)").
>
> Suggested distinction: A universal corresponds to a predicate that may
> be applied to a class of zero or more physical entities. An abstract
> particular corresponds to a predicate that applies to only one entity.
> As an example, the form "oblate spheroid" would characterize all the
> major planets and moons in the solar system, but a satellite map of the
> earth would uniquely characterize our planet (with a nearly zero chance
> that it would have an equally close resemblance to any other planet
> in the universe).
>
> My category "abstract" is very close to the category "information"
> that Adam Pease gave above, but I would take exception to the phrase
> "object-like (rather than stuff-like)". I would prefer to say that
> the digital information in a CD is more "object-like" and the analog
> information in a vinyl recording is more "stuff-like", and I would
> call them both "abstract". We could, for example, translate the bits
> on a CD to analog information for an FM radio broadcast and then
> record the reception on another CD. With current technology, we would
> probably lose some bits along the way, but with a sufficiently broad
> bandwidth on the FM broadcast, it would be possible to get a recording
> that was identical to the original.
>
> I also agree with Jon Awbrey's comments about signs. A sign type x
> is abstract, and a sign token y is physical. The sign type contains
> the information that is "encoded in" or "characterizes" the sign token.
> C. S. Peirce had a lot more to say about signs, which I tried to
> accommodate in my KR book. But I would be the first to admit that
> the 23 pages of Sections 2.2 and 2.3, in which I tried to summarize
> the philosophies of Peirce and Whitehead among others, cannot begin
> to do justice to the many volumes that they wrote on the subject.
>
> Bottom line: I believe that we can reconcile the various views
> that have been put forth in these discussions, but there is still
> more work to be done.
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Folks,
Here is a sample of reasoning for your contemplation,
from the Western tradition's first textbook of psychology,
concerned with the nature of "intelligent living ceratures"
and their ilk. If SUO can get this far in its analysis of
the same subject matter, I think that a milestone will have
been passed, and maybe a millstone, too, but I will let SUO
be the judge of that. Me, I plan to skip town for couple
of days, or maybe three.
Enjoy!
Jon
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[ Note: I use this as a source text in Subsection 1.3.9.3
| of my dissertation, headed up as "The Formative Tension".
]
Due to the importance of Aristotle's account
for every discussion that follows it, not to
mention for the many that follow it without
knowing it, and because the issues it raises
arise repeatedly throughout this work, I am
going to cite an extended extract from the
relevant text (Aristotle, On the Soul, II.i),
breaking up the argument into a number of
individual premisses, stages, and examples.
| a. The theories of the soul (psyche)
| handed down by our predecessors have
| been sufficiently discussed; now let
| us start afresh, as it were, and try to
| determine (diorisai) what the soul is,
| and what definition (logos) of it will
| be most comprehensive (koinotatos).
|
| b. We describe one class of existing things as
| substance (ousia), and this we subdivide into
| three: (1) matter (hyle), which in itself is
| not an individual thing, (2) shape (morphe) or
| form (eidos), in virtue of which individuality
| is directly attributed, and (3) the compound
| of the two.
|
| c. Matter is potentiality (dynamis), while form is
| realization or actuality (entelecheia), and the
| word actuality is used in two senses, illustrated
| by the possession of knowledge (episteme) and the
| exercise of it (theorein).
|
| d. Bodies (somata) seem to be pre-eminently
| substances, and most particularly those
| which are of natural origin (physica),
| for these are the sources (archai)
| from which the rest are derived.
|
| e. But of natural bodies some have life (zoe)
| and some have not; by life we mean the
| capacity for self-sustenance, growth,
| and decay.
|
| f. Every natural body (soma physikon), then,
| which possesses life must be substance, and
| substance of the compound type (synthete).
|
| g. But since it is a body of a definite kind, viz.,
| having life, the body (soma) cannot be soul (psyche),
| for the body is not something predicated of a subject,
| but rather is itself to be regarded as a subject,
| i.e., as matter.
|
| h. So the soul must be substance in the sense of being
| the form of a natural body, which potentially has life.
| And substance in this sense is actuality.
|
| i. The soul, then, is the actuality of the kind of body we
| have described. But actuality has two senses, analogous
| to the possession of knowledge and the exercise of it.
|
| j. Clearly (phaneron), actuality in our present sense
| is analogous to the possession of knowledge; for both
| sleep (hypnos) and waking (egregorsis) depend upon the
| presence of the soul, and waking is analogous to the
| exercise of knowledge, sleep to its possession (echein)
| but not its exercise (energein).
|
| k. Now in one and the same person the
| possession of knowledge comes first.
|
| l. The soul may therefore be defined as the first actuality
| of a natural body potentially possessing life; and such
| will be any body which possesses organs (organikon).
|
| m. The parts of plants are organs too, though very
| simple ones: e.g., the leaf protects the pericarp,
| and the pericarp protects the seed; the roots are
| analogous to the mouth, for both these absorb food.
|
| n. If then one is to find a definition which will apply
| to every soul, it will be "the first actuality of
| a natural body possessed of organs".
|
| o. So one need no more ask (zetein) whether body and
| soul are one than whether the wax (keros) and the
| impression (schema) it receives are one, or in
| general whether the matter of each thing is
| the same as that of which it is the matter;
| for admitting that the terms unity and being
| are used in many senses, the paramount (kyrios)
| sense is that of actuality.
|
| p. We have, then, given a general definition
| of what the soul is: it is substance in
| the sense of formula (logos), i.e., the
| essence of such-and-such a body.
|
| q. Suppose that an implement (organon), e.g. an axe,
| were a natural body; the substance of the axe
| would be that which makes it an axe, and this
| would be its soul; suppose this removed, and
| it would no longer be an axe, except equivocally.
| As it is, it remains an axe, because it is not of
| this kind of body that the soul is the essence or
| formula, but only of a certain kind of natural body
| which has in itself a principle of movement and rest.
|
| r. We must, however, investigate our definition
| in relation to the parts of the body.
|
| s. If the eye were a living creature, its soul would be
| its vision; for this is the substance in the sense
| of formula of the eye. But the eye is the matter
| of vision, and if vision fails there is no eye,
| except in an equivocal sense, as for instance
| a stone or painted eye.
|
| t. Now we must apply what we have found true of the part
| to the whole living body. For the same relation must
| hold good of the whole of sensation to the whole sentient
| body qua sentient as obtains between their respective parts.
|
| u. That which has the capacity to live is not the body
| which has lost its soul, but that which possesses
| its soul; so seed and fruit are potentially bodies
| of this kind.
|
| v. The waking state is actuality in the same sense as the
| cutting of the axe or the seeing of the eye, while the
| soul is actuality in the same sense as the faculty of
| the eye for seeing, or of the implement for doing its
| work.
| w. The body is that which exists potentially; but just as
| the pupil and the faculty of seeing make an eye, so in
| the other case the soul and body make a living creature.
|
| x. It is quite clear, then, that neither the soul nor
| certain parts of it, if it has parts, can be separated
| from the body; for in some cases the actuality belongs
| to the parts themselves. Not but what there is nothing
| to prevent some parts being separated, because they are
| not actualities of any body.
|
| y. It is also uncertain (adelon) whether the soul as an
| actuality bears the same relation to the body as the
| sailor (ploter) to the ship (ploion).
|
| z. This must suffice as an attempt to determine
| in rough outline the nature of the soul.
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