RE: SUO: Re: World's largest individual organism

[WBurkett@pdit.com]

Title: RE: SUO: Re: World's largest individual organism

Martin,

Thanks for your additional thoughts.   I think comparing our breakdowns is useful, too, so let me add a few more thoughts.

> To compare my classification with Bill's, his (1) seems close to my (B),

Agreed.  Except for the notion of "belief" I think they are the same. 

> his (2) to my (C),

Agreed - Sort of.  I think your (C) is a subset of the phenomena in (2).  The symbol "poetry" is not involved in the phenomena described by your (C).

> and his (3) with no direct correspondence, but treatable
> as (A)'s, (B)'s, and (C)'s. My (A) does not seem to be covered by Bill's
> set apart from (3) being a very limited special case of an (A).

Agree and disagree.  (3) could certainly be treated as an (A) - John noted the scenario of instrumenting a brain and observing the electrical behavior thereof.  However, (3) can ONLY be treated as a (B) (and, thus, participate in a (C)) within the mind of a single individual.  (This phenomena, incidentally, is called "unlimited semiosis".)  Because it is only accessible to the person experiencing it, I consider it outside the scope of the work we need to do - it doesn't matter to the SUO.

You are also correct that my breakdown doesn't explicitly cover your (A).  There are two reasons for this:

(i) The observable things that we typically don't interpret as signs (like your chair), that are not part of sign systems, don't figure into my equation of what "meaning" is - they are extraneous to it.  And I'm speaking at meta-level here, considering the sign system as the "object language" I am talking about (I think I got that right  - the subject language is used to talk about the object language??)  This is not to say that the notion/concept of a chair is outside or extraneous to the the SUO as a sign system.

 
(ii) I believe that your categories (A) and (B) as physical phenomena are not distinct categories.  Science divides the world into categories and phenomena based on observer-independent differentia and is also independent of location/space and time.  Since your (B) depends crucially on the observer, my conclusion is that it is not valid scientific categorization of external, real-world phenomena - it's entirely arbitrary.

Bill

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Schoening, James R CECOM DCSC4I
> [mailto:James.Schoening@mail1.monmouth.army.mil]
> Sent: Thursday, August 24, 2000 8:45 AM
> To: Standard-Upper-Ontology (E-mail)
> Subject: RE: SUO: Re: World's largest individual organism
>
>
>
> This message from Martin King martin_king@uk.ibm.com bounced
> so here it is
> again:
>
> On 22/8 Bill Burkett wrote:
>
> >What _is_ objectively "out there" in reality, and
> scientifically observable
> >and measurable, are three things (or five, depending how you count):
>
> >(1) physical symbols constructed according to socially constructed,
> >acknowledged, and accepted conventions;
> >(2) (a) perception of those symbols by sentient beings
> (i.e., us people),
> >and (b) it's converse, the production of symbols, and
> >(3) the electrochemical behavior in the brain that (a) are a
> response to
> >perceiving the symbols, or (b) are the motivation,
> intention, or purpose
> >that leads to the production of symbols.
>
> I would use a significantly different classification for what is
> objectively "out there":
> (A) Things I consider to exist on the basis of physical
> phenomena I observe
> and I believe are not intended to be symbols of anything else
> (e.g. the
> phenomena I can describe as "an image of blue cloth and grey
> plastic and
> pressure on my skin which I classify as the chair on which I
> am sitting").
> (B) Things I consider to exist on the basis of physical
> phenomena I observe
> and I believe are intended by myself or others as symbols for
> something
> else (e.g. the phenomena I can describe as "an image of
> shapes against a
> contrasting background which I recognize as the word CHAIR").
> (C) Perceived associations between a (B) and an (A) (e.g.
> belief that if I
> use the word CHAIR as a symbol for the thing I am sitting on,
> most English
> speaking people most of the time would recognize that symbol
> and interpret
> it in a way compatible with my intention).
>
> While these categories seem clear, useful, and scientifically
> observable
> and measurable to me, there are a host of hidden complexities, e.g.
> - I see a relatively direct relationship between the light patterns
> entering my eye and the blue and grey chair I am sitting on. The
> relationship is less direct when I watch a TV picture of a
> Russian naval
> officer sitting on a chair in a studio, but I believe the
> Russian's chair
> to be just as real for nearly all practical purposes.
> - almost any (B) can also be treated as an (A) for some
> purposes (e.g. a
> lexicographer investigating the etymology of the word CHAIR)
> - almost any (A) can also be treated as a (B) for some purposes (e.g.
> Hercule Poirot using a chair to represent the position of a
> person in a
> room in reconstructing the scene of a crime)
> - I can certainly create a (B) as a symbol for a (C), and
> that arguably
> means I am treating the (C) as an (A)
> - I could consider the electrochemical activity of the brain
> as an (A) on
> the basis of a coloured picture on paper or a television
> screen, but see it
> as evidence of recognition of another (A) or of a (B) or (C).
>
> To compare my classification with Bill's, his (1) seems close
> to my (B),
> his (2) to my (C), and his (3) with no direct correspondence,
> but treatable
> as (A)'s, (B)'s, and (C)'s. My (A) does not seem to be
> covered by Bill's
> set apart from (3) being a very limited special case of an (A).
>
> While I think my classification is more useful than Bill's in
> the context
> of an SUO, particularly because we need to consider (A)'s
> explicitly, even
> if we can only do so using (B)'s. I suggest that in an SUO (or an
> information system) a) we can only create and manipulate
> symbols, and b) we
> will need to create and manipulate symbols to represent an "out there"
> which includes (A)'s, (B)'s, and (C)'s.
>
> Yours, Martin
>
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